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 Abstract 
 
  
 
When compared to the other candidate states of Central and Eastern Europe, Romania 
emerged as a laggard of transition. Its integration into the European Union has been marked by 
much uncertainty and setbacks, as well as profound delays in fulfilling the EU's entry 
conditions.  As a difficult case, the dynamics of Romania's EU accession provide insight into 
the potential and limits of the EU's leverage, revealing how domestic factors can be decisive in 
constraining external influence.  Focusing on the reform trajectory in the fields of judiciary 
reforms, anti-corruption and external border policies between 1989 and 2007, this study 
assesses the interaction between EU politics and domestic politics and the role of domestic 
factors in slowing down internal reforms.  By identifying the domestic conditions under which 
conditionality is likely to more, or less, successful, this study contributes to the 
Europeanization and enlargement literature.  By assessing the preparations for accession in the 
field of Justice and Home Affairs, this research also fills a major lacuna in the existing 
specialised literature. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 
On 1 January 2007 Romania achieved the much-cherished goal of becoming a full 
member of the European Union (EU).  Back in 1989, when the images of violence in 
the streets of Timişoara and Bucharest and those of the summary execution of Nicolae 
Ceauşescu and his wife Elena were broadcast around the world, not many would have 
predicted this outcome.  Under Ceauşescu Romania experienced a brutal Stalinist-style 
dictatorship that drove out opposition and imposed tremendous economic and social 
costs upon its people1.  This meant that in 1989 Romania was the least equipped for a 
rapid and swift democratic and economic transition, lacking a grassroots opposition to 
the regime and facing a disastrous economic situation as a result of Ceauşescu’s 
megalomaniac policies of the 1980s (Almond, 1990; Calinescu and Tismăneanu, 1992; 
Gallagher, 1996; Linz and Stepan, 1996).  Yet, in less than two decades, the country has 
gone a long way in dismantling communist structures and in embracing democracy and 
market economy, and the goods shortages and political terror of the communist times 
are, for many, only a distant memory.  In the past few years the economy has been 
performing well, democratic institutions have been established, the standard of living 
and real wages have continued to increase and the life of many Romanians is, in many 
respects, now comparable to that of fellow citizens in Western Europe.  
 
                                                
1  For accounts of Romania under Ceauşescu see in particular Almond (1988), Hale (1971) and the 
edited volume by Nelson (1981).  
 2 
Romania’s remarkable transformation is only one side of the story.  The other side is a 
bumpy post-communist itinerary with often half-hearted commitments, insufficient 
political will and flawed implementation that affected the pace and quality of the reform 
process and slowed down the transition from authoritarian rule and central planning to 
democracy and a market economy. 
 
Like all the countries emerging from communist regimes, Romania faced serious 
difficulties in restructuring the socialist-era institutions and its economy in the early 
transition period.  Communism left behind a collapsed economy, inefficient state 
institutions, a highly politicised and unaccountable judiciary and public administration, 
corruption, political apathy and mistrust.  But if we compare the country’s reform 
trajectory throughout the 1990s with that of the other post-communist states in Central 
and Eastern Europe (CEE), Romania often stands out as the ‘laggard’ of transition.  A 
decade after the collapse of communism only Albania and the former Yugoslavia, with 
the exception of Slovenia, had made less progress in their transition to democracy and a 
market economy (Phinnemore and Light, 2001, p.1).  Similarly, if we look at Romania’s 
integration into the EU, the country lagged behind in its preparations for EU 
membership, even when compared to Bulgaria2.  Romania remained on track with the 
EU’s enlargement timetable – closing the negotiations at the end of 2004 and finally 
acceding in January 20073. 
                                                
2  See ‘Romania: Bucharest lagging behind Sofia in EU accession efforts’, RFERL, 19 December 2001;  
‘As EU status beckons, Bulgaria and Romania drift further apart’, European Voice, 5 February 2004; 
‘Behind the schedule to catch the EU train’, Euromoney, April 2004, pp. 110-17. 
3  The objective of Romania’s accession in 2007 was first recognised by the European Council in 
Brussels in October 2002 and later endorsed by the Thessaloniki European Council in June 2003, 
which also stated the EU’s objective of closing the accession negotiations in 2004.  See respectively 
European Council (2002a) and (2003).   
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However, its process of accession has been exceptionally problematic, marked by many 
uncertainties and setbacks as well as pronounced delays in fulfilling the EU’s entry 
conditions.  
 
Perhaps one of the clearest examples of Romania’s difficult journey to EU integration is 
the way the country closed the accession talks with the EU in December 2004.  
Romania was in fact the only candidate state from the 5th enlargement wave to finalise 
the negotiations under extremely tough and unprecedented conditions, forced by 
Brussels to sign up to an extensive list of commitments to remedy serious shortcomings 
in implementing Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) and Competition policies, amid the 
risk of seeing its accession date delayed by one year, with a decision by qualified 
majority in the Council.  A similar risk also existed for Bulgaria, although this was less 
of a credible threat because the so-called postponement clause in its Treaty of Accession 
was not linked to any specific commitments and was far more difficult to activate since 
it required the unanimous agreement of all the member states. 
 
Brussels’ tough negotiating stance towards Romania in part reflected an ‘enlargement 
fatigue’ inside the Union after the entry of ten new countries in 2004, with some 
member states showing less inclination towards an ‘all-inclusive’ EU enlargement 
policy and reluctance in welcoming applicants despite unclear commitments to 
democracy and sound economic governance.  However, as Bechev and Noutcheva 
(2008, p. 125) pointed out, the difference in treatment between Romania and Bulgaria at 
the closure of the accession talks, and the unprecedented entry conditions imposed on 
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Bucharest, also showed a long existing concern among EU policy-makers with 
Romania’s membership credentials. 
 
The fact that Romania found itself on the verge of EU membership with considerable 
delays in satisfying its accession requirements raises an interesting research puzzle for 
the study of the EU's leverage.  It has generally been assumed by European integration 
scholars that the EU policy of enlargement has been a major catalyst for change in post-
communist countries of CEE.  In the last decade several influential studies on 
Europeanization and EU conditionality have gone to great length to show how the 
credible offer of membership, coupled with the severity of the accession process, gave 
the EU an unprecedented leverage on domestic policy-making in the candidates states of 
CEE (see, for example, Grabbe 2006; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005; 
Steunenberg and Dimitrova, 2007; Vachudova, 2005).  Equally, a number of scholars 
working on democratisation and economic transition in CEE have claimed that the EU 
actively promoted in the region democratic governance and market-oriented reforms as 
well as the emergence of democratic institutions (see for example, Linz and Stepan, 
1996; Pridham and Vanhanen, 1994; Pridham, et al., 1997; Whitehead 1996).  
 
The course and speed of the reforms in CEE after 1989, and their relative success, have 
much supported these arguments especially when their democratic and economic 
performance was compared to the limited progress made by other post-communist states 
that lacked concrete prospects of integration into western institutions (see, Ekiert et al., 
2007; Schimmefennig, 2007; Way and Levitsky, 2007). 
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Yet, even among the CEE candidates there has been a considerable variation in the 
quality of efforts made to satisfy the EU's membership conditions, suggesting that the 
leverage of the EU might have worked in different ways and with very different effects. 
This has highlighted the need for more detailed empirical assessments of the EU's 
influence as its "transformative power", as Grabbe (2006) termed it, might not been as 
great as commonly assumed.  The same author warned about the generalised tendency 
in much of the literature to over-estimate the Europeanization effect of EU 
conditionality on the CEE candidates arguing that “a systematic examination of the 
limits of the EU’s impact as well as its extent is essential because the effects may not 
have been as great as commonly supposed” (Grabbe, 2006, pp. 41-42).  In a similar 
tone, Schimmefennig and Sedelmeier (2005, p.2) pointed out how “the process of 
Europeanization in the CEECs and its outcome have rarely been subjected to a 
systematic, theory-oriented and comparative analysis”.  Moreover, it has also 
increasingly become obvious that the dynamics of domestic politics in a candidate state, 
and the specificity of its implementing conditions, influence the scope of the EU's 
leverage, affecting institutional and policy choices and subsequently institutional and 
policy outcomes.  Thus, while traditional strands of the EU integration and 
conditionality literatures devoted only marginal attention to domestic political contexts, 
more systematic efforts are now emerging to incorporate domestic factors into 
theoretical frameworks and empirical analyses examining the conditions for the success 
or failure of the EU’s leverage (see Hughes et al., 2004; Jacoby, 2004; O’Dwyer, 2006a; 
Pridham, 2005; Vachudova, 2008). 
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Against this background, the complexity of Romania’s integration into the EU makes it 
an interesting case study to assess the scope and impact of the EU’s accession 
conditionality on the country’s reform trajectory, as the dynamic of its accession might 
reveal some of the potentials, as well as the limits of the EU’s leverage. Indeed, while 
Romania’s remarkable transformation make it reasonable to assume that the EU’s 
demanding entry conditions heavily influenced domestic-policy making, its laggard 
status in the process of EU integration also suggests that factors emanating from the 
domestic environment might have played an important role in constraining the EU’s 
influence.   
 
On the basis of these considerations, this thesis advances and explores two hypotheses.  
The first hypothesis is that the EU exerted a powerful leverage on the country’s post-
communist reform trajectory.  The credible prospect of membership, coupled with the 
extensive accession conditions laid down by the EU, influenced domestic policy-
making and the pace of domestic reforms.  Secondly, this study posits that the overall 
impact of the EU was however not as great as one might expect because domestic 
factors mitigated the scope of its influence and constrained reform potentials.  In order 
to test empirically these hypotheses, this thesis will examine the impact of the EU’s 
accession conditionality on JHA policies in Romania, considering policy and 
institutional developments from the collapse of the communist regime in 1989 to the 
country’s formal accession to the EU on 1 January 2007 (see section 1.4 below for a 
justification of the case studies).  
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The rest of this introduction is organised in the following way. The first section 
identifies the thesis objectives and the central research questions while section two 
outlines the core of the argument put forward by this research. Section three then 
sketches the contribution of this thesis to academic research on EU conditionality and 
Europeanization as well as to the specialised literatures on Romania’s post-communist 
transition and Justice and Home Affairs.  Section four offers a justification for the case 
studies while the last part outlines the methodology and structure of the dissertation.  
 
1.1 Thesis objectives and central research questions  
 
This thesis assesses the impact of the EU on public policies in Romania up to the 
moment of the country’s formal accession on 1 January 2007.  It investigates in detail 
how the EU used its leverage to stimulate reforms, assesses why at times it was 
effective while at others it was not, and evaluates the extent to which EU-driven reforms 
have become sustainable and irreversible now that Romania has secured full EU 
membership.  In exploring the domestic impact of the EU this research also looks at 
how domestic factors intervened in the conditionality-compliance dynamic, affecting 
the pace and quality of reforms and mitigating the scope of the EU’s leverage.  
 
The central objective of this research is to provide a detailed, empirically rooted study 
of the impact of the EU’s membership conditionality on domestic policies and 
institutional structures in Romania.  By tracing the link between the EU’s accession 
conditionality and the reforms introduced in Romania, and by examining how the 
domestic environment may affect compliance, this thesis thus aims to advance 
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knowledge on the potentials and limits of the EU’s leverage on aspiring and would-be 
members and provide insights into the domestic conditions for its success.  This 
research objective will be pursued through a detailed study of Romania’s preparations 
for membership in the field of JHA, one of the most complex and politically sensitive 
policy-making fields at EU level, and one area where Romania lagged behind the most. 
Focusing in particular on the reform trajectory in the field of justice, fight against 
corruption and external border policies, this research seeks to answer two sets of 
questions:  
 
1. What impact did the EU’s accession requirements have on JHA policies in 
Romania, and what is the outcome of such influence? Is there evidence that 
EU conditionality was conducive to promoting effective and long-lasting 
domestic changes? 
 
2. Was the EU potentially powerful leverage constrained by factors emanating 
from the domestic context?  
 
In order to answer the above research questions, this study builds upon the literatures on 
EU conditionality and Europeanization, as I discuss in more detail in the next chapter. 
Unlike theories and academic accounts explaining how and why enlargement 
happened4, these provide interesting insights into the mechanisms of EU influence on 
                                                
4  For competing explanations on EU enlargement see in particular Fierke and Wiener (1999); 
Moravcsik and Vachudova (2003); Schimmelfennig (2001) and (2003); Sjursen (2002) and Nugent 
(2004) for a review.  For discussions on NATO enlargement see for example, Bebler (1999); 
Carpenter and Conry (1998); Crawford (2000); Goldgeier (1999) and Rauchhaus (2000). 
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the domestic structures in aspiring members as well as useful conceptual tools for 
unpacking some of the conditions for its success (see, in particular, Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier, 2005; Grabbe, 2006; Jacoby, 2004; Kelley, 2004a; Vachudova, 2005).  
Since the EU accession preparations happened in parallel with a comprehensive post-
communist reform process, it is increasingly recognised by Europeanization scholars 
that the specificity and challenges of post-communist transition must also be taken into 
account when studying the impact of the EU.  Grabbe (2006, p. 97) for example argued 
that the political context and the institutional legacies inherited from communism 
determined how the EU influence worked and affected the outcome of Europeanization. 
Therefore, this research also draws on the transition literature, particularly research 
carried out on Romania, that provides insights and background material on domestic 
political dynamics in the country. 
 
Although this research is chiefly concerned with assessing the role and impact of the 
EU, it is important to recall that other international organizations, such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) and the Council of Europe also had much leverage on Romania’s 
post-communist politics and the need to satisfy the requirements set by these institutions 
also guided and stimulated domestic changes (Deletant, 2001, p.35; Freyberg-Inan, 
2002; Gallagher, 2004; Pop, 2002).  Moreover, in several policy areas, the reform 
agenda of these institutions overlapped and complemented EU conditionality.  For 
example, the IMF played a prominent role with regards to macro-economic policies and 
structural economic reforms. 
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NATO’s accession requirements stimulated the modernisation of the military services 
and the reform of the security services, while the Council of Europe’s legal standards in 
the areas of human rights, rule of law and democratic institutions have been the 
reference points for the EU’s assessment of the country’s democratic credentials.  
Several agencies of the United Nations (UN), the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE), various non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as well 
as the EU’s member states also intervened, in different ways, in support of Romania’s 
transition although their role is often not fully acknowledged in literature.  While space 
constraints limit my ability to assess in any detail how and when this further external 
pressure stimulated domestic changes, the role of some of these institutions and 
international organizations will be acknowledged throughout this thesis. 
 
1.2 Outline of the thesis argument 
 
Based on a detailed analysis of EU conditionality and the reform trajectory in the three 
case-studies under consideration, this thesis puts forward the following argument.  In 
relation to the first research question - i.e. the impact of the EU's accession requirements 
on JHA policies - this research argues that the EU was instrumental in guiding, 
stimulating and at times provoking domestic changes.  The prospect of membership, 
and the risk of exclusion from the EU’s enlargement process, proved to be a powerful 
incentive for reforming state structures, policies and institutions.  Moreover, by using its 
leverage mechanisms strategically, the EU set the pace and timing of domestic reforms 
and on several occasions it proved successful in compelling the often-recalcitrant 
political class to live up to its commitments.  
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In addition, EU accession conditionality affected to a significant degree the substance of 
domestic policies and institutional choices introduced to fulfil the accession 
requirements, largely due to the lack of pre-existing JHA policy and institutional 
arrangements prior to the opening of the accession negotiations. 
 
While acknowledging that the EU has been a major source and catalyst for reforms, this 
study nevertheless highlights the limited effects of EU conditionality on Romania.  An 
assessment of the quality of the measures put in place to satisfy the EU’s requirements 
shows that Brussels failed to entice full compliance with its accession demands prior to 
Romania’s formal accession in 2007.   Almost two decades after the fall of the 
Ceauşescu regime, the Romanian justice system remains a discredited and dysfunctional 
institution and has yet to transform itself into a credible and efficient body.  Corruption 
is still regarded as a widespread and endemic phenomenon despite Romania now 
possessing one of the most comprehensive anti-corruption legal frameworks in Europe.  
With regards to Romania’s compliance record in the field of external border controls, 
the legal framework might well be in place but its implementation remains uneven, 
flawed by weak administrative structures and by poorly established practices and 
methods. 
 
The limited reforms in Romania can be explained by the fact that the impetus for 
reforms has come mostly from outside rather than from within Romania, while 
successive post-communist governments rhetorically committed to extensive state 
reforms, successfully pleasing EU officials with compliance on-paper without 
necessarily accepting the terms for integration. 
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As the following chapters will highlight, reforms in critical areas - such as those 
regulating the powers and functions of state institutions and the fight against corruption 
- have been introduced primarily in response to mounting external pressure, lacking 
however the necessary political consensus to ensure their long-term sustainability.  As a 
result, at the time of writing many of the EU-driven reforms remain fragile and concerns 
remain over their long-term sustainability.  
 
With regards to the second research question – i.e. whether the EU’s leverage was 
constrained by factors emanating from the domestic environment – the case studies 
show that domestic factors mitigated the potentially powerful scope of the EU's 
influence and largely help explain Romania's laggard status in the process of EU 
integration.  In particular, the reform trajectory and implementation record in the field 
of justice, anti-corruption and external border policies reveals that insufficient political 
will, half-hearted commitments and the desire to protect vested interests by powerful 
veto players have affected the pace and quality of domestic reforms leaving Romania 
struggling to bring its policies, institutions and practices in line with the EU’s 
membership requirements.  When EU-compatible rules were finally introduced, 
implementation did not always follow, flawed by the weakness of the country’s 
administrative and judicial capacity that further undermined the efficacy of the legal, 
institutional and administrative measures put in place to meet the EU’s demands. 
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1.3 Contributions of the Thesis 
 
As previously pointed out, this thesis aims at advancing knowledge and insight 
regarding the potentials, as well as the limits, of the EU’s leverage on aspiring and 
would-be members. It does so by exploring in details the effect of EU conditionality on 
Romania’s reform trajectory in the field of JHA.  In this respect this research draws 
upon and contributes to different academic literatures.  First, this research contributes to 
the debates on external influence on post-communist transition, especially to the 
growing research on Europeanization and EU conditionality.  
 
In the last fifteen years, much has been written on the impact of the EU on the countries 
of CEE and the mechanisms and conditions for the success of the EU’s leverage have 
been topics of a lively academic debate –see chapter 2 for a comprehensive review of 
the literature. The comparative work carried out in recent years has provided evidence 
of the EU’s influence on post-communist politics.   Several theoretical studies have also 
offered the tools for a much more sophisticated understanding of when, how and why 
the EU stimulated, shaped and at times provoked domestic changes in the region 
(Haughton 2007, p.233).   However, academic research has so far rarely focused in 
measuring the impact of the EU in terms of specific policy and institutional changes, 
and those who embarked on this task have done so mostly at the comparative level  (see, 
for example, Grabbe, 2006; Hughes et al. 2004; Jacoby 2004, and the edited volume by 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005).  
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By tracing the link between EU conditionality and domestic reforms in three policy 
areas – judiciary reforms, anti-corruption and external border policies – and in a single 
case study, Romania, this research thus contributes to the Europeanization and 
conditionality literatures, providing noteworthy empirical evidence on the actual impact 
of the EU.  Moreover, by looking closely at how the domestic environment affects 
compliance this study also enhances academic knowledge on the domestic conditions 
under which conditionality is likely to be more or less effective.  
 
By studying Romania's accession process in the field of JHA this thesis also contributes 
to two other bodies of literature: the literature on Romania's post-communist transition 
and the specialised literature on JHA.  Many aspects of Romania’s communist 
experience and post-communist politics have received attention and a number of recent 
comprehensive studies have much enriched the academic literature (see, for example, 
Gallagher, 2005; Pop, 2006; Siani-Davies, 2005; Tismăneanu, 2003).  However, 
extensive research on Romania’s integration to the EU remains scarce, and with a few 
exceptions (see, in particular, Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008; Phinnemore, 
2006a), studies on EU-Romania relations are generally confined to articles in academic 
journals or chapters in edited books (see, for example, Pop, 2002; Pridham, 2006 and 
2007; Ram, 2001 and 2003).  By assessing the role of the EU on Romania's reform 
trajectory, this research thus contributes to academic knowledge in this field. 
 
This thesis also contributes to the literature on JHA.  As one of the most dynamic EU 
policy-making areas, the literature concerning this subject has grown rapidly in recent 
years.   
 15 
A great bulk of the JHA literature has focused on policy developments at EU level, 
especially on external border policies (see, for example, Amato and Batt, 1999; 
Anderson and Bort, 2001; Apap and Carrera, 2003; Grabbe, 2000 and 2002; 
Groenendijk et al., 2003; Townsend, 2003) and the emergence of asylum and 
immigration regimes at EU level (Anagnost, 2000; Becker et al., 1999; Geddes, 2000; 
Lavenex, 1999 and 2001; Monar, 1999).  Some research has also been carried out on 
police and judicial cooperation among the EU member states (Anderson and Apap, 
2002a and 2002b; Cullen et al., 1996; Guild and Geyer, 2008; Micklitz, 2005).  
However, the study of judiciary reforms and the fight against corruption – two policy 
areas dealt with by this research - has surprisingly received little academic attention.  
With regards to the JHA literature in the context of the enlargement, a number of 
interesting studies have been published in recent years on the experience of accession of 
the candidate states.  But these focused mostly on the Visegrad countries, especially 
Poland (see for example, Piorko and Wolczuk, 2001; Piorko and Sie Dhian Ho, 2003; 
Wolczuk, 2002 and the edited volume by Henderson, 2005), while the experience of 
accession of Romania has been largely neglected, despite the security implications 
arising from its membership to the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ).  
Therefore, by exploring Romania’s experience of accession in these policy areas this 
research fills a major lacuna in the existing JHA literature. 
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1.4 Case Selection 
 
This research is concerned with the impact of the EU on domestic policies and 
institutional structures in Romania.  To achieve the research objectives outlined earlier 
in this introduction, this thesis looks in detail at the process of accession of Romania in 
the field of JHA.  I focus on this policy field for several reasons.  Firstly, it is clearly a 
very important area covering a wide range of issues such as crime, terrorism, 
immigration and asylum policies, external border controls, justice and the fight against 
corruption.  These issues affect the everyday life of ordinary citizens and therefore are 
highly sensitive areas for policy makers, the media and electorates. 
 
Secondly, JHA has been high on the EU’s political agenda during the accession 
negotiations with the CEE candidates.  It was the opening of the eastern bloc and the 
application for EU membership of several eastern European countries that spurred much 
dynamism in JHA activities since the early 1990s (Friis and Jarosz, 2000; Occhipinti, 
2004).  Fear of uncontrolled migration and organised crime from the countries of CEE 
and neighbouring states broaden the consensus for EU-wide approaches, and led to the 
progressive development of converging visa, immigration and asylum policies after the 
Amsterdam Treaty came into force in 1999. In the context of the accession negotiations 
with the CEE candidates, this fear translated into an enormous pressure and extensive 
monitoring of the candidates’ progress.  Moreover the acquis was set as non-negotiable 
and despite the flexibility accorded to some member states - most notably the UK, 
Ireland and Denmark – no opt outs or derogations were offered. 
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Thirdly, JHA has been a highly debated and politically sensitive issue for domestic 
politicians in many of the CEE candidates, including Romania.  These are areas that 
touch the nerve of state sovereignty, and the EU’s negotiating position caused much 
frustration domestically because it implied full compliance with the EU’s requirements, 
without benefiting from full membership to the AFSJ for many years after accession, 
most notably in the areas of labour migration and full participation into the Schengen 
area.  Overall, JHA is interesting because it helps shed light on the complexity of the 
process of EU accession and the daunting challenges faced by an aspiring member in 
complying with the EU’s entry conditions. As Monar (2000) noted, some of these 
challenges are intrinsically linked to the nature of the EU’s demands and the volume of 
the accession acquis, its political sensitivity and the immense pressure deriving from the 
EU while others are purely of an internal nature, linked mostly to the specific domestic 
implementing conditions in post-communist states.  
 
Romania’s experience of accession in the field of JHA is particularly important because 
it mirrors in a number of ways the complexity of its negotiations for EU membership.  
Indeed, JHA is one area where Romania has been lagging behind the most. Persistent 
delays were registered by the European Commission in its annual Reports, and at the 
closure of the accession talks in 2004 Romania had to sign up to a list of highly detailed 
commitments to address serious shortcomings in implementing JHA policies, especially 
with regards to judiciary reforms, the fight against corruption and compliance with the 
EU’s external border policies.  I do not claim that the dynamic of accession in the field 
of JHA and the difficulties that emerged hold true for all other policies. 
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Indeed, in some areas of the acquis, compliance was smooth and unproblematic.  But 
JHA presents a number of features which helps to shed light on the interaction between 
EU politics and domestic politics, providing a good test case for assessing the potential 
and limits of the EU’s leverage on the one hand and the impact of domestic factors in 
slowing down the preparations for membership on the other.  With regards to the scope 
of the EU's leverage, JHA is one area where the EU was potentially in a very powerful 
position to shape domestic policy and institutional choices, largely due to the lack of 
pre-existing EU-compatible legal and regulatory frameworks in place prior to the 
opening of the negotiations.  At the same time this is one area where the EU had 
considerable room for manoeuvre in certifying compliance (or not) given the broad 
scope and evolving nature of its demands during the negotiations.  At domestic level, 
this is one area where resistance to change was mostly likely to be expected, given the 
fact that compliance with the JHA acquis has involved radical changes to politically 
sensitive policy areas. 
 
As previously mentioned, to investigate Romania's compliance record this research 
presents three cases under the JHA policy umbrella: the reform of the justice system, the 
fight against corruption and the EU’s external border policies within the framework of 
the Schengen acquis.  Starting from the analysis of the initial conditions at the moment 
of the regime change in 1989, this study traces the reform trajectory throughout the pre-
accession and accession period in each policy area, assessing the impact of EU 
conditionality on domestic reforms and the role played by the domestic environment in 
slowing down the preparations for accession.   
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These case-studies have been selected not only for their political relevance but also 
because they have emerged as the most problematic ones during the accession 
negotiations. All three policy areas were high on the EU’s political agenda during the 
negotiations, and these were subject to the postponement clause at the conclusion of the 
accession talks due to serious shortcomings registered both at legal and implementation 
level.  Moreover these are areas where Romania continues to be monitored in the post-
accession period.  With regards to judiciary reforms and the fight against corruption, a 
special post-accession monitoring mechanism has been created by the Commission in 
late 2006 to verify the correct implementation of domestic reforms after accession.  As 
for Romania’s compliance with the EU’s external border policies, implementation of 
the acquis is monitored under the existing Schengen evaluation process. 
 
Despite these similarities, the case-studies are very diverse when it comes to the 
substance of the EU’s accession demands.  Issues related to the functioning of the 
justice system fall under the EU’s democratic conditionality and there is virtually no EU 
acquis in this field.  Anti-corruption and external border policies were part of the 
negotiating Chapter 24.  However, while the EU’s anti-corruption framework is 
primarily made up of non-binding recommendations, border policies are perhaps the 
most regulated domain in the field of JHA.  Thus, this selection of case-studies allows 
us to test empirically whether the degree of clarity of the EU’s demands and the 
presence (or not) of policy and institutional templates affects the ability of the EU to 
shape domestic policy and institutional choices, as some scholars would predict (see, for 
example, Grabbe, 2006; Jacoby, 2004; Hughes et al., 2004; Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier, 2004).  
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I exclude other important policy areas such as asylum and immigration policies mainly 
because these were largely uncontested at domestic level.  I touch upon third-pillar 
matters, mostly judicial and law enforcement cooperation, but I do not analyse these in 
any detail primarily because the EU framework is still in flux and during the 
negotiations, these were largely considered as secondary matters.  JHA also covers other 
important areas, such as the fight against terrorism, drugs and arms trafficking, goods 
smuggling and trafficking in human beings, but space constraints limit my ability to test 
a wider set of policy areas. 
 
 
1.5 Methodology and Structure of the Dissertation 
 
The argument of the dissertation will unfold in the following way. Chapter 2 offers an 
overview of the relevant literature and introduces the analytical framework that shapes 
the analysis of the empirical material. Building in particular on the existing literatures 
on EU conditionality, Europeanization and Romania's post-communist transition, it 
conceptualises the mechanisms of the EU's leverage and the conditions for its success, 
and identities how domestic factors can favour, or hinder the scope of its leverage. 
Chapter 3 documents the evolution of EU-Romania relations from the collapse of the 
communist regime in 1989 to Romania’s formal accession to the EU in January 2007, 
highlighting developments at domestic level and in the framing of EU conditionality 
throughout the transition period. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 present the three case studies, 
documenting empirically the impact of EU conditionality on the reform trajectory in the 
field of justice reforms, anti-corruption and external border policies. 
 21 
In particular, the case-studies will specify how and when the EU’s leverage was 
instrumental in pushing for policy and institutional changes and will assess how 
domestic factors affected the pace and quality of internal reforms.  It will be shown how 
the EU's accession conditionality played a critical role in shaping the country's reform 
trajectory.  However, the lack of political will, the weakness of the country’s 
administrative capacity, widespread corruption and the desire to protect vested interests 
acted as a ‘break’ to the introduction of EU-compatible reforms, and undermined the 
correct implementation of EU rules at national level.  The conclusion in Chapter 7 will 
return to the research-questions and hypotheses, summarising the key findings of this 
research.  At the light of these findings the conclusion will also reflect upon the 
contribution of this study to academic knowledge and will identify areas for future 
research.  The chapter will also present the most recent developments in EU-Romania 
relations, analysing the mechanisms and scope of the EU’s leverage in the post-
accession period.  The thesis will conclude with an assessment of Romania’s accession 
process as seen through the lens of the EU’s enlargement policy, pointing to the lessons 
learned by the EU from its enlargement to Romania along with the likely implications 
for current and future candidates.   
 
The analysis relies on two sets of evidence.  The first set is the information available 
through official documents spelling out EU conditionality and documenting the reform 
trajectory of Romania in the cases under consideration.  This includes the EU’s 
documentary record on the enlargement process, such as the European Council’s 
conclusions and the European Commission’s Regular Reports, as well as Romania’s 
own documentation, including domestic legislation, action plans and strategies 
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developed during the negotiating phases.  Official documentation is very useful when it 
comes to understanding the content of the accession requirements set by the EU as well 
as the domestic policy and institutional choices made in response to the EU’s demands.  
However, when it comes to evaluating compliance, the European Commission’s 
assessments do not always provide a reliable source of information, given the general 
and often highly politicised nature of the evaluations (Grabbe, 2006, p. 64).  For this 
reason, this research also makes use of several reports and surveys elaborated by the 
World Bank, the Council of Europe and other NGOs.  Not only do these provide 
valuable analytical material, especially in assessing Romania’s implementation record, 
but they also allow to cross-check the information available in the official 
documentation.   
 
Although not directly acknowledged, this research has also benefited much from the 
information I obtained during the period of internship carried out between September 
2005 and May 2006 in the Cabinet of EU Commissioner Franco Frattini, who at the 
time was responsible for the AFSJ.  During this period, I was exposed to EU 
conditionality in the making, and this allowed me to gather important insights on 
political processes at EU level in the concluding phases of Romania’s process of 
accession. 
 
The second set of evidence is the information obtained through over sixty semi-
structured interviews with both EU and Romanian officials.  These were conducted 
primarily in Brussels and Bucharest between March and December 2006. 
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This methodology was chosen because it allows, as Lilleker (2003, p.208) pointed out, 
‘to learn more about the inner workings of the political process, the machinations 
between influential actors and how a sequence of events was viewed and responded to 
within the political machine’.  The interviews were in fact designed to shed light on the 
policy interests, priorities and strategies of the various actors involved in process of 
accession of Romania to the EU and to help understand the framing of EU 
conditionality, the interaction between European and domestic politics as well as the 
key challenges experienced by Romania in preparing for membership.  On the EU side, 
I have interviewed European Commission’s officials at cabinet level and in Directorate-
General (DG) Enlargement, DG External Relation, DG Justice, Freedom and Security 
(JLS), member states’ diplomats, experts engaged in twinning projects in Romania, as 
well as officials from the European Commission’s delegation in Bucharest.  On the 
Romanian side, I have interviewed representatives of the diplomatic mission to the EU, 
Members of Parliament, government Ministers from different administrations, as well 
senior and middle-weight civil servants in the Romanian Ministry of Justice, Ministry of 
European Integration, Ministry of Interior and Administration (MIA) and Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. 
 
To crosscheck information, I have also interviewed members of the judiciary and the 
anti-corruption prosecution services as well as representatives of law-enforcement 
agencies, including officials from the Romanian Border Police Inspectorate.  The 
objective of these interviews was two-fold: to gather insight knowledge on the one hand 
and shed light on policy priorities of key actors and potential veto players on the other, 
thus providing valuable data on the level of political consensus on the direction of EU-
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driven reforms, hence the likelihood of their sustainability and correct implementation 
after accession.  To achieve further data triangulation, I have also consulted and 
exchanged views with several policy analysts and academics observing Romania’s 
transition process and accession to the EU as well as civil-society activists and 
journalists. 
 
All interviews were semi-structured and open to allow interviewees to elaborate on their 
experiences and explanations for outcomes.   Most of these were tape-recorded and 
subsequently transcribed.  However, since the fieldwork was carried out during the final 
stages of Romania’s accession (October 2005 – December 2006) some interviewees 
preferred to speak “off-the-record”.  This was especially the case of EU officials and 
member states’ diplomats.  Thus, when quoted, I have often only indicated their 
position or institutional affiliation at the time of the interview (See appendix A for a 
complete list of interviewees). 
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Chapter 2 
EU Conditionality and Domestic Reforms 
 
 
As pointed out in the introductory chapter, this thesis seeks to provide a detailed 
assessment of the impact of the EU's membership conditionality on domestic policies 
and institutional structures in Romania, particularly in the field of JHA.  To 
conceptualise the potential scope of EU influence it is necessary to identify the 
mechanisms through which the EU exerts its leverage on aspiring and would-be 
members as well as the key conditions for its success. The theoretical and empirical 
findings of the Europeanization literature, especially the research carried out on the 
candidate states of CEE, offer the analytical tools that will be applied to this research.   
 
Against this background, this chapter presents the analytical framework of this study.  
The first section offers an overview of the Europeanization and EU conditionality 
literatures, highlighting the various mechanisms through which the EU can influence 
state behaviour and domestic policy choices.  Focusing in particular on conditionality as 
a mechanism of Europeanization, the second section of this chapter then conceptualises 
the interaction between EU politics and domestic politics, pointing out how the EU 
exerts its influence on aspiring and would-be members and, how (and why) domestic 
political elites respond to external pressure.  Section three moves on to consider the 
conditions for the success of the EU's leverage. 
 26 
Building on the theoretical and empirical findings of the Europeanization and EU 
conditionality literatures this section identifies a set of key variables both at domestic 
and EU levels that can enhance or constrain the scope of the EU’s leverage.  These are 
(1) The credibility of conditionality; (2) The clarity and determinacy of EU conditions; 
and (3) The adaptation costs and policy priorities of key veto players. The empirical 
investigation in chapters 4, 5 and 6 will then look at the interaction between these 
variables to examine in the detail how conditionality worked in the three cases under 
examination. The empirical chapters will also assess how factors emanating from the 
domestic environment affected compliance.  
 
2.1 The domestic impact of the EU: review of the literature 
 
In the last decade, the study of the impact of the process of EU integration on domestic 
policies and institutional settings has emerged as one of most dynamic fields of 
academic enquiry, and the concept of Europeanization has increasingly been employed 
by European Integration scholars to assess the mechanisms and scope of this impact.  
 
In simplistic terms Europeanization refers to the domestic impact of the EU, and the 
analytical focus of much of the Europeanization literature has been that of comparing 
the outcomes of EU influence across national and policy contexts in the member states 
– i.e. assess whether the process of EU integration has led to a convergence or 
divergence between decision-making structures, administrative systems, policies and 
processes. 
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However, the concept of Europeanization is contested and several competing definitions 
and analytical frameworks have so far been put forward.  Scholars have used the term to 
refer to the emergence of distinctive political institutions and structures of governance 
at European level (Risse et al., 2001, p.3) as well as to explain how these institutions 
affect national politics. Goetz and Hix (2000, p.27), for example, defined 
Europeanization as “a process of change in national institutional and policy practices 
that can be attributed to European Integration”.  In another important study 
Europeanization was defined as “the process of influence deriving from European 
decisions and impacting member states’ policies and political and administrative 
structures” (Héritier et al., 2001, p.3).  Drawing on an earlier insight by Ladrech (1994) 
Claudio Radaelli took the concept even further, associating Europeanization with a 
progressive change in the logic of political behaviour.  According to his definition 
Europeanization involves 
 
Processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalisation of formal and 
informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and 
shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy 
process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and sub-national) 
discourse, political structures and public policies (Radaelli, 2004, p.3).  
 
The large number of definitions in the literature is evidence of a vibrant debate in this 
field of research, and despite some scholars warning about the risk of “conceptual 
stretching” (Radaelli, 2000), the study of Europeanization has offered highly 
sophisticated theoretical accounts conceptualising the interaction between domestic and 
European levels of governance (see, for instance, Börzel and Risse, 2000; Featherstone 
and Radaelli, 2003; Héritier et al., 2001).   
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At an empirical level, the extensive research carried out in recent years has also helped 
clarify some of the possible outcomes of EU influence as well as identify the key factors 
that can positively or negatively affect the timing and correctness of implementation of 
European legislation.  Studies carried out on policy convergence in EU15 member states 
have highlighted, in particular, the degree of compatibility (or incompatibility) between 
European rules and domestic institutional, policy and regulatory traditions (Börzel, 
1999; Duina, 1997; Duina and Blithe, 1999; Giuliani, 2003; Knill and Lenschow, 1998 
and 2002), the policy priorities of key veto players (Fischer et al., 2002; Gwiazda, 2007; 
Haverland, 2000; Héritier et al., 2001) as well as the bureaucratic capacity and the 
financial and human resources available in a particular institutional setting (see Hille 
and Knill, 2006; Knill, 2001; Knill and Lenschow, 2001).   
 
The classic strand of the Europeanization literature focuses on the domestic 
implementation of EU policies in the existing member states.  However, in recent years 
this growing academic agenda has evolved and expanded to non-EU countries, such as 
Switzerland and Norway (Fischer et al., 2002; Lægreid et al, 2004; Mach et al., 2003) as 
well as the aspiring and would-be members in Central Europe and the Western Balkans. 
In the context of the EU enlargement, in particular, an increasing number of scholars 
have adopted the concept of Europeanization as a conceptual tool to examine the 
domestic changes taking place in the candidate countries in response to the promise of 
EU membership.  Here the concept of Europeanization has been applied to study 
territorial organisations in the candidate states (Brusis, 2004 and 2005; Hughes et al., 
2004) as well as public administrations (Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2004) and 
decision-making structures (Lippert et al., 2001). 
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Scholars have also looked at the impact of the EU on public policies (Andonova, 2003; 
Dimitrova, 2002; Grabbe, 2006; Epstein, 2006; Sissenich, 2007), on governance (Goetz, 
2001; Grabbe, 2001), on political competition (Grzymała-Busse and Innes, 2003), as 
well as on party politics and the development of party systems in transition countries 
(Lewis and Mansfeldová, 2006; Pridham, 2001).   
 
The study of Europeanization in the context of the EU’s enlargement process to CEE 
fits in a wider academic debate among scholars of International Relations (IR) and 
comparative politics on the role and potential influence of trans-national actors and 
international institutions on regime change in post-communist Europe5.  One of the 
main merits of the Europeanization literature is that it has provided the missing link 
between these theories and scholarly research on democratisation and regime change.  
Indeed, by taking into account the core features of the relations between the EU and the 
CEE candidates -namely conditionality and power asymmetry - and the specificity of 
post-communist countries, research on Europeanization in CEE has helped to 
conceptualise in a more accurate way the mechanisms and scope of the EU’s influence 
on post-communist transition. 
 
With regards to the mechanisms of the EU’s leverage, the literature on Europeanization 
has identified several potential routes through which the EU shapes, directly or 
indirectly, state behaviour and domestic policy and institutional choices. 
                                                
5  The literature on external influence on post-communist transition is vast. Among the most significant 
studies it is worth mentioning in particular Checkel, 2007; Grabbe, 1999, 2006; Dimitrova, 2004; 
Dimitrova and Pridham, 2004; Ekiert and Hanson, 2003; Kelley, 2004; Linden, 2002; Pevehouse, 
2002; Rupnik, 2000; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005; Vachudova, 2005; Zielonka and 
Pravda, 2001; Whitehead, 1996. 
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Depending on the strand of social science they derive from, explanations have singled 
out the importance of incentives-based methods such as conditionality, of socialisation 
or of processes of learning, imitation and the diffusion of ideas.  Broadly speaking, 
rationalist accounts have generally stressed the importance of conditionality as the main 
mechanism through which the EU induces policy and institutional changes in a 
candidate state (see for example Dimitrova, 2004; Grabbe, 2001 and 2006; 
Schimmelfennig et al., 2003; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005; Steunenberg and 
Dimitrova, 2007, Vachudova, 2005).  Constructivists, by contrast, focused more on the 
softer and non-coercive mechanism of socialisation (see, for example, Checkel, 1999 
and 2001; Dimitrova and Rhinard, 2005; Finnemore and Sikking, 1998; Kelley, 2004a; 
Linden, 2002; Risse, 2001).  In this case compliance with external demands is not 
incentive-based, as in the case of conditionality, but depends on whether a state is 
persuaded by the value of the external rules, that is when domestic actors regard 
external rules and the demands of an International Organization appropriate in the light 
of collective identities, values and norms (Schimmelfennig et al., 2006).   
 
The interaction between these two mechanisms has so far not been fully clarified in the 
literature, although some considerable efforts have been made to study both 
mechanisms under the same framework of analysis.  Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 
(2005) for instance, elaborated and compared three distinctive models capturing the 
different mechanisms of the EU’s influence in post-communist countries.  Judith 
Kelley’s study on minority policies in CEE convincingly shows how conditionality and 
socialisation are more complementary than mutually exclusive mechanisms, because in 
day-to-day policy processes these tend to occur simultaneously (Kelley, 2004a). 
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While recognising that the distinction between conditionality and socialisation might be 
purely artificial, this thesis will focus primarily on assessing the impact of EU 
conditionality on JHA policies in Romania.  This methodological choice was made for 
two main reasons.  Firstly, the literature has generally identified conditionality as the 
most effective and powerful mechanism through which the EU induces the candidate 
states to comply with its accession demands, especially in the case of contested reforms 
(Dimitrova, 2004; Dimitrova and Pridham, 2004; Grabbe, 2006; Schimmefennig et al., 
2003, Schimmefennig and Sedelmeier, 2004; Steunenberg and Dimitrova, 2007; 
Vachudova, 2005).  For example, Judith Kelley argues that socialisation failed when the 
domestic opposition to reforms was strong but as domestic opposition grew, “incentive-
based methods such as membership conditionality were not only increasingly necessary 
to change behaviour, but they were also surprisingly effective” (Kelley, 2004b, p.426).  
Secondly, socialisation tends to happen at a much slower pace and evidence of its 
effects may take some time before they become apparent (Checkel, 2007; 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005).  By contrast, conditionality-induced changes 
are already to be expected prior to accession, as the fulfilment of the EU’s entry 
requirements is a pre-condition for membership.  This is particularly the case of JHA 
policies that were high on the EU’s political agenda already in the mid 90s and 
represented a potential veto point in the EU’s enlargement decisions (Grabbe, 2006). 
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2.2 Conditionality as a mechanism of Europeanization 
 
If there is one important feature characterising the relation between the EU and the 
countries of CEE, this is conditionality.  Countries wishing to negotiate for EU 
membership are required to comply with several conditions elaborated by the member 
states.  According to the conclusions of the 1993 Copenhagen European Council, EU 
membership requires: 
• That a candidate state has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of 
minorities; 
 
• The existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope 
with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union 
 
 
• The ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the 
aims of political, economic and monetary union. 
 
The Madrid European Council in 1995 further added that the candidate states would 
have to ensure that their administrations and judiciaries were capable of implementing 
and enforcing the acquis effectively (European Council, 1995).  Despite the initially 
vague nature of the accession requirements, EU conditionality was progressively spelled 
out via the numerous European Commission’ reports, which monitored the candidates’ 
progress towards accession and fleshed out the conditions to be fulfilled to proceed on 
the negotiating ladder.   
 
The breadth of the EU’s agenda for policy and institutional change in CEE and the high 
threshold set for membership have important implications for our study of JHA policy 
developments in Romania because conditionality affects, directly and indirectly, 
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domestic policy-making and internal political developments.  To understand how EU 
conditionality interacts with domestic politics and influences policy and institutional 
choices it is useful to begin by outlining briefly how conditionality works. 
 
Conditionality is an incentive-based method for stimulating compliance and its basic 
thrust is the rational logic of cost-benefit analysis whereby domestic change is a 
reaction to the material and social benefits offered by an international organization. 
Schimmelfennig et al. (2003, pp. 496-497) defined it as a strategy of “reinforcement by 
reward” whereby an international organization, such as the EU, “reacts to the fulfilment 
or non-fulfilment of its conditions by granting or withholding rewards”, without 
however necessarily resorting to coercion mechanisms to change the behaviour of the 
non-compliant government.  At domestic level, actors’ decision to comply with the 
external demands is also based on a cost-benefit calculation.   According to the rational 
choice logic, being purpose oriented, actors change their policies and behaviour and 
accept to comply with international rules if the reward offered and the benefits of 
compliance exceed the costs of non-compliance. 
 
It is important to recall that EU conditionality is qualitatively different to any other 
forms used by other institutions, such as the IMF or the World Bank, because the 
benefits are not linked to the various stages of accession (with the sole exception of 
access to the pre-accession funds) but arrive with the final reward of membership. 
Moreover, the process of accession is characterised by an extensive monitoring of 
progress as well as a continuous pressure exercised by EU institutions, especially by the 
European Commission, to ensure compliance with the acquis. 
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If we look at the EU’s enlargement policy vis-à-vis the CEE candidates through the lens 
of the rationalist logic, accession conditionality can, therefore, have several important 
effects on domestic policy-making.  First, the credible and conditional prospect of 
membership, coupled with the perceived benefits of EU accession can interfere with the 
strategic calculus of domestic political elites, providing powerful incentives for 
domestic reforms (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005; Steunenberg and Dimitrova, 
2007).  For the CEE candidates in general, and Romania in particular, the prospect of 
EU membership carried enormous economic and political benefits, and the political 
elites accepted the huge costs of compliance with EU conditionality because these were 
perceived as lower than the costs of exclusion from the EU’s enlargement process.  As 
Andrew Moravcsik and Milada Anna Vachudova argued: 
East European states take part in the laborious accession process because EU 
membership brings tremendous economic and geopolitical benefit - particularly as 
compared to the uncertain and potentially catastrophic costs of being left behind as 
others move forward.  While the candidates have had to comply with the EU’s 
requirements and acquiesce to certain unfavourable terms, EU membership has 
remained a matter of net national interest. On balance, the sacrifices demanded of 
them seem entirely in keeping with the immense adjustment, and the immense 
benefits, involved (Moravcsik and Vachudova, 2003, p. 43).  
 
 
Secondly, conditionality reduces the negotiating power of domestic political elites, who 
have little or no room for negotiating the entry conditions or shaping their policy output 
(Grabbe, 2006, p.41).  Compliance with the acquis involves in fact a large-scale 
transposition of EU laws into national legislation.  The technocratic nature of the 
accession process - with the screening of national legislation and the negotiations in the 
31 Chapters of the acquis -  ‘ties the hands’ of decision-makers, posing political 
constraints on their ability to deviate from the EU’s conditionality demands. 
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As Noutcheva (2006a, p.8) noted, domestic decision-makers that voluntarily embark on 
closer relations with the EU “are compelled to react to the conditions set in Brussels and 
this external dimension does play a role in domestic politics”.  Thirdly, the process of 
EU integration can change the opportunity structures within which domestic elites 
operate (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 1999, p.2; Schimmelfennig et al., 2003, p. 497) and can 
empower reformers (Ekiert et al., 2007, p. 12; Grabbe, 2006, p.51), either as a result of a 
deliberate effort by external actors or because domestically driven.  In the first case, EU 
policy-makers can influence domestic decision-making by strengthening, through 
‘informal coalitions’, those domestic actors that are already committed to EU priorities 
as well as empower new ones (Jacoby, 2006, pp. 625-626).  In the second case, 
domestic actors may use the accession requirements to implement a reform strategy 
domestically and to bypass internal opposition or administrative constraints to enforce 
decisions (Ekiert et al., 2007; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005).  According to 
Cortell and Davies (1996), international norms can also serve as a powerful legitimating 
force for domestic policy choices.  In their view, “government officials and societal 
interest groups can appeal to international rules and norms to further their own interests 
in the domestic political arena.  Through these appeals, international rules and norms 
become incorporated into domestic debates, under some conditions influencing national 
policy choices” (Cortell and Davies, 1996, p.452).   
 
The process of accession is generally regarded as the key vehicle through which the EU 
channels its influence. However, besides the mechanisms of the accession process and 
the format of the negotiations, there are several parallel ways in which the EU can shape 
actors’ preferences – from financial aid to advice and twinning projects involving 
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member states’ experts (Grabbe, 2006; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2004).  These 
provide further routes for the EU to intervene in domestic decision-making and 
influence directly domestic policy and institutional choices. 
 
2.3 When is EU conditionality effective 
 
Drawing on some of the key assumptions of the Europeanization and EU conditionality 
literatures, the previous section has highlighted how conditionality interacts with 
domestic politics.  But does EU conditionality always work? And if not, when and 
under which conditions is it likely to be more successful?  The Europeanization and EU 
conditionality literatures have devoted particular attention to the interaction between 
four variables: the credibility of conditionality, the clarity and “determinacy” of EU 
conditions, the size of the adaptation costs and the policy priorities of key veto players. 
 
The credibility of conditionality 
In the study of EU enlargement to post-communist states, there is a broad consensus in 
the literature that the credibility of EU conditionality has been the most critical factor 
for the success of the EU's leverage.  A number of influential studies have pointed out 
how the credible promise of EU membership, coupled with the credible threat of being 
excluded from the accession process in case of non-compliance, were critical for 
promoting extensive policy and institutional changes in the candidate countries of CEE 
(see, for instance, Grabbe, 2006; Moravcsik and Vachudova, 2003; Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier, 2004 and 2005; Vachudova, 2005). 
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Scholars have also demonstrated how the effectiveness of the EU’s leverage varied over 
time and became extremely powerful only after the EU’s commitment to eastward 
enlargement and launch of the EU’s accession process with the CEE candidates.  In 
particular it has been shown that the EU was mostly effective in stimulating policy and 
institutional changes during the decision-making phases, especially when deciding 
whether or not to open the accession negotiations and when to close the accession 
process (see Brusis, 2005; Grabbe, 2006; Steunenberg and Dimitrova, 2007).   
 
The changing scope of the EU’s leverage was superbly captured by Milada Anna 
Vachudova (2005). In her analysis of the reform trajectory in six post-communist 
countries (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania) she 
convincingly shows how in the first five years of transition the EU exerted only a 
“passive leverage” on the countries' post-communist reform trajectory.  This passive 
leverage - that Vachudova (2005, p.65) defines as “the traction that the EU has on 
domestic politics of credible candidate states merely by virtue of its existence and its 
usual conduct” - reinforced the reform strategies in liberal states.  But in Romania, as 
well as in Bulgaria and Slovakia (defined by the author as illiberal states), the EU’s 
passive leverage failed to break corruption and rent seeking behaviour.  Only when the 
enormous benefits of EU membership and high costs of exclusion from the enlargement 
emerged clearly, was the EU able to exert “an active leverage” on the country’s political 
trajectory.   
 
 
 
 38 
The empirical chapters will investigate the changing scope of the EU's leverage in the 
pre-accession and accession period, detailing also how and to what extent the credible 
prospect of membership, and the threat of delays or exclusion from the EU’s 
enlargement process spurred domestic reforms. In particular, based on the above-
mentioned assumption that EU conditionality is most effective during the decision-
making stages, we should expect specific policy and institutional changes in 
conjunction with the opening and closing of the accession process.  
 
The clarity and determinacy of EU conditions 
According to the Europeanization and EU conditionality literature, the clarity or 
"determinacy" of EU rules is an important factor for predicting the level of compliance 
one might expect at domestic level.  Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005), in 
particular, argued that compliance is likely to be higher when the EU’s conditions are 
clear and unambiguous because domestic actors know exactly what to do to meet the 
requirements for accession.  By contrast, when the EU’s demands are vague and open to 
interpretation, such as in the case of democratic conditionality, domestic political elites 
have more discretion in accepting or bypassing them.  In their opinion, determinacy also 
matters because it "enhances the credibility of conditionality. It is a signal to the target 
government that they cannot manipulate the rule to their advantage or avoid adopting it 
at all.  At the same time, it binds the EU. If a condition is determinate it becomes more 
difficult for the EU to claim unjustly that it has not been fulfilled and to withhold the 
reward" (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005, pp. 12-13).   
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With regards to specific policy changes, empirical studies have found the EU to be most 
influential in those areas where the acquis was thick, i.e. the EU prescribed models or 
templates for the candidate states to follow or emulate at national level (Grabbe, 2006; 
Epstein, 2006).  In contrast, when the EU acquis was thin, such as in the case regional 
policy, health care or consumer protection, the impact of the EU was far more limited as 
the candidate states had much more scope for choosing or ignoring prevailing Western 
models (Hughes et al., 2004; Jacoby, 2004).  With regards to democratic conditionality, 
such as human rights and minority rights protection, the scope of EU influence 
depended almost exclusively on the importance EU policy-makers attached to the 
conditions for accession.  According to Schimmelfennig et al. (2003), even when 
lacking specific policies at EU level, EU conditionality can still produce visible 
domestic changes if the conditions for membership are repeatedly stated, because this 
sends a clear signal to a candidate state that the EU puts great emphasis on compliance 
with its conditions.   
 
The case studies will assess whether the precision of the EU accession demands helped 
achieve greater policy and institutional convergence.  Based on the previous analysis we 
should expect a high degree of policy convergence in the field of external border 
policies, because the acquis was complex and detailed.  However, in the field of 
judiciary reforms and anti-corruption, the literature predicts a limited convergence 
because of the lack of substantial EU legislation in the field.  In these two policy areas 
we should expect the scope of the EU’s influence to be contingent upon the importance 
it attached to compliance and the extent to which it showed willingness to use its 
leverage mechanisms to push for domestic changes.   
 40 
Adaptation costs and policy priorities of key veto players 
There is a general consensus in the literature on Europeanization that the interests and 
policy priorities of key veto players matter for a successful compliance.  A number of 
studies carried out in the EU15 member states have shown how veto players at political, 
institutional and administrative levels can mediate EU influence, affecting institutional 
and policy choices and subsequently policy and institutional outcomes (Fisher et al., 
2002; Gwiarzda, 2007; Haverland, 2000; Hèritier et. al, 2001).   
 
The policy preferences and priorities of key veto players have also emerged as a key 
variable in the study of the effectiveness of EU conditionality in aspiring and would-be 
members.  Although the number of veto players in the CEE candidates has generally 
been regarded as lower than in the existing member states (Dimitrova, 2002, p. 176; 
Schimmelfennig et al., 2003, pp. 498-99), a number of scholars have shown how the 
interests and priorities of government representatives (Pridham, 2002) as well as veto 
players in the constitutional courts (Ganev, 2002; Malová, 2002) and in the public 
administration (Dimitrova, 2002) are crucial for the success of EU conditionality. 
Indeed, as Grabbe (2006, p.53) noted, to be effective conditionality requires “willing, 
not reluctant partners”.  Since the EU lacks coercive mechanisms to enforce compliance 
in non-members, the effectiveness of EU conditionality depends to a significant degree 
on the commitment of domestic political elites and the presence of political actors 
willing to comply with EU rules. 
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The receptiveness of domestic elites, their commitment to and motivations for 
complying with the EU’s extensive entry conditions are important for two reasons.  
Firstly, they determine the quality of compliance one can expect at domestic level.  If 
incumbent politicians pass legislation or set up institutions in line with the EU’s 
requirements but these bear little or no actual impact on domestic policy and 
institutional settings, it is unlikely that EU rules will be implemented correctly (Jacoby, 
1999).  As Noutcheva (2006a, p. 11) argued: “If domestic actors pass legislation 
compliant with EU-demands but legal enforcement does not follow up and problems of 
technical nature are not obvious, the ensuing conclusion is that there is no political will 
to do the reforms requested”.  Secondly, actors’ motivations to comply with the EU’s 
demands determine whether reforms triggered by conditionality will be irreversible 
once this loses its effectiveness.  If EU-induced reforms are not based on a broad 
political consensus for transforming the country and preparing it for integration, reforms 
are unlikely to be irreversible (Pridham, 2007; Steunenberg and Dimitrova, 2007).   
 
What determines the propensity of domestic actors to accept the EU’s entry conditions? 
According to Schimmelfennig et al. (2003) the size of the domestic costs of fulfilling 
EU conditionality ultimately determines whether domestic decision-makers will embark 
in EU-compliant reforms, independently of the credibility of the reward offered.  In 
their opinion, “these costs increase the more EU conditions negatively affect the 
security and integrity of the state, the government’s domestic power base, and its core 
political practices for power preservation” (Schimmelfennig et al., 2003, p. 499). 
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The previous analysis suggests that the interests and priorities of domestic veto players 
is an important variable in the study of domestic compliance, especially with regards to 
domestic political elites.  According to Geoffrey Pridham (2002), political elites are 
crucial not only for the introduction of EU-compatible rules but also for their successful 
implementation, since they can overcome corporate interests or bureaucratic inertia.  As 
he writes: “It is above all the commitment to EU accession of national governments that 
is the most decisive factor for, if unqualified, this drives through political conditions and 
may seek to overcome counter- pressures such as resistance from professional or 
corporate interests or bureaucratic lethargy” (Pridham, 2002, p. 961).   
 
Based on these considerations, the empirical analyses in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 will also 
consider the interests and priorities of key veto players.  As relevant actors, this study 
focus mostly on the governing coalitions in the 1989-2006 periods primarily because 
the reforms of the judiciary, of anti-corruption legislation, and of borders and visa 
regimes require the initiative of governments and the passing of legislative acts.  
However, when assessing judiciary reforms and anti-corruption policies I will also 
consider the policy priorities of representatives of the justice sector, including the 
constitutional court that has been identified by previous research as a potential obstacle 
to EU-oriented reforms (Ganev, 2002; Weber, 2002).  
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2.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has set out the analytical framework for this study.  A review of the 
Europeanization and EU conditionality literature has suggested that, in exercising its 
leverage, the EU does so in a number of ways and conditionality plays an important role 
in shaping actors’ preferences and actions.  However, the literature also suggests that 
the success of this leverage much depends on the policy preferences and the willingness 
of the domestic political elites to comply with the EU’s accession requirements.  Thus, 
domestic politics and domestic implementing conditions are important in the study of 
compliance as they tend to shape the pace and quality of domestic reforms, hence the 
likelihood of their successful implementation.  Therefore, to assess the domestic impact 
of EU conditionality, it is necessary to take into consideration not only the way the EU 
uses its leverage to stimulate domestic reforms but also internal political dynamics.  In 
particular, the Europeanization and EU conditionality literature suggests four variables 
to be taken into account when studying compliance.  These are: the credibility of 
conditionality, the clarity of EU conditions and the adaptation costs and policy priorities 
of key veto players.  Chapters 4, 5 and 6 – dealing with judiciary reforms, anti-
corruption and Romania’s compliance with the EU’s external border policies – will look 
at the interaction between these variables, investigating how EU conditionality operated 
in practice to provoke domestic changes.   These empirical chapters will also specify 
how the domestic environment has affected the pace and quality of the institutional and 
policy measures put in place within the framework of the accession negotiations. 
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It will be suggested that the difficulties experienced by Romania in fulfilling the EU’s 
entry conditions are primarily of domestic origin, resulting from often hesitant and half-
hearted reforms that slowed down the preparations for EU accession, leaving the 
country struggling to bring its policies, institutions and practices in line with the EU’s 
entry requirements.   
 
To fully appreciate the interaction between EU conditionality and domestic reforms, it 
is also important to outline the historical context of the evolution of the relation between 
the EU and Romania.  As Chapter 3 will highlight, significant changes took place in the 
last two decades both at domestic level – with the coming into power of reformist 
coalitions that spurred domestic reforms – and at EU level, with the progressive framing 
of an ‘all inclusive’ enlargement policy.  These developments helped the country move 
forward with its relations with the EU, and allowed EU institutions to become 
increasingly more involved in domestic decision-making.  
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Chapter 3 
EU-Romania relations 1989 – 2007 
 
This chapter provides the historical background of this research by documenting the 
main steps in the evolution of EU-Romania relations, from the collapse of the 
communist regime in 1989 to the country’s formal accession to the EU on 1 January 
2007.  During this period the EU shaped its conditionality strategy vis-à-vis Romania, 
progressively laying down the conditions for its accession and increasingly becoming 
involved in domestic policy-making.  The following three empirical chapters, exploring 
respectively the reform trajectory in the field of justice, anti-corruption and external 
border policies, will then detail the specific content of the EU’s accession requirements 
in each policy area, tracing the impact of EU conditionality on domestic policy and 
institutional changes. 
 
The relationship between the EU and Romania can be broadly divided into four phases: 
the post-1989 phase, with the establishment of trade relations followed by the launch of 
the first pre-accession strategy after the Copenhagen European Council’s commitment 
to enlargement in 1993; the launch of the accession partnership and the Helsinki 
European Council’s decision in 1999 to open accession talks with Romania; the 
negotiations for accession between 2000 and 2004; and finally, the period prior to 
Romania’s formal entry to the EU in January 2007, with the signature of the Treaty of 
Accession and the EU’s monitoring of domestic reforms under the terms of the 
postponement clause introduced at the closure of the negotiations in late 2004. 
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These four phases also roughly coincided with electoral cycles that brought about some 
significant political changes at domestic level.  This contributed to initiating domestic 
reforms that helped the country to move along the lines of Euro-Atlantic integration.  
 
It is important to emphasise that the evolution of EU-Romania relations cannot be 
studied in isolation as it is intrinsically linked to the broader context of EU’s evolving 
enlargement strategy vis-à-vis the post-communist states of CEE.  It has been the EU 
that determined the method, speed and timetable of Romania’s accession.  Yet, the 
dynamic of its enlargement has not been solely driven by conditionality and the 
progress made by Romania in fulfilling the EU’s entry conditions.  As David 
Phinnemore (2005) convincingly argued, the pace of Romania’s integration into the EU 
owes as much to external factors as to Romania’s actual progress in fulfilling the 
membership conditions.  As he writes: “Romania has benefited from the EU's initially 
hesitant and later comprehensive approach to the development of relations with the CEE 
countries and eastern enlargement as well as a coupling of Romania with Bulgaria and 
the impact of geo-strategic developments on EU decisions concerning the future of 
European integration” (Phinnemore, 2005, p.2).  These are important considerations on 
the nature of the EU’s enlargement policy, and they carry implications for the study of 
how conditionality worked in shaping the reform process in Romania.  For these 
reasons this chapter pays particular attention to the main factors behind the EU’s 
commitment to include Romania, in its enlargement process, highlighting how political 
considerations, rather than the fulfilment of the EU’s entry conditions, often helped the 
country’s bid for closer links with the EU.   
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3.1 The post-1989 period (1989 -1995) 
 
Romania’s relations with the EU developed within the context of the EU’s general 
policy vis-à-vis the former communist countries of CEE after the fall of the Berlin Wall 
and the strategic decision of EU leaders to overcome the division of the continent by 
seeking closer links with the countries of CEE.  After 1989, Romania was progressively 
included in all the programs launched by the European institutions to encourage 
democratic and economic transition, including PHARE (Poland and Hungary 
Assistance for the Restructuring of the Economy), the economic aid programme created 
in 1989 to support post-communist transition in CEE and, from 1997 onwards, to assist 
the candidate countries in their preparations for joining the EU.  
 
Economic ties between Romania and the then European Community (EC) were 
established in 1990 with the launch of the negotiations for a new Trade and Cooperation 
Agreement (see Official Journal, 1991).  This agreement, which replaced the previous 
one signed at the beginning of the 1980s (see Official Journal, 1980), covered trade, 
commercial and economic cooperation, binding Romania to abolish progressively any 
restriction on imported goods from the EC.  However, in the early transition period the 
EU remained cautious in its relations with Romania, and the first significant step 
forward in the strengthening of bilateral relations came only in 1992 when Romania, 
together with Bulgaria, began the negotiations for a Europe Agreement. 
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The Europe Agreements - which had been created as a rapid response by EU leaders to 
the political changes in CEE after 1989 - aimed at creating a free trade area between the 
EC and the associated countries of CEE with the implementation, over a ten year 
period, of the common market legislation and a deepening of bilateral financial and 
economic cooperation.  The Europe Agreements also foresaw political dialogue and the 
creation of an institutional framework to support their implementation, including the 
establishment of the Association Council, the Association Committee, a Joint 
Parliamentary Committee and subcommittees dealing with various technical questions 
(Sedelmeier, 1994; Sedelmeier and Wallace, 1996).  By signing this agreement in 1993 
Romania committed to a gradual opening of its market to industrial goods from the EU, 
to bring its policies in line with the acquis, and to pursue democratic and market-
oriented reforms.  On the EU side, the member states committed to the progressive 
opening of their markets to industrial goods from Romania and to support the process of 
economic and democratic reforms in the country (see Official Journal, 1994).  Although 
at this stage EU conditionality was still at an embryonic level, for Romania and 
Bulgaria the EU introduced a suspension clause in their Europe Agreements that linked 
trade and economic cooperation to the respect of the rule of law, the protection of 
human rights and the introduction of market-oriented reforms (Grabbe, 2006, p.9).  
 
The decision of the member states to conclude the Europe Agreement with Romania 
was largely political, reflecting geo-political concerns inside the Union rather than the 
actual progress made by the country in its transition to democracy and market economy. 
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The political class that replaced Ceauşescu in 1989 - Ion Iliescu and the National 
Salvation Front (Frontul Salvării Naţionale, FSN) - had formally committed to pluralist 
politics, free elections, establishment of market economy, and the respect of the 
country’s national minorities.  On the international front, Euro-Atlantic integration 
figured at the top of the country’s foreign policy objectives.  Yet, these pledges did not 
translate into the necessary domestic political reforms and after 1989 many in EU 
quarters began to question the democratic credentials of the Romanian post-communist 
elite.  Details on the true nature of the revolution had emerge in the early 1990s, and the 
dubious victory of the FSN in the 1990 elections, followed by the brutal repression of 
the student demonstration in June the same year, was an indication that the political 
leadership that overthrew Ceauşescu had in fact not abandoned authoritarian practices 
and was not prepared to relinquish its grip on power by democratic means. 
 
The European Parliament (EP) was perhaps the most critical voice among European 
institutions.  Already in the late 1980s, the EP took a strong stance towards the 
Ceauşescu regime, openly condemning the persistent violation of human rights and the 
suffering imposed upon ordinary citizens (see European Parliament, 1989a, 1989b). 
This led to the Commission imposing sanctions on Romania, with the closure of a 
technical mission to the country and the exclusion of Romania from further trade 
concessions made to the countries of CEE (Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008, p.19). 
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Similarly, in its 1991 report the EP openly questioned the country’s democratic 
trajectory and the reform credentials of its political class:  
Political reform is lagging. It is still not clear whether the Revolution was not, in 
fact, a coup. The new government, the NSF, consists mainly of ex-communists. 
There are doubts as to the freedom of the elections last year. Democratisation of 
the decision making process has not yet been achieved. Human rights are still 
being violated (European Parliament, 1991, p.24).  
  
 
Despite these concerns, EU leaders decided to seek closer relations with Romania 
mainly because of a growing fear of instability in the Balkan region. The breakdown of 
the former Soviet Union in 1991 and the explosion of ethnic conflicts in Yugoslavia 
had highlighted the fragility of the democratic process in post-communist states, calling 
the EU to reconsider its strategy vis-à-vis the region, including Romania. The 
Romanian political class was quick to capitalise on this insecurity among the member 
states to ensure the country’s inclusion in the EU’s emerging policies towards the 
region.  As Papadimitriou and Phinnemore (2008, p. 31) noted: “Whilst widely 
mistrusted in Brussels, the Romanian government was able to exploit international and 
regional security risks in order to convince EU policy-makers that possible exclusions 
from the association process would undermine the country’s fragile transition and 
destabilise the wider Balkan neighbourhood” .  
 
The most significant step forward in EU-Romania relations came in June 1993, when 
the Copenhagen European Council recognised the prospect of membership of the CEE 
countries and specified the conditions for its future enlargements. To qualify for EU 
membership, aspiring members had to show high standards in democratic practices and 
economic governance in addition to having the ability to assume the obligations of 
membership, that is to align their national legislation with the EU acquis.  
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The vagueness of the accession conditions laid down by the European Council in 
Copenhagen for future enlargements has prompted much academic debate, raising 
questions as to whether this was the result of a conscious and deliberate attempt to 
actually calm enthusiasm in the countries of CEE rather than guide their internal 
reforms (see Baun, 2000; Grabbe, 1999; Mair and Zielonka, 2002; Mayhew, 1998, pp. 
14-15).  Wade Jacoby (2004, p.7), in instance, argued that EU officials “were wary of a 
checklist approach, because for several years, each IO had an internal consensus against 
a rapid enlargement.  Some officials worried that if they gave precise targets to CEE 
reformers, they would come under more pressure to admit CEE states if those targets 
were met”.    
 
An equally puzzling question that had generated highly interesting academic 
discussions among EU enlargement scholars is why the EU offered a membership 
prospect to the post-communist states of CEE, including Romania, despite the 
institutional, budgetary and operational costs associated with admitting poorer 
countries into its structures (Baldwin et al., 1997).  Some scholars have argued that the 
EU committed to enlargement because this represented a considerable opportunity for 
the members states to expand its markets and increase its competitiveness while 
enhancing the security and stability at its borders (see, Grabbe, 2001; Moravcsik and 
Vachudova, 2003; Vachudova, 2004).  Others have put forward explanations based on 
sociological and constructivist approaches, stressing the collective identity of the EU 
and its desire to export its democratic values and norms beyond its borders 
(Schimmelfennig, 2002; Sedelmeier, 2000; Sjursen, 2002). 
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Ulrich Sedelmeier, for instance, argued that “The discourse of a collective EU identity, 
characterised by a “responsibility” towards the CEECs, became a central aspect of the 
EU’s policy” (Sedelmeier, 2000, p. 269).  Frank Schimmelfennig, challenged both 
rationalist and constructivist explanations, arguing that material incentives explained 
why the EU offered association through the Europe Agreement but cannot account as 
to why the EU agreed to share its political power through the full inclusion of the 
Eastern European countries.  In his opinion, reluctant member states became 
“rhetorically entrapped” and compelled to approving the EU’s enlargement policy 
(Schimmelfennig, 2001, pp. 47-70).  
 
In the study of EU enlargement to post-communist states, there is however a broad 
agreement that the decision taken in 1993 in Copenhagen represented an important step 
forward in the development of the EU’s relations towards the countries of CEE, 
including Romania, paving the way for the progressive framing of the EU’s eastward 
enlargement policy.  The Copenhagen conditions were in fact followed by the formal 
launch of the EU’s pre-accession strategy at the Essen European Council in December 
1994, which reaffirmed the commitment of the member states to enlargement and 
outlined the main measures to support the accession preparations of the candidate 
countries (European Council, 1994).  These measures were further spelled out by the 
European Commission in its 1995 Single Market White Paper, which became the main 
benchmark for assessing the progress made by the candidate states in transposing the 
internal market acquis (Commission of the European Communities, 1995). 
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The conclusions of the European Council in Essen were welcomed in Romania, where 
the political class had been active in campaigning against a possible differentiation in 
the EU’s policies towards the countries of CEE (Phinnemore, 2000).  To secure its 
place in the emerging enlargement agenda all major political parties also gave 
unanimous consensus for EU integration, and on 22 June 1995 Romania became the 
third country to submit its application for EU membership.  The reasons for seeking EU 
membership were explained in the Snagov Statement, the declaration signed by 
fourteen political parties in support of the application for accession: 
The national strategic objective of Romania’s accession to the European 
Union represents a crucial point of solidarity and convergence of political 
and social entities, a historical chance to promote the ideals and fundamental 
interests of the Romanian people, its identity and traditions towards 
international co-operation, the possibility, wide opened, to bridge the gap 
between Romania and the developed countries, to modernise the country in 
line with the requirements of the information society and to create the 
conditions to rise the standards of living and the quality of life in Romania 
(Quoted in Prisãcaru, 1996, p.33).  
 
 
Romania also actively courted NATO and one year earlier, on 26 January 1994, it was 
the first ex-communist country to sign NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP), a 
programme of bilateral cooperation considered as a preparatory stage for membership.  
 
Economic and security considerations, along with a fear of being excluded from 
mainstream western institutions, were perhaps the most significant motives 
underpinning the applications for EU and NATO membership (Gallagher, 2004 and  
Phinnemore, 2000).  Yet, its political class proved unprepared to release the grip on 
power and pay the price of initiating painful reforms to comply with the EU’s demands.  
Despite declaring EU membership as a top foreign policy objective, Iliescu showed 
aversion to democracy and sound economy policies and his party paid lip service to the 
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demands of the EU and those of other international organizations with half-hearted and 
largely cosmetic reforms.  As Tom Gallagher critically noted, Iliescu “needed Western 
financial backing to reload a battered economy and he desired a normalization of 
relations with the West to boost the legitimacy of his regime”.  However, Iliescu and his 
entourage were “mediocre politicians looking for some sort of modus vivendi with the 
West in the hope they could still enjoy the autonomy to pursue a semi-authoritarian 
course in Romania” (Gallagher, 2001, p.108).  Yet, the separation between foreign 
policy and domestic affairs would ultimately prove detrimental for the country, and in 
spite of the initial impetus for EU and NATO integration, Romania would soon find 
itself under open criticism from the EU and other International Organizations and 
relegated to a laggard status in the process of Euro-Atlantic integration.  
 
3.2 From Exclusion to Inclusion (1996-1999) 
 
In November 1996 the Romanian citizens went to the ballot for the third time after the 
collapse of the Ceauşescu regime6 and unseated President Iliescu and his Social 
Democratic Party of Romania (Partidul Democraţiei Sociale din România, PDSR) in 
favour of Emil Constantinescu - the then rector of the University of Bucharest - and a 
four-party parliamentary coalition known as the Democratic Convention of Romania 
(Convenţia Democrată Română, CDR). Michael Sharif (1997) argued that a radical 
contribution to the victory of the CDR came from the failure of Iliescu and his party to 
generate economic recovery and improve democratic standards. 
                                                
6  Elections were also held in 1990 and 1992.  
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In his opinion: “Their authoritarian habits, economic incompetence (or ideologically 
induced resistance to economic reforms), and condoning of rampant corruption in their 
own ranks seemed to have spread a general realization that ‘enough was enough’” 
(Shafir, 1997, p.155).  
 
The 1996 elections opened, albeit briefly, a new chapter in Romanian post-communist 
politics.  Domestically, they were seen as a turning point for Romanian democracy - 
with the first peaceful alternation in power since 1947 – and a genuine opportunity to 
overcome the legacy of Communist party rule in the country (Mungiu-Pippidi, 1999, 
p.136; Shafir, 1997; Tismăneanu and Kligman, 2001).  At international level, the exit of 
the former communists from power was equally welcomed.  For example, the IMF 
released previously frozen funds in an effort to support the process of economic reforms 
in the country.  At EU level, the coming into power of the CDR alliance brought fresh 
hope that Romania would be able to launch reforms to improve the functioning of its 
state institutions and its economy.  The 1996 elections also brought new foreign support 
for Romania’s bid for NATO membership, which until then was not considered as “ a 
serious candidate for membership” as Alfred Moses (1998, p. 137), the then US 
ambassador to Romania, later noted.  
 
At domestic level, the first CDR-led government under Prime Minister Victor Ciorbea 
(1996-1998) showed commitment to democratic and economic reforms and embarked 
on a series of measures to fulfil the conditions for Euro-Atlantic integration.  These 
include reforms aiming at the modernisation of the judicial system and of the public 
administration, as well as attempts to curb corruption. 
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According to Tom Gallagher (2001, p.110), the reform drive of the new leadership 
aimed primarily at transforming Romania’s image abroad from a Balkan trouble spot to 
a zone of stability and prosperity in the region and to enhance international support for 
its bid for NATO and EU accession.  
 
However, despite the strenuous lobbying of the new leadership to sell Romania’s case 
for NATO membership and the pressure from some member states (notably France), 
Romania would not make NATO’s first enlargement invitation list in Madrid in 1997 - 
only Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary were invited to start the negotiations - and 
would only be invited in 2002, at the Prague Summit, along with Lithuania, Latvia, 
Estonia, Slovenia, Slovakia and Bulgaria.   
 
According to Barany (2004), NATO’s decision to leave Romania out the first 
enlargement wave and then commit to its membership in 2002 had much more to do 
with geopolitical concerns than with Romania’s eligibility (or lack of it). In 1997, the 
US administration was against the inclusion of Romania (as well as Slovenia), because 
its membership would have called into question the issue of membership of the three 
Baltic States, with the risk of antagonising Russia.  At the same time, there were 
concerns about the country’s democratic credentials and the commitment of Iliescu to 
political and economic reforms.  However, the Kosovo War in 1999 and the 9/11 
terrorist attacks changed everything since the US “needed all potential allies, regardless 
of their deficiencies” (Barany, 2004, p.72). 
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TABLE 3.1.   Romania’s compliance with the White Paper Acquis (1997) 
 
 
 
White Paper Chapters 
 
Total 
Directives/Regulations 
  
Romania 
 1. Free Movement of Capital   4 0 
 2. Free and Safety of Industrial Goods 165 100 
 3. Competition 4 4 
 4. Social Policy and action 29 25 
 5. Agriculture 203 101 
 6. Transport 55 40 
 7. Audio-visual 1 1 
 8. Environment 45 38 
 9. Telecommunication 16 11 
10. Taxation  4 2 
11. Free movement of goods 4 2 
12. Public procurement 6 4 
13. Financial Services 21 19 
14. Protection of personal data 2 0 
15. Company Law 6 5 
16. Accountancy 5 4 
17. Civil Law 2 1 
18. Mutual Recognition of professional qualifications 18 10 
19. Intellectual property 11 8 
20. Energy 15 9 
21. Customs Law 201 29 
22. Indirect Taxation 75 10 
23. Consumer protection 11 5 
 
Total 
 
899 
 
426 
Source: Commission of the European Communities (1997a)  
 
With regards to Romania’s integration into the EU, important deadlines were also 
missed. In December 1997, the Luxemburg European Council invited five CEE 
candidates (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Estonia and Slovenia) to open the 
negotiations and Romania was not among them (European Council, 1997).  In July 1997 
the European Commission avis - the first official assessment of Romania’s state of 
democracy and market economy - had judged the country unprepared for membership 
and therefore did not recommend the opening of the accession negotiations.  In fact, the 
Commission expressed concerns for the limited progress made in fulfilling the 
Copenhagen criteria, especially at economic level. 
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According to the Commission, Romania “would face serious difficulties to cope with 
the competitive pressures and market forces within the Union in the medium 
term”(Commission of the European Communities, 1997a, p. 111).  The avis also noted 
the limited progress made in implementing the White Paper and in transposing the 
internal market acquis. At the end of 1997 only half of the EU’s directives and 
regulations had actually been transposed into national legislation (See Table 1.1).  A 
rather encouraging assessment was made of Romania’s efforts to meet the political 
criterion for accession, although this reflected more a conviction of the reformist 
credentials of the new leadership than the real situation on the ground (Phinnemore, 
2000).  Indeed, the avis noted shortcomings in guaranteeing civil liberties, protecting 
the rights of national minorities, rooting out corruption and improving the work of 
courts.  But the Commission concluded that “the current improvement in Romania, 
following the arrival in power of a new government, indicates that Romania is on its 
way to satisfying the [Copenhagen] political criteria” (Commission of the European 
Communities, 1997a, p.114).  The Commission reached similar conclusions also for 
Bulgaria, while Slovakia was the only CEE applicant to be excluded from the 
‘Luxemburg group’ for non-compliance with the Copenhagen political criterion for 
membership (Commission of the European Communities, 1997b).  
 
The decision in Luxemburg to exclude Romania from the first group of those invited to 
negotiate for membership created considerable frustration and uncertainty in the 
country. According to David Phinnemore (2000).   Many in Bucharest feared that the 
differentiation introduced among the aspiring members would heavily penalise 
Romania, jeopardising the country’s credibility at international level and undermine 
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public support for painful economic and state reforms.  The other CEE candidates that 
were left out from the first group of countries invited to open the accession talks also 
raised similar concerns.  To soften their negative reactions, as well as minimise the 
perceived level of differentiation between front-runners and late-comers, EU leaders in 
Luxemburg decided to launch an enhanced pre-accession strategy with all the remaining 
candidate states, to enable them to “eventually” become members of the EU (European 
Council, 1997).  
 
The first Accession Partnership for Romania, adopted by the European Council in 
March 1998, spelled out the short and medium term priorities to be addressed by the 
Romanian authorities in order to meet the accession criteria.  The member states also 
invited Romania to submit a National Programme for the Adoption of the acquis, with a 
timetable for achieving compliance with the priority areas set by the EU (Official 
Journal, 1998).  Among the most important priorities identified by the member states 
there were: macroeconomic reforms, the privatisation of state-owned companies and of 
the banking sector, legislation protecting foreign investments and regulating the 
financial market, the adoption of civil service reforms and harmonisation with the EU’s 
competition law.  In the field of JHA, the member states called for efforts to modernise 
border structures, improve the fight against corruption and organized crime and 
alignment to the acquis in the field of asylum and immigration policies (see Official 
Journal, 1998).  The Accession Partnership was later revised in 1999, 2002 and 2003 
targeting priority areas and shortcomings identified by the European Commission in its 
annual Regular Reports (see Official Journal, 1999a, 2002a, 2003a).  
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Romania was finally invited to open the negotiations in December 1999 - along with 
Bulgaria, Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia and Malta - when the Helsinki European Council 
decided to open the accession talks with all the remaining candidates.  While affirming 
the principle of differentiation, stating that every country would be judged on its own 
merits, the decision taken in Helsinki represented a significant turning point in the EU’s 
enlargement strategy, making it possible for late comers to catch up with the front 
runners, and for the two laggards - Romania and Bulgaria - to have a promise of 
eventual membership (European Council, 1999a).  The launch of the negotiations was 
made conditional to Romania introducing structural reforms of child-care institutions 
and the resolution of macro-economic problems, two key areas of concern highlighted 
by the European Commission in its 1999 Regular Report (Commission of the European 
Communities, 1999). Despite this additional conditionality the Helsinki decision was 
enthusiastically welcomed in Romania ending a decade of uncertainty on the country’s 
prospect of EU integration7.  
 
As in the case of the Europe Agreement, geopolitical concerns rather than the actual 
progress made in fulfilling the conditions for accession shaped the EU’s decision to 
initiate accession talks in 1999.  The country’s support during the Kosovo conflict and 
the desire among some member states to reward Romania and compensate the country 
for its losses, were key factors that helped Romania’s candidacy for EU (and NATO) 
membership (Gallagher, 2004, p. 8;  Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008, pp. 43-46). 
                                                
7  President Constantinescu was quoted as having said: “We can now see the light at the end of the 
tunnel”. See ‘Union comes of age at Helsinki’, European Voice, 16 December 1999.  
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However, limited progress was actually made in fulfilling the EU’s entry conditions, 
especially on the economic front.  In 1998 the Commission’s Regular Report expressed 
serious concerns with Romania’s economic performance:  
The economic situation in Romania is very serious. The new [Vasile] government 
must give absolute and urgent priority to restoring macroeconomic stability and 
establishing the credibility in the international financial markets. This must involve 
a substantial privatisation programme, attracting foreign direct investment, 
accelerating structural reforms and impressing financial discipline on enterprises. 
Romania urgently needs a medium term economic strategy to deal with all these 
issues comprehensively(Commission of the European Communities, 1998a, p. 22). 
 
The conclusions did not read any better, noting that  “Romania had made very little 
progress in the creation of a market economy and its capacity to cope with the 
competitive pressure and market forces has worsened” (Commission of the European 
Communities, 1998a, p. 50).  As Papadimitriou and Phinnemore (2008, p.42) noted, 
“Implicit in the conclusions was a clear sense of disappointment with the efforts of the 
post-1996 governments that had promised so much”. 
 
Indeed, the CDR alliance had committed to extensive state reforms but it proved too 
factious and unable to live up to its commitments.  Many of the reforms promised were 
not implemented, and the lack of political consensus among the coalition members 
slowed down the introduction of far-reaching institutional and policy changes.  As we 
shall see in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, legislative efforts to modernize the justice system 
were blocked by internal divisions on the direction of the reforms, while powerful veto-
players slowed down efforts to set up a sound legal framework to fight corruption.  
Alignment with the JHA acquis also proceeded slowly, and only a few steps were taken 
to modernise border structures and bring policies and institutions in line with the EU’s 
accession requirements. 
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The biggest failure of the CDR coalition was perhaps registered at economic level.  
Back in 1996, one the factors of the success of the CDR at the national elections had 
been the promise to restructure industry and agriculture, reinvigorate privatisation and 
promote the recovery of the economy after six years of inefficient and largely cosmetic 
reforms.  Despite initial success in promoting macroeconomic stability, economic 
reforms soon stagnated, and between 1997 and 1999 the economy experienced three 
years of negative economic growth, unemployment almost doubled and poverty 
continued to increase (Pop-Eleches, 2001, p.159).   
 
By the spring of 1999 Romania was facing the deepest economic crisis since the 
collapse of the communist regime and it was ordinary Romanians who were the worst 
hit.  In part this was due to the fact that the CDR had inherited a disastrous economic 
situation from the previous administration, with a skyrocketing inflation and declining 
foreign investment. But the economic situation also reflected deep structural problems 
in the Romanian economy, caused by the slow pace of the privatisation of small and 
medium scale industrial enterprises, especially in the energy sector, and the failure to 
implement much needed structural reforms (Freyberg-Inan, 2002; Hunya, 1998).  The 
lack of consensus on the directions of economic and state reforms inside the ruling 
coalition also proved detrimental to the economy. Legislation often stalled in 
Parliament, a problem that the executive tried to overcome by extensively resorting to 
emergency ordinances (Shafir, 2001, pp. 86-88; Stan, 2002).  This practice increased 
legislative uncertainty, placing an excessive burden on the justice sector and 
contributing to its chronic inefficiencies - see Chapter 4. 
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The constantly changing legal framework also negatively affected economic 
development because foreign investors were discouraged by the legal uncertainty in the 
Romanian market. 
 
The medium-term economic strategy launched in late 1999 by the newly appointed 
Prime Minister Mugur Isarescu, an economist who had been head of Romania’s Central 
Bank since the 1990, proved beneficial in saving the Romanian economy.  The year 
2000 was the first to bring some modest economic growth but this was perhaps too little 
and came too late to bring the much-promised economic benefits to ordinary 
Romanians, who sealed the defeat of the CDR coalition in the parliamentary elections in 
December 2000. 
 
3.3 Negotiating accession (2000 – 2004) 
 
The decision of the Helsinki European Council in 1999 opened a new chapter in 
Romania’s relations with the EU, paving the way, on the 15 February 2000, for the 
formal opening of the accession negotiations. The year 2000 was also an electoral year 
in Romania, and in December the PDSR (renamed in 2001 Partidul Social Democrat, 
PSD) and its leader Ion Iliescu retuned to power after a head to head second round of 
presidential votes with Corneliu Vadim Tudor and his ultra-nationalist Greater Romania 
Party (Partidul România Mare, PRM), while President Constantinescu did not run for a 
second mandate fearing a poor electoral performance (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2001, p.230). 
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While the return of Iliescu and the ex-communists was regarded by some as a setback 
for Romanian democracy (Gallagher, 2001; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2001; Tismăneanu and 
Kligman, 2001) it did not come as a complete surprise.  As previously highlighted, the 
CDR coalition had performed poorly in economic reforms, in improving democratic 
standards, in fighting corruption and in securing Romania’s place in the EU and NATO.  
According to Tom Gallagher (2001) these failures decreased its popularity primarily 
because these objectives were among the most important electoral promises made by the 
coalition in 1996.  Grigore Pop-Eleches (2001) further argued that during the election 
campaign, Iliescu and PDSR also carefully exploited the weaknesses of the coalition, 
and went a long way in presenting themselves as a reformed political class. In his view 
“The PDSR electoral platform for 2000 avoided the shrill tones of its 1996 campaign.  
Instead, the PDSR and Iliescu emphasized their adherence to the values of European 
integration, democracy, and ethnic tolerance, while at the same time promising a 
coherent economic program to spur economic recovery and fight poverty” (Pop-
Eleches, 2001, p.162).  
 
Determined to achieve Romania’s integration into the EU and NATO during his 
mandate Adrian Nastăse, the newly appointed Prime Minister, announced a series of 
plans to speed up privatisation, to combat corruption, to thin out bureaucracy and attract 
foreign investors in the country (Government of Romania, 2000).  Priority was given to 
economic restructuring, and not only because Romania’s economy was in a state of 
disarray.  During the 1990s many in PSD had shared the belief that Romania’s poor 
economic performance was the main reason why the country failed to be invited to start 
membership talks with the EU and NATO. 
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Writing in 1997 Mircea Geoana, the then Romanian Ambassador to the US who was 
appointed as Foreign Minister in the Nastăse cabinet, noted: “Romania is not among the 
first invitees, and the reason is clear: its poor economic performances” (Geoana, 1997, 
p.19).  However, many of the reforms promised did not materialise.  If rhetorically the 
new administration pledged to introduce sound political reforms by modernising the 
judiciary and the public administration and root out corruption, PSD proceeded in 
practice to secure political control over every state sector.  
 
With the opening of the accession negotiations in 2000 the EU became increasingly 
vocal on the state of the rule of law in the country, but criticism was carefully bypassed 
with largely cosmetic reforms that fell short of any implementation efforts.  As we shall 
see in the following chapters, the judiciary remained under the effective political control 
of the executive until 2004.  The restructuring of the economy and the launch of 
extensive privatisations of state enterprises offered wide opportunities for corruption 
and enrichment, while the executive efforts at curbing corruption did not go beyond 
cosmetic reforms.  It is only when the EU threatened to sanction Romania with 
exclusion from its enlargement that significant reforms were introduced, although many 
of them would not actually be implemented before the formal closure of the accession 
negotiations in December 2004.  More progress was registered in fulfilling the EU’s 
entry conditions in the field of external border policies, but this was primarily because 
incumbent politicians had very strong incentives to comply with the EU’s demands 
since Brussels linked domestic reforms to granting visa-free travel to the Schengen area 
for Romanian citizens – see chapter 6. 
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The limited progress made by Romania in fulfilling the entry conditions was clearly 
reflected in the European Commission’s Regular Reports.  In its 2002 assessment 
Brussels judged Romania’s preparations insufficient to grant membership.  According 
to the Commission it was unlikely that the country would be able to join prior to 2007.  
Significant shortcomings were identified in the legal transposition and the 
implementation of the acquis in most areas, and Brussels officials expressed concerns 
with the major delays in the negotiating process.  In October 2002 only 13 out of the 31 
chapters of the acquis had provisionally been closed, and according to the Commission 
the weaknesses of the country’s administrative capacity posed major constraints in the 
preparations for accession (Commission of the European Communities, 2002a, p. 132).  
In December 2002, at the Copenhagen Summit, the member states decided to wrap up 
the negotiations with eight former communist countries plus Cyprus and Malta, setting 
the stage for the ‘big bang enlargement’ on 1 May 2004.  Romania (as well as Bulgaria) 
would have to wait, although this decision did not come as a surprise to Bucharest and 
Sofia, who had themselves set 2007 as a target date for accession.  To reassure the two 
laggards of the continuing nature of the enlargement process, the European Commission 
put forward in November 2002 Roadmaps containing a detailed list of short and 
medium term actions to be fulfilled in order to comply with the criteria for membership 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2002b).  
 
The year 2004 was perhaps the most difficult for Romania’s quest for EU integration. In 
February, the EP became extremely vocal on the state of the rule of law in the country. 
A motion by Baroness Emma Nicholson - the then EP’s Rapporteur for Romania - 
openly called into question Romania’s membership prospects, expressing serious  
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BOX 3.1. Extract from the European Parliament’s Motion (February 2004) 
 
The European Parliament,  
…. 
 
1. Deplores that despite progress in a number of areas, Romania currently faces serious 
difficulties fulfilling the requirements of the political Copenhagen-criteria; states that 
finalizing accession negotiations at the end of 2004 and becoming a member in 2007 is 
impossible unless Romania fully implements the following:  
 
- anti-corruption measures, especially addressing corruption at the political level and 
implementing anti-corruption laws, 
 
- independence and functioning of the judiciary, especially limiting the powers of the 
Ministry of Justice and providing more resources to the judiciary, 
 
- freedom of the media, especially taking decisive action against the harassment and 
intimidation of journalists and curbing the economic control of the media which has 
resulted in self censorship, 
 
- measures to stop ill-treatment at police stations, starting with the publication of the 2002- 
report of the Council of Europe’s Committee for the Prevention of Torture  on the 
conditions at police stations; 
 
- recognises the right of families affected by the moratorium to receive a reply to their 
requests; considers that the failure to reply in 3 years constitutes an  infringement of the 
most basic human rights; 
 
2. Calls on the Commission together with the Romanian government to develop action 
plans accompanied by clear benchmarks on these reforms in order to better evaluate the 
progress made;  
 
… 
Source: European Parliament (2004) 
 
 
preoccupations with the country’s democratic standards.  For the EP, finalising the 
negotiations in 2004, and becoming member in 2007 would be ‘impossible’ unless 
Romania took drastic action to fight corruption, ensure judiciary independence and 
guarantee media freedom (See Box 3.1).  Although in its final version the motion did 
not recommend a suspension of the negotiations thanks to a last-minute deal struck by 
the Romanian government8, the tough position of the EP was an alarm bell for the 
                                                
8  Author’s interview with Baroness Emma Nicholson de Winterbourne, European Parliament’s 
Rapporteur for Romania 2000- 2004, Brussels, June 2006. 
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Romanian political class.  The EP’s criticism did not go unnoticed in Bucharest where 
many still recalled how Emma Nicholson’s harsh criticism of the treatment of children 
in orphanages caused outcry in the member states and forced the government to 
reconsider its international adoption practices9.  Fearing a delay in the conclusion of the 
negotiations, Prime Minister Nastăse responded to the EU’s criticism with a reshuffling 
of the executive and the removal, among others, of controversial Justice Minister 
Stănoiu, who had increasingly come under fire for her excessive control over the 
judiciary.  Hildegard Puwak, the then Minister of European Integration, was also forced 
to resign in 2003 when a corruption scandal for the embezzling of EU funds broke out 
in the media.  Under the mounting pressure from the EU Nastăse also ‘reluctantly‘10 
signed up to a ‘To Do’ list, containing a number of immediate measures the government 
would undertake to secure the timely conclusion of the negotiation.  In an effort to 
convince Brussels of the executive’s will to live up to its commitment, the government 
also approved in March 2004 two major legislative packages to reform the justice 
system and fight corruption– see Chapters 4 and 5 respectively.  
 
In November 2004, just a few weeks ahead of the foreseen closure of the negotiations, 
the timing of Romania’s accession began to look uncertain.  The Commission’s Regular 
Report published in October 2004 had noted progress, most notably at economic level, 
finally granting Romania the status of functioning market economy. 
                                                
9  In late 2001 the Romanian Government was forced to suspend all international adoption procedures 
after an EP’s report exposed the corruption and malpractice in the adoption system.  For media 
coverage see ‘Romania: EU Report Assails Nation over Treatment of Orphans, RFERL, 4 June 2001.  
10  Author’s interview with Adrian Nastăse, Prime Minister of Romania 2000-2004, Bucharest, October 
2006. 
 69 
The Commission also acknowledged the legislative improvements to guarantee the 
independence of the judiciary and in fighting corruption (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2004).  After the publication of the Report, the government expressed 
confidence that Romania would be able to close the accession negotiations in 2004 and 
secure membership in 200711.  However, the reform drive of the Nastăse executive did 
not convince Brussels officials who maintained serious reservations on the 
government’s will to proceed with implementing judiciary reforms and anti-corruption 
policies.  A large-scale JHA mission carried out by experts from the member states at 
the end of 2004 found strong evidence of political interference in the justice sector and 
hardly any convincing track-record was produced by the government in tackling 
political corruption.  Major shortcomings were also identified in Romania’s competition 
legislation, especially in the field of state aid, as well as taxation and compliance with 
the EU’s environmental legislation.  Brussels officials feared that, with the negotiations 
drawing to an end, the lessening of the EU’s leverage would weaken Romania’s will to 
comply with the EU’s conditionality targets (Pridham, 2006, p.13). 
 
With this background in mind it is perhaps not surprising that the Barroso Commission, 
which was appointed a few weeks prior to the conclusion of the negotiations, felt unease 
about finalising the accession process. Olli Rehn, the newly appointed Commissioner 
responsible for enlargement, was behind the EU’s toughening of its conditionality 
towards Romania. 
 
                                                
11  See interview of Vasile Puşcaş, Romanian Chief EU negotiator (2000-2004) in “Romania’s Chief 
Negotiator: We will be Ready for Membership in 2007”, South East European Times, 1 November 
2004.  
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BOX 3.2. Romania: The Postponement Clauses 
 
a) General Postponement Clause  
  
Art. 39 (1). If, on the basis of the Commission's continuous monitoring of commitments 
undertaken by Bulgaria and Romania in the context of the accession negotiations and in 
particular the Commission's monitoring reports, there is clear evidence that the state of 
preparations for adoption and implementation of the acquis in Bulgaria or Romania is such 
that there is a serious risk of either of those States being manifestly unprepared to meet the 
requirements of membership by the date of accession of 1 January 2007 in a number of 
important areas, the Council may, acting unanimously on the basis of a Commission 
recommendation, decide that the date of accession of that State is postponed by one year to 
1 January 2008.  
  
b) Specific Provisions by Qualified Majority Vote 
  
Art. 39 (2). Notwithstanding paragraph 1, the Council may, acting by qualified majority on 
the basis of a Commission recommendation, take the decision mentioned in paragraph 1 
with respect to Romania if serious shortcomings have been observed in the fulfillment by 
Romania of one or more of the commitments and requirements listed in Annex IX, point I.  
  
Art. 39 (3). Notwithstanding paragraph 1, and without prejudice to Article 37, the Council 
may, acting by qualified majority on the basis of a Commission recommendation and after 
a detailed assessment to be made in the autumn of 2005 of the progress made by Romania 
in the area of competition policy, take the decision mentioned in paragraph 1 with respect 
to Romania if serious shortcomings have been observed in the fulfillment by Romania of 
the obligations undertaken under the Europe Agreement or of one or more of the 
commitments and requirements listed in Annex IX, point II 
 
Source: Annex X, Treaty of Accession of Bulgaria and Romania (Official Journal, 2005) 
 
 
 
 
As soon as he came into office he openly opposed the closure of the negotiations, 
questioning the limited track record in implementing the acquis in the field of 
competition and JHA policies12.  The accession talks were finally closed but at the 
eleventh hour and on the verge of a diplomatic crisis in the European Council due to 
Finland threatening to veto the formal closure of the accession process.  However, as a 
condition for wrapping up the negotiation, Romania was forced to accept a special 
postponement clause in its Treaty of Accession allowing the EU to potentially delay its 
                                                
12 See interview with Olli Rehn, ‘Amânarea aderârii pâna în 2008 râmane o posibilitate’, BBC 
Romanian, 9 December 2004 and; ‘Defiant EU Commission say Romania is not ready’, Financial 
Times, 4 December 2004.   
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membership by one year in case of a failure to comply with a highly detailed list of 
commitments in the field of JHA and competition policies (see Box 3.2).  These 
covered the areas of state aid, restructuring of the steel industry, improved control of the 
EU's external borders, implementation of the Schengen Action Plan, introduction of 
anti-corruption measures, judiciary and police reforms as well as the development of an 
anti-crime strategy (see, Official Journal, 2005).  
 
The conditions imposed on Romania were unprecedented and significantly tougher than 
those introduced also for Bulgaria, where the postponement clause was only of a 
general nature and more difficult to activate because it required the unanimous 
agreement of all the member states.  According to a senior EU official interviewed by 
the author, although Romania’s accession date could only be delayed by one year the 
introduction of the postponement clause by a qualified majority in the Council was 
intended as a clear political message that postponement was a serious option13.  As Olli 
Rehn himself later explained: “Because these are exceptional circumstances and 
because Romania has a lot of hard work to do in these fields [JHA and competition] in 
the next two years, the Council wanted to retain the possibility to decide on a 
suspension of membership by qualified majority vote”14. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
13 Author’s interview with Barbara Brandtner, member of Cabinet of Commissioner Neelie Kroes, 
European Commission, Brussels, May 2006.  
14  Quoted in ‘EU: Enlargement Chief Discusses Romania, Turkey, Ukraine’, RFERL, 9 December 
2004.  
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BOX 3.3. General Safeguards in the Treaty of Accession of Romania and Bulgaria 
 
 
General economic safeguard clause to remedy serious and persistent difficulties in one or 
other economic sector in the present or new Member States (Art. 36 of the Accession 
Treaty Protocol) 
 
Internal market clause to prevent or deal with serious breaches of the functioning of the 
internal market (Art. 37 of the Accession Treaty Protocol) 
 
Justice and home affairs safeguard to deal with serious shortcomings in the field of 
cooperation in civil and criminal matters (Art. 38 of the Accession Treaty Protocol).  
 
 
Source: Treaty of Accession of Romania and Bulgaria (Official Journal, 2005) 
 
 
Moreover, similar to the Accession Treaty of the ten countries that acceded in May 
2004, the Treaty of Romania (and Bulgaria) also contains three specific safeguard 
clauses allowing the Commission to suspend concrete benefits of membership in the 
first three years after accession in case of serious shortcomings in the economic, single 
market and JHA fields (Box 3.3). 
 
The EU’s uncompromising stance towards Romania provoked considerable frustration 
in Bucharest. Despite Nastăse being quick to point out that these additional measures 
were “a way of supporting Romania’s accession to the European structure”15, the 
unprecedented terms imposed by the EU to close the two remaining negotiating 
chapters caused widespread resentment, and behind closed doors many accused 
Brussels of applying unfair conditions and a second-class treatment to their country16. 
                                                
15 Quoted in ‘Romania has completed the accession negotiations’, Nine O’Clock, 9 December 2004.  
16  Authors’ interview with Vasile Puşcaş, Romanian Chief EU negotiator 2000-2004, Bucharest, 
October 2006.  
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Yet, the Romanian government subscribed to these conditions because it feared a 
progressive toughening of the closing criteria with a risk of postponing indefinitely the 
country’s accession.  As a senior diplomat openly confessed to the author, “we feared 
we would fall victims of our own limits. Closing under these terms was better than not 
closing at all”17.   
 
The conclusion of the accession negotiations also coincided with the electoral campaign 
for the presidential and parliamentary elections and this ‘diplomatic gift’ was a useful 
electoral token for Nastăse and his presidential campaign.  Indeed, the PSD 
administration had been successful on the international front.  It secured NATO 
membership, visa-free travel to Europe for Romanian citizens and successfully 
concluded the accession talks with the EU.  But voters in the December elections 
unseated Nastăse and the PSD.  The second round of presidential votes on 12 December 
2004 saw his unexpected defeat in favour of Traian Băsescu, the outgoing mayor of 
Bucharest, by 51 to 49 percent and the coming into power of the centre-right Justice and 
Truth Alliance (Alianţa Dreptate şi Adevăr, DA)18 As we shall see in the following 
chapters, the appointment of a new government created a much-needed momentum for 
reforms that will prove crucial for securing Romania’s accession in 2007. 
 
                                                
17  Author’s interview with a senior Romanian diplomat, who for professional reasons has asked to 
remain anonymous, Brussels, 2006.   
18  Formally speaking the parliamentary elections, which run in parallel with the first round of the 
presidential elections, were won by the left-wing PSD party combined with the Humanist Party of 
Romania (Partidul Umanist Român, PUR renamed in 2005 Partidul Conservator, PC) with nearly 
37% of the votes. The centre-right DA Alliance, comprising the National Liberal Party (Partidul 
Naţional Liberal, PNL) and Băsescu’s own Democratic Party (Partidul Democrat, PD) obtained 
approximately 32% of the votes. However, after the results of the presidential elections, PUR 
switched sides giving a majority in Parliament to the DA Alliance.  For a full analysis of the 
elections see Gross and Tismăneanu (2005).  
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3.4 Membership on the horizon (2005 -2007) 
 
The credible threat of a delay in Romania’s accession represented the central tenet of 
EU - Romania relations from the closure of the accession talks in late 2004 to the 
country’s formal accession on 1 January 2007.  The newly appointed government, led 
by Prime Minister Călin Popescu-Tariceănu, inherited a hefty burden of tough 
commitments and short deadlines from the PSD administration.  Yet, the executive 
promised to fulfil all these conditions and in an effort to prove the credibility of the 
coalition in the eyes of foreign observers, President Băsescu appointed Monica Macovei 
- a non-partisan human rights lawyer - as the head of the Ministry of Justice19.  The first 
few months of 2005 saw an impressive flurry of government activities to meet the 
deadlines set in the Accession Treaty.  Some of the most visible reforms took place in 
the justice system and in fighting political corruption, with the opening of high-profile 
cases against well-known politicians including former Prime Minister Adrian Năstase – 
see Chapters 4 and 5.  Progress was also registered in securing the EU’s external 
borders as well as fulfilling shortcomings in the field of taxation, environmental 
legislation and in implementing the EU’s competition policy.  
 
For a country with a rather poor track record in living up to its commitments, the reform 
momentum in Romania in early 2005 took many in Brussels quarters by surprise, but 
was perceived as a positive signal that the centre-right coalition was serious about 
reforms. 
                                                
19 Author’s interview with Renate Weber, Advisor on Constitutional and Legislative matters to 
President Băsescu 2004-2005 and President of the Open Society Foundation, Bucharest, October 
2006.  
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The Commission responded with support and encouragement and senior EU officials 
shared the belief that the EU’s tough conditionality strategy was yielding positive 
results20.  On 22 February 2005 the European Commission issued a positive opinion on 
Romania’s application for membership (Commission of the European Communities, 
2005a).  This was followed by the formal assent of the EP in April that gave the green 
light for the signature of the Treaty of Accession, which was signed in Luxemburg on 
25 April 2005.  In October 2005, the Comprehensive Monitoring Report from the 
Commission - the first assessment of Romania’s progress since the closure of the 
accession talks - praised the executive efforts.  Successful lobbying by the Romanian 
government also ensured that progress would not go unnoticed.  The report still 
contained a number of outstanding issues to be addressed but for the first time, Romania 
found itself ahead of Bulgaria in the race for EU membership, which received a rather 
harsh treatment for its failure to curb organised crime and corruption and to address the 
question of accountability of the judiciary (Commission of the European Communities, 
2005b).   
 
Thanks to the reform efforts undertaken, Romania successfully received an encouraging 
report in May 2006, and in September the European Commission gave the green light 
for its accession.  However, to ensure that Romania would continue implementing the 
reforms after accession, the Commission introduced a post-accession monitoring 
mechanism to verify compliance in the field of judiciary reforms and anti-corruption. 
                                                
20  Author’s interviews with EU officials including Kristian Hedberg, member of the cabinet of 
Commissioner Olli Rehn and Karolina Kottova, member of the cabinet of Commissioner Franco 
Frattini. Brussels, June-September 2005. 
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According to the terms of the so-called ‘Verification and Cooperation Mechanism’, 
Romania is now required to report on a yearly basis on a set of benchmarks devised by 
the Commission amid the risk of safeguard measures being activated in the field of JHA 
(see Box. 3.4).  
 
BOX 3.4. Verification and Cooperation Mechanism – Romania 
 
… 
 
(5) The remaining issues in the accountability and efficiency of the judicial system and 
law enforcement bodies warrant the establishment of a mechanism for cooperation and 
verification of the progress of Romania to address specific benchmarks in the areas of 
judicial reform and the fight against corruption. 
 
(6) If Romania should fail to address the benchmarks adequately, the Commission may 
apply safeguard measures based on Articles 37 and 38 of the Act of Accession, including 
the suspension of Member States' obligation to recognise and execute, under the conditions 
laid down in Community law, Romanian judgments and judicial decisions, such as 
European arrest warrants. 
… 
   
    Source:  Commission of the European Communities (2006a) 
 
 
 
A similar mechanism was also established for Bulgaria, covering judiciary reforms, 
anti-corruption efforts as well as the fight against organized crime (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2006b).   
 
As we shall see in further details in the following chapters, several factors help to 
explain the reform momentum in Romania after the closure of the accession 
negotiations.  First of all, the one-year delay was perceived in Bucharest as a serious 
and credible threat.  Not only could the postponement clause be relatively easily 
activated by the majority of the member states, but Olli Rehn’s tough stance towards 
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Romania at the closure of the negotiation and the anti-enlargement mood in many EU 
capitals after the 2004 enlargement signalled that the EU was no longer prepared to 
accept mere commitments to warrant membership.  As Geoffrey Pridham (2006, p.14) 
pointed out: “Romania and Bulgaria experienced the thin edge of a forthcoming wedge 
over accession conditionality. This showed that Brussels intended enlargement in the 
future to be a far more stringent, rather less predictable and by no means automatic 
process”.   
 
Moreover, the Commission skilfully used the threat of postponement to maximise the 
scope of its leverage. Firstly, the postponement clause allowed the Commission to 
subject Romania to an intensive and unprecedented monitoring.  Indeed, in the two 
years preceding Romania’s accession, the number of formal exchanges between EU and 
Romanian officials intensified and several missions both at political and technical level 
took place in the country.  For instance, between 2005 and mid-2006 three large-scale 
JHA missions involving member states’ experts took place in the country with the 
objective of verifying whether the country fulfilled the conditions laid down in the 
Accession Treaty21. Secondly, in order to keep the pressure for reforms on the 
Romanian government, Brussels officials also skilfully used the ‘rhetoric of 
postponement’ to foster uncertainty on the future accession date.  Thus, while praising 
the reform efforts, the Commission repeatedly stated that postponement was a serious 
option.  
                                                
21  Author’s interview Sabine Zwaenepoel, Desk-Officer for Romania and Bulgaria, European 
Commission, Brussels, April 2006.  
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For example, presenting the findings of the Comprehensive Monitoring Report to the 
EP, Olli Rehn stated:  “Should there be serious shortcomings, I would not hesitate to 
make use of all our remedial tools. This includes not only the possibility of postponing 
accession by one year but also all the other safeguard clause” (Rehn, 2005). Moreover, 
although the Commission was in a position to make a recommendation for the accession 
of Romania and Bulgaria already in May 2006, it delayed the decision until September 
to ensure that the reform momentum would not be lost.  
 
The Commission’s tough conditionality strategy was considerably strengthened by the 
difficult political climate within the EU after the rejection by French and Dutch voters 
of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005.  Since the question of further enlargements was 
present in public debates prior to the referenda, their negative outcome was interpreted 
as a signal of a growing discontent, if not opposition to further enlargements (Bechev 
and Noutcheva, 2008, p. 125).  Facing growing popular criticism for the handling of the 
accession preparations of the CEE countries, some member states had also slowed down 
the ratification process of the Treaty of Accession of Romania and Bulgaria, calling on 
the Commission for factual, rather than political, assessments of their compliance with 
the conditionality targets.  The member states’ position not only justified Brussels’ 
unprecedented monitoring but also raised the stake for non-compliance, because a non-
ratification by any member state of the Treaty of Accession would have halted 
Romania’s accession.  Finally, EU conditionality proved successful because it helped 
reformers inside the ruling coalition bringing much needed reforms to the top of the 
political agenda.  As we shall see in later chapters, the tough deadlines imposed by the 
Commission, the extensive monitoring that took place in the country until the moment 
 79 
of accession and the credible threat of postponement proved crucial in enabling Monica 
Macovei, the bold Justice Minister, to bypass opposition and push forward 
comprehensive reforms of the judiciary and in the anti-corruption legal framework, well 
beyond the commitments Romania was requested to comply with in the Treaty of 
Accession.  
 
Undoubtedly, the achievements in the field of justice and anti-corruption helped 
Romania secure accession in 2007.  However, the political decision to allow Romania 
accede was also influenced by other factors including the need to safeguard the 
institutional credibility of the European Commission.  Arguably, Brussels was never in 
a sufficiently strong position to recommend postponement.  While publicly backing the 
Commission’s tough conditionality strategy, some member states did not support a 
potential de-coupling of the two laggards, or a delay in their accession22.  Without a 
strong political backing the Commission risked being overruled by the Council, a 
politically damaging situation for an institution that has been entrusted by the member 
states to monitor the accession preparations of aspiring members.  Moreover, 
recommending postponement for either of the two laggards could have endangered the 
ratification of the Treaty of Accession and halt the enlargement process.  Days before 
the publication of the Progress Report in May 2006, only 14 countries had ratified the 
Accession Treaty while others - notably the Netherlands, France and Germany - awaited 
the Commission’s assessment to begin the process in their respective national 
Parliaments. 
                                                
22  Author’s interview with a senior EU Commission official who for professional reasons has asked to 
remain anonymous, Brussels, 2006.  
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In a more optimistic scenario, recommending postponement could have resulted in a 
halt or reversal of domestic reforms.  After all, Romania’s accession could not be 
delayed indefinitely but was set to happen on 1 January 2008 at the latest (Phinnemore, 
2006b, p. 19). 
 
All in all, the EU remained trapped in its own commitments, and despite evidence that 
some crucial reforms were far from irreversible, the need to safeguard the 
Commission’s credibility and the EU’s enlargement policy shifted the balance in favour 
of accepting Romania (and Bulgaria) in 2007 (Noutcheva, 2006b, p.1).  Yet, the 
decision to introduce a post-accession monitoring mechanism in the field of judiciary 
reforms and anti-corruption is evidence that Brussels officials recognised the fragility of 
the reform momentum in the country, especially in relations to its democratic standards 
and respect of the rule of law.  
 
3.5 Conclusion  
 
This chapter presented an overview of EU-Romania relations from the collapse of the 
communist regime to Romania’s formal accession to the EU on 1 January 2007.  During 
this period the EU progressively defined its enlargement policy, while political changes 
at domestic level helped the country to move along the lines of Euro-Atlantic 
integration.  As I have pointed out, in less than two decades Romania went from the 
margins of the EU’s foreign policy interests to full integration into the Euro-Atlantic 
structures.  Its relations with the EU have developed at a rapid pace, and conditionality 
was not always the critical factor in the advancing of the relations. 
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Romania benefited much from the EU’s all-inclusive enlargement policy, while political 
priorities inside the Union helped the country secure accession in 2007.  
 
The puzzling question here is how far Romania would have transformed itself without 
geopolitical factors helping the country’s bid for EU membership.  The political 
leadership that replaced Ceauşescu and ruled the country for most of its transition  - 
Iliescu and the PSDR/PSD - showed aversion to democracy and often paid lip service to 
the EU’s demands with half-hearted and cosmetic reforms designed to protect, rather 
than challenge, networks of political patronage and corruption.  Yet, the prospect of 
membership and the severity of the EU’s accession process, constrained domestic actors 
and had a major impact in shaping the behaviour of domestic political elites. As the next 
three chapters will highlight, EU conditionality proved to be in many occasions the 
main driver of domestic reforms. This not only helped Romania transform, but also 
allowed the EU to intervene considerably in its domestic affairs. 
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Chapter 4  
Reforming the Justice System 
 
 
This chapter presents the first empirical case study of this research, tracing the impact of 
EU conditionality on judiciary reforms in Romania from the collapse of the communist 
regime to the country’s formal accession to the EU in January 2007.  As specified in 
Chapter 1, this case study was selected because it emerged as one of most complex and 
controversial issues in the country’s post-communist transition and negotiations for EU 
membership.  Significant shortcomings related to the independence, accountability and 
efficiency of the justice system were identified by the European Commission in its 
annual reports, and the limited progress made during the negotiations resulted in the 
introduction of extra monitoring mechanisms before and after Romania’s accession to 
the EU.   
 
In line with the research questions and hypotheses outlined in Chapter 1, the objective 
of this chapter is twofold: firstly, this chapter aims at empirically show how EU 
conditionality influences domestic decision-making and shapes domestic policy and 
institutional choices.  Secondly, this chapter identifies how domestic factors can mitigate 
the impact of EU conditionality and affect compliance.  To evaluate the scope of EU 
influence and the limitations on the use of that influence this chapter draws upon and 
tests some of the keys assumptions of the Europeanization and EU conditionality 
literature with regards to the conditions for the success of the EU’s leverage. 
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As mentioned in some length in Chapter 2, the literature suggests that domestic change 
in response to the process of EU integrations depends on four set of factors: the 
credibility of conditionality, the clarity of EU demands, the size of the adaptation costs 
and the policy priorities of key veto players. 
 
In relation to the credibility of EU conditionality, the literature suggests this varied over 
time and was mostly effective during the decision-making phases, especially when 
deciding whether to open or close the accession negotiations and the accession process 
(Brusis, 2005; Grabbe 2006; Steunenberg and Dimitrova, 2007).  Studies have also 
emphasised that the clarity of EU rules and the presence of institutional and policy 
templates are important factors for the success of EU conditionality (Grabbe, 2006; 
Hughes et al., 2004; Jacoby, 2004). In the Europeanization framework, actors' 
preferences and the adaptation costs are also used to explain problems of compliance.  
In particular the literature predicts a lower likelihood for compliance in policy areas with 
higher adaptation costs.  
 
On the basis of these assumptions, in the field of judiciary reforms we should expect 
limited compliance as the EU lacked formal acquis or legally binding instruments, and 
the costs of adaptation were particularly high given the political sensitivity of judiciary 
reforms.  This chapter advances the argument and empirically shows that vague 
membership conditions do not necessary limit the scope of the EU’s impact, as much of 
the literature predicts. 
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While precise conditions facilitate compliance, the EU can nevertheless influence state 
behaviour and compel domestic political elites to introduce EU-compatible rules even 
when it lacks formal EU-wide legislation.  The critical factor here is not the clarity of the 
EU's demands or the presence of policy and institutional models but the importance the 
EU attaches to compliance and the extent to which it is prepared to use its leverage 
mechanisms to push for domestic change.  Building on the Europeanization and EU 
conditionality literature this chapter also empirically highlights how the impact of EU 
conditionality varied over time and was mostly effective in the decision-making phases - 
i.e. when to open or close the membership negotiations and to close the accession 
process.  
 
To outline my argument this chapter proceeds as follows:  the next section introduces 
the content of the accession conditionality in the field of judiciary reforms laid down by 
the EU in the context of its enlargement to CEE.  This is followed in section 2 by a 
detailed analysis of judiciary reforms in Romania up to the moment of its accession in 
2007.  The purpose of this section is to highlight how and when EU’s policy of 
conditionality had led to formal policy and institutional changes in the country.  Finally 
the last section of this chapter offers an explanation as to why significant problems were 
registered in modernising the Romanian justice system, showing how domestic factors 
mitigated EU influence and slowed down domestic reform. 
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4.1. Background to the EU’s approach 
 
The reform of the justice system has been an important item on the EU’s agenda during 
the negotiation with the CEE candidates, although this was presented relatively late 
during the negotiations for accession.  The importance attached to the judiciary grew 
progressively and largely mirrored broader policy developments at EU level.  For most 
of the 1990s the EU’s demands focused on ensuring the candidate states had in place a 
sufficiently strong judicial capacity to enforce EU policies.  It is only with the 
Amsterdam Treaty, that set the ambitious objective of creating an “Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice” (AFSJ) and placed Justice among the political objectives of the 
Union23, that greater attention was paid to questions related to the independence and 
accountability of the justice system. 
 
The 9/11 terrorist attacks also pushed onto the political agenda the need for greater 
cooperation between the judicial and law enforcement authorities in the fight against 
cross-border crime and terrorism.  At EU level, this led to several steps being taken in 
the fields of criminal and civil justice, such as the legal approximation of definitions and 
sanctions of several forms of cross-border crimes, the creation of EUROJUST to 
improve cooperation and coordination between the judicial authorities of the member 
states, and the agreement on the European Arrest Warrant, that allows the arrest and 
transfer of criminal suspects for trail and detention throughout the Union.  
                                                
23 See Art. 1(5) of the Treaty of Amsterdam (Official Journal, 1997b). 
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In the context of the accession negotiations with the candidate states, the increased 
attention to the independence, accountability and efficiency of the justice system 
translated into a more stringent monitoring of the candidates’ efforts, to ensure they had 
in place the means to facilitate communication of court decisions and to provide for 
legal assistance both in the field of criminal and civil justice. 
 
4.1.1.  EU accession conditionality in the area of Judiciary Reforms  
 
Formally speaking, EU conditionality in the field of judiciary reforms stems from the 
Copenhagen political criterion for membership elaborated by the European Council in 
1993, according to which an aspiring member must achieve “the stability of institutions 
guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law” (European Council, 1993, p.13).  
Although the justice system is not mentioned explicitly, fulfilling this condition would 
be unconceivable without the existence of an independent and impartial judiciary.  
 
The judiciary occupies a unique position in a democratic society.  As the guarantor of 
citizens’ rights and freedoms and the respect of the rule of law, it plays a fundamental 
role in restraining the legislative and executive powers and in safeguarding the rights of 
individuals and minority groups.  An independent, efficient and accountable judiciary is 
also crucial in the fight against organized crime and corruption, confronting the interests 
of the political branches and those of powerful individuals (Open Society Institute, 
2001, p.17).  An independent and efficient judiciary is also important for the correct 
application of EU policies. The EU legal system rests on the assumption that the judicial 
authorities of the member states are able to apply the Treaty provisions for the unitary 
application of the acquis and ensure the proper functioning of the Single Market.  
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Thus, as a condition for accession, the EU requires a candidate state to have in place a 
sufficiently strong ‘judicial capacity’ to enforce EU legislation.  This criterion for 
membership was spelled out in 1995 by the Madrid European Council, and the progress 
made by the candidate states in fulfilling this condition has been subject to a specific 
evaluation in the European Commission’s annual Reports.  
 
Although not formally defined by the EU, a strong judicial capacity presupposes an 
independent, impartial and accountable judiciary with professionally well-trained 
magistrates and auxiliary personnel, access to legislation and efficient court proceedings 
(Open Society Institute, 2002a, p.14).  These principles were implicit in the annual 
Reports of the European Commission.  When assessing the judicial capacity of the 
candidate states the Commission mostly emphasised the need to: 1) Guarantee the 
independence of the judiciary; 2) Improve the training of judges and filling judicial 
vacancies; 3) Improve access to justice and case handling and; 4) Ensure the effective 
enforcement of the court decisions (Kochenov, 2004, pp.20-21).   
 
What kind of judicial system best matches these criteria is not easily discernable from 
the Copenhagen conditions.  Strictly speaking the EU does not have common standards 
or legally binding instruments with regards to judicial independence or judicial 
capacity, and apart from the instruments developed to tackle common challenges 
through increased judicial cooperation, this area remains one of exclusive competence 
of individual member states24.  
                                                
24 The only exception is the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Art.47 establishes 
the right to a fair trail “before an independent and impartial court”. See Official Journal (2000a). 
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Some scholars have argued that the lack of EU standards and the vagueness of EU 
conditionality in the justice field, constrained the EU’s leverage as it posed problems for 
EU officials in evaluating the progress made by the candidate states (Pridham, 2002; 
Smilov, 2006).  The member states have also various arrangements when it comes to the 
constitutional and institutional settings guaranteeing the independence, accountability 
and efficiency of their justice system.  Indeed, lacking EU-wide standards or a legally 
binding acquis, the Commission was not in a position to recommend a specific 
institutional model or shape directly the content of policy and institutional choices.   
 
However, where the EU has been silent, the member states’ own domestic practices 
have provided important guidelines for assessing judicial independence and judicial 
capacity in the candidate countries.  At the same time, through EU-financed twinning 
projects and bilateral programmes, the members states have provided models for the 
candidate states to follow or emulate and helped identify the standards and requirements 
for accession.  There are also a number of internationally recognised standards that 
acted as reference point for evaluating judicial independence and judicial capacity in the 
candidate countries25.  These include the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of 
the Judiciary (United Nations, 1985) and the Council of Europe’s Recommendations on 
the Independence, Efficiency and Role of Judge (Council of Europe, 1994).  Important 
guidelines to evaluate progress, and help the candidate states identify the conditions for 
accession, have also been provided by the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights, which progressively spelled out the substantive conditions for an 
                                                
25  Author’s interview with Sabine Zwanepoel, Desk Officer for Romania and Bulgaria, DG JLS, 
European Commission, Brussels, April 2006.  
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independent and impartial judiciary.  These include the existence of guarantees against 
external pressure, the independence of individual judges from judicial hierarchies (also 
known as internal or intra-judicial independence), and a sufficient organizational 
separation of the judiciary from the executive power.  Not only are the rulings of the 
European Court of Human Rights binding on individual member states, bur by focusing 
primarily at the substantive conditions for judicial independence, rather than the legal 
and formal ones, these have provided significant guidance on the acceptable models and 
practices for judicial independence and its accountability (O’Boyle et al, 2005).  
 
4.2 The Impact of EU Conditionality on Judiciary Reforms  
in Romania 
 
The reform of the justice system has been one of the most complex and controversial 
issues of Romania’s post-communist transition and negotiations for EU accession.  In 
its annual Reports the European Commission repeatedly criticised the Romanian 
judiciary for being over-politicised, unaccountable, unprofessional and chronically 
understaffed (see, for example Commission of the European Communities, 2002a, pp. 
24-25; 2004a, pp. 19-21).  Reports from the Council of Europe, the World Bank and 
several NGOs further exposed the chronic inefficiencies of the justice system and the 
effective subordination of the judiciary to political power (see, for example, Council of 
Europe, 1997; World Bank, 2001a; Freedom House, 2005a).  At domestic level 
successive post-communist governments either paid lip service to the EU’s demands 
with half hearted reforms or proved unable to find the necessary political consensus to 
introduce extensive changes. 
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Legal guarantees for judicial independence were progressively established but reforms 
came about mostly under considerable external pressure from the EU and other 
international organization.  Yet, powerful veto players in the judiciary have undermined 
the correct implementation of many EU-driven reforms, and a number of questions 
remain open on their long-term sustainability. 
 
4.2.1 EU conditionality and Judiciary Reforms in Romania after 1989 
 
Romania entered transition with a highly dysfunctional and discredited justice system.  
During communism the judiciary was characterised by a highly centralised 
administrative control of the Ministry of Justice, undue interference of the executive in 
court proceedings, archaic methods of case filing and case proceedings, limited access 
to legislation as well as poor working and pay conditions for judges and courts 
personnel.  Four decades of communism had also undermined the institutional 
independence of the judicial branch, since judges were not expected to act as 
independent decision-makers but rather as mere executors of the will of politicians.   
 
After the collapse of the regime, Romania embarked on redesigning new state laws and 
institutions and the question of the judiciary’s autonomy and its relation with other 
branches of the state was addressed in the 1991 Constitution.  This recognised the 
independence of the judiciary26 and created the Superior Council of Magistracy (SCM)  
 
                                                
26  Article 123 of the 1991 Constitution states that “Judges shall be independent and subject only to the 
law” (Monitorul Oficial, 1991). 
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BOX 4.1. The Romanian Court System 
 
Court of First Instance (Judecătorie) 
Located in every district and in the city of Bucharest the Court hears first instance criminal, civil and 
some administrative and commercial cases in the first instance. 
 
Country Court (Tribunal) 
Considers certain types of cases in the first instance (i.e. important criminal, civil, administrative and 
commercial law cases), and review appeals on the decisions of the courts of first instance.  
 
Court of Appeal (Curtea de Apel) 
Considers certain cases in the first instance, such as serious criminal and civil matters, and reviews 
second level appeals on decisions from the Tribunal. 
 
Supreme Court of Justice (Curtea Supremă de Justiţie) 
It handles appeals from the Court of Appeal and has jurisdiction for decisions of first instances or for 
high-level officials are charged with serious crimes.  
 
With the exception of the Judecătorie, each court has specialised sections: civil, criminal, commercial, 
and administrative.  
 
***  *** 
 
Constitutional Court (Curtea Constituţională) 
Made up of nine members appointed for a 9 year mandate, the Constitutional Court reviews the 
conformity of laws, regulations and government ordinances with the Constitution. The Court also 
supervises the procedures for electing the President and conducting national referenda, oversees the 
suspension and impeachment of the President, and decides on the constitutionality of a political party. 
 
Court of Account (Curtea de Conturi) 
Reviews government spending and pursues cases to collect revenues on behalf of the state.  
 
Military courts (Tribunalul Militar) 
Act as Martial Courts and deal with disciplinary matters involving members of the military and the police. 
 
 
 
as the main managerial body of the judiciary system27.   In the early transition period the 
basic reorganisation of the judiciary also took place with the adoption of the first post-
communist law on the judiciary organization. Law 92/1992 entrenched the fundamental 
principle of the separation of powers between the judiciary and the other state branches, 
defined the rules for the appointment of judges and prosecutors and organised the 
Romanian court system into four levels of Courts (see Monitorul Oficial, 1992).  
                                                
27 See Articles 132-133, Constitution of Romania (Monitorul Oficial, 1991).  
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With regards to the role of the EU, in this initial period it did not exert much of a direct 
influence primarily because its conditionality did not systematically target the area of 
judiciary reforms.  As I have discussed in Chapter 3, the Europe Agreement that was 
signed in 1993 contained an explicit suspension clause that linked trade and economic 
cooperation to the respect of the rule of law. However, this did explicitly addressed 
judiciary independence, efficiency and accountability.  Indirect influences from Western 
Europe were of course present, as the models and practices in the member states served 
as a reference point for decision makers.  Yet, until the mid-1990s the reform process 
was primarily domestically driven, and it is only after Romania’s formal application for 
membership in 1995 that institutional and policy changes became responsive to the 
EU’s concerns.  The first explicit form of EU conditionality in the field of judiciary 
reforms came in fact only in 1997, when the European Commission issued its formal 
Opinion on Romania’s application for membership.  In this first assessment of the 
Romanian justice system the Commission noted:  
The Romanian judicial system is not working satisfactorily. The courts are 
overloaded and judgements can be a long time coming. The problems can be 
attributed to a shortage of qualified judges (23% of posts are vacant), a lack of 
equipment, complex procedures and the great number of new rules to be enforced 
(Commission of the European Communities, 1997a, p.15).  
 
It is significant to note how, albeit critical, the Commission did not make explicit 
reference to judicial independence and accountability, but merely questioned the ability 
of the justice system to enforce EU legislation.  According to the Commission, “the 
judicial system in Romania has important weaknesses, particularly concerning resources 
and relevant expertise.  Given this situation, the Commission has significant doubts 
about the ability of the system to assure the effective application of the acquis” 
(Commission of the European Communities, 1997a, p.104). 
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In the years that followed the EU progressively sharpened its conditionality and more 
precise requests were put forward to the Romanian authorities.  However, it is only in 
the 1999 Accession Partnership that the member states identified a set of clear priorities 
to improve the functioning of the judiciary.  These were: 1) Adoption of a new penal 
code; 2) Adoption of the law on penal procedures; 3) Limit the use of pre-trial 
detention; 4) Facilitate access to legal advice and representation; 5) Extend the court 
information system to all courts; 6) Improve the enforcement of civil judicial decisions 
(Official Journal, 1999a). These priorities targeted primarily the strengthening of 
judicial capacity to ensure the enforcement of the EU’s acquis.  The EU’s demands 
largely reflected the EU’s emphasis on efficiency rather than accountability and judicial 
independence because of the concern with Romania’s ability to implement the Single 
Market acquis effectively.  These latter issues would in fact enter the EU’s agenda only 
after 2000, with the opening of the accession negotiation.  
 
At domestic level, the CDR coalition that came into power after the 1996 elections 
showed willingness to improve the functioning of the justice system and address the 
European Commission’s criticism.  After the publication of the Commission avis, a 
number of measures were taken by Valeriu Stoica, the then Minister of Justice, to 
modernise the judiciary, including the strengthening of the National Institute of 
Magistrates as a specialised institution in charge of the training of judges and 
prosecutors, a rationalisation of the organizational structures of the Public Ministry, the 
creation of the People’s Advocates and the removal of some former communist judges 
from office (Monitorul Oficial, 1997). 
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The Minister of Justice also attempted to address the crucial problem of brain-drain in 
the judiciary by increasing salary levels and by launching an extensive recruitment 
campaign for judges, prosecutors and court clerks28.  The legislative framework was 
also modified to reinforce the administrative capacity of the judicial system, and some 
provisions addressed - albeit timidly - the issue of corruption and malpractice.  
However, the reform momentum proved short-lived.  In December 1999, the 
government brought to Parliament a package of draft laws on judiciary reforms 
(Monitorul Oficial, 1999a).  These addressed organisational and human resources issues 
that were highlighted by the European Commission in its previous report, especially in 
relation to attracting and retaining qualified judges and prosecutors and improving their 
status and salaries (see Commission of the European Communities, 1998a, p.9).  The 
amendments to the legal framework proposed by the Ministry also included a revision 
of the Civil Procedural Code, the creation of special sections within courts to deal with 
social security and labour law, and disciplinary measures for judges failing to deal with 
cases in due time.  
 
According to some legal practitioners, if introduced some of these measures would have 
considerably improved the efficiency of the judicial process and the speed of court 
procedures, bringing Romania a step closer to western standards29.  Yet, the coalition 
proved fractious and the Justice Minister was unable to find the necessary political 
                                                
28 Author’s interview with Valeriu Stoica, Minister of Justice 1996-2000, Bucharest, December 2006.  
29 This comment was made by different legal experts and practitioners interviewed by the author 
between September and December 2006.  These include the interview conducted with Madeleine 
Crohn, the country Director of ABA/CEELI, Iulian Gîlcă, who served as President of the SCM in 
2006 and Arin Octav Stanescu, a Bucharest based lawyer and President of the Romanian Insolvency 
Practitioners Association.   
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consensus to introduce most of the reforms promised30.  As a result, out of the whole 
package of legislation proposed, only some parts related to probation and the revision of 
the civil codes were approved via government ordinances while crucial issues related to 
the reorganization of the judiciary and the division of powers remained unanswered.  
 
When Romania opened the accession negotiations with the EU in 2000, the legal 
framework guaranteeing the independence and accountability of the judiciary still had 
to be created, including addressing the issue of executive control over judiciary affairs.  
A 2001 World Bank study commissioned by the Năstase government found major built-
in problems within the country’s justice system, especially in applying the most basic 
internationally recognised guarantees for judicial independence and accountability.  For 
the World Bank the Romanian justice system was “inefficient and perceived to be 
corrupt”, with judges “neither sufficiently independent nor accountable” (World Bank, 
2001a, p.4).  According to the report, the functioning of the justice system was 
undermined by slow court procedures, extensive control of the Minister of Justice over 
the judiciary, the weak role of the SCM as well as the poor organizational structure 
between judges and prosecutors (World Bank, 2001a, pp.10-15).  
 
Indeed, neither the 1991 Constitution nor the 1992 Law on Judicial Organization gave 
powers to the SCM, and the effective control of the justice system was firmly set in the 
hands of the executive via the Justice Minister, who was entrusted to ensure “the proper 
organization and functioning of the judiciary as a public service”31. 
                                                
30  Author’s interview with Valeriu Stoica, Minister of Justice 1996-2000, Bucharest, December 2006. 
31 Art. 18 Law no. 92/1992 (Monitorul Oficial, 1992). 
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The SCM was empowered to appoint, promote and revoke judges and prosecutors, 
including those in key managerial positions such as Presidents of courts, but these 
decisions were not independently formulated since the SCM could only act upon a 
recommendation from the Ministry of Justice.  Moreover, the SCM had no control over 
the administration of courts or budgetary issues, as it could only provide advisory 
opinions upon a direct request from the Justice Minister32.     
 
In the early 1990s the problem of political interference in judicial affairs had raised 
same concerns among EU officials33, but the only outspoken voice was the Council of 
Europe.  For instance, in its 1993 opinion on Romania’s application for membership the 
Council of Europe explicitly recommended to the Romanian authorities to address the 
question of judicial independence, by making “it impossible in future for a minister to 
give instructions to a judge” (Council of Europe, 1993).  But Iliescu and the PSDR had 
little interest in transforming the political and administrative power structures of the 
communist regime, and paid lip service to these requests.  Reforming the justice system 
into an efficient and accountable institution would have challenged their power basis 
and their network of patronage.  Thus, while proclaiming a commitment to democracy 
and EU integration the Romanian political class appeared unprepared to pay the costs of 
introducing sound democratic reforms.  When they returned to power in December 
2000, Iliescu and the PSDR/PSD committed once again to improve the country’s 
democratic credentials. 
                                                
32 Art. 88 Law no. 92/2002 (Monitorul Oficial, 1992). 
33  Authors’ interview with Enrico Grillo Pasquarelli, Head of Unit –Section, DG Enlargement, 
European Commission, Brussels, May 2006.  
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In the field of judiciary reforms, the executive under Adrian Năstase promised to restore 
“the authority of the state and of its institutions” and “the confidence in the act of 
justice” (Government of Romania, 2000, p. 21).  In particular, the government 
committed to enhancing the stability of the legislative framework, to introduce more 
coherent regulations governing judicial proceedings as well as to guarantee the 
predictability of the legislative policy, speed up the administration of justice and the 
enforcement of judicial decisions and enhance the professionalism and honesty of the 
judiciary (Government of Romania, 2000, p. 21).  Judiciary reforms based on 
“independence, authority, professionalism and Magistrates’ promotion on objective 
criteria basis” were also presented as a key step in the new anti-corruption strategy for 
2001-2004 (Government of Romania, 2001a).   
 
To achieve these objectives, the government promised a substantial revision of the law 
on judicial organization (i.e. Law 92/1992) in order to strengthen the role of the SCM, 
regulate the career system and the disciplinary procedures for magistrates (Government 
of Romania, 2001b, p.39).  According to the executive’s own commitment with the EU, 
these measures were going to be introduced by the end of 2002 at the latest 
(Government of Romania, 2001b, p.39).  However, these commitments did not translate 
into significant legislative or institutional changes, and during the first two years of the 
PSD administration hardly any progress was made in realising greater independence and 
professionalism of the judiciary.  As it soon became evident, this was rather ‘a 
calculated strategy’ to reassure foreign officials, but this did not reflect a generalised 
political consensus or political will to introduce radical changes into the justice system.  
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The slow pace of judiciary reforms did not go unnoticed.  Romania had opened the 
accession negotiations in 2000, and this gave the EU more room for using its leverage 
to push for domestic changes.  The European Commission and the EP became 
increasingly vocal on the state of the rule of law in the country, especially in relation to 
the question of judiciary independence, and this compelled the government to modify 
the legal framework regulating the justice system.   
 
From 2002 onwards, external pressure from the EU and other international 
organizations became the main driver of domestic reforms.  Fearing that the EU’s 
outspoken criticism would jeopardise the country’s chances to join NATO, in late 2002 
the Năstase’s executive committed to addressing the issues of the independence and 
accountability of the justice system via constitutional amendments34.  The revision of 
the Constitution in 2003 introduced the principles of the judiciary as an “independent 
branch of power” as well as the right to a fair trail within “a reasonable time”35.  The 
Constitutional amendments also introduced for the first time the principle of life-long 
tenure for magistrates and revised the composition and mandate of the SCM, granting 
this institution the sole decision-making powers for the promotion, transfer and 
sanctioning of judges and prosecutors36.  Moreover it was thanks to the immense 
pressure from the EU and the World Bank that the Chamber of Deputies finally 
relinquished, in 2003, its effective control over Supreme Court’s rulings by rescinding 
the much controversial right of the General Prosecutor to file extraordinary appeal to 
                                                
34  Authors’ interview with Enrico Grillo Pasquarelli, Head of Unit –Section, DG Enlargement, 
European Commission, Brussels, May 2006. 
35  Art. 124 Constitution of Romania as amended by Law No. 429/2003 (Monitorul Oficial, 2003a). 
36  Art. 125 Constitution of Romania as amended by Law No. 429/2003 (Monitorul Oficial, 2003a). 
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High Court sentences both in civil and criminal matters37.  Perhaps the clearest example 
of EU-induced reforms is the adoption of the so-called three-law package - Law on the 
Superior Council of Magistracy, Law on the Organization of the Judiciary, and Law on 
Magistrates38 – which introduced significant changes to the status of magistrates and 
brought important structural improvements to the court system through transparent and 
merit based criteria for the selections of judges.  This set of legislative provisions were 
adopted by the government following the EP’s motion in February 2004, which 
threatened to call for the suspension of the accession negotiations because of the 
country’s questionable democratic standards.  As I mentioned in Chapter 3, fearing a 
delay in the negotiations and hence the chance of Romania not closing the accession 
talks in time to accede in 2007, in March 2004 Năstase also agreed to a government 
reshuffle, with the replacement of Rodica Stănoiu that had come under fire for her 
excessive control over the judiciary.  To improve the government’s image in the eyes of 
the EU, Năstase appointed Cristian Diaconescu - a young party member from the 
reformist wing of PSD - as the head of the Ministry of Justice.   
 
                                                
37 Between 1994 and 1996 this ground was used extensively by the General Prosecutor – who under 
the Romanian legal system has supervisory review powers of courts’ decisions - to return unlawfully 
nationalised houses to its owners claiming that courts did not have jurisdiction over those cases. 
Despite strong criticism from the European Court of Human Rights pointing to a violation of the 
right of access to justice, this provision remained in the Civil Code until 2003 and in the Criminal 
Code until 2004, when it was finally dropped under the pressure of the European Commission and 
the World Bank.  Between 2001 and the end of 2004 this power was formally used only when courts 
adopted wrong decisions. According to Freedom House (2005a) this addressed the problem only in 
part. Since the correctness of a court’s decisions is a matter of interpretation, retaining the powers of 
the General Prosecutor still allowed for decisions to be scrapped and retried by a new panel of 
judges. Since cases were not randomly distributed, this left significant room for political 
intervention. For a full analysis see Freedom House (2005a, p. 22). 
38 See Monitorul Oficial (2004a), (2004b) and (2004c).  
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Drafted explicitly to comply with the EU’s demands - as the then Justice Minister 
confirmed to the author during an interview39 - the three-law package was, at least on 
paper, the first coherent attempt to systematically address the shortcomings of the 
justice sector, bringing the judicial legal framework broadly in line with European 
standards40.  As requested by the EU, the reform package stripped the Minister of 
Justice of most of its powers in favour of the SCM, which until then had no control over 
the recruitment, promotion, management and sanctions of judges and prosecutors.  
Significant amendments were also introduced for the appointment of judges, which 
were now required to pass an examination41.  
 
In its progress report published in late 2004 the European Commission welcomed the 
improvements introduced in the legal framework, but still noted how the new laws did 
not fully eliminate the opportunity for influencing the judicial process (Commission of 
the European Communities, 2004a, pp.19-20).  Many in Brussels doubted the 
government’s commitment to implement the reforms, and it did not go unnoticed how 
the PSD administration used the constitutional provision granting judges life-long 
tenure to appoint party affiliates in leading managerial positions within the high courts 
and in the SCM, thus effectively maintaining its grip on the judiciary (Commission of 
the European Communities, 2004a, pp.20). 
                                                
39  Author’s interview with Cristian Diaconescu, who served as Minister of Justice between March and 
December 2004, Bucharest, October 2006.  
40  Author’s interview with Renate Weber, Presidential Advisor to Băsescu on Constitutional and Legal 
Affairs and President of the Open Society Foundation in Romania, Bucharest, October 2006. 
41  Law  no. 92/1992 was very permissive on the nomination of magistrates without examination. Art. 
67, which was later abrogated, allowed appointing to the magistracy without examination persons 
holding a Ph.D in law or who had previously acted in the capacity of magistrate, general inspector, 
and legal counselor within the Ministry of Justice, law professors as well as lawyers or notaries with 
a minimum 5 years experience (See Monitorul Oficial, 1992).   
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Furthermore the Commission’s report expressed concerns over the level of corruption in 
the judiciary, and the Draft Common Position elaborated prior to the expected 
conclusion of the negotiations explicitly called on the member states to demand drastic 
actions to curb corruption in the justice system (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2004b, p.7).  NGOs remained equally critical on the state of the rule of 
law in the country. According to the 2004 Freedom House’s assessment:  
The Romanian courts are weakened by low budgets and excessive property 
lawsuits resulting from contradictory restitution legislation. But political 
interventionism remains the number one problem. Bad politics prompts bad justice 
in Romania, overriding any endemic organizational or administrative problems in 
the Judiciary (Freedom House, 2004, p.15).  
 
 
 
With this background in mind it is perhaps not surprising that Olli Rehn, who was 
appointed Commissioner for enlargement as Romania was finalising its negotiations, 
opted for a tough stance towards the Năstase’s executive.  As discussed in Chapter 3, as 
a condition for wrapping up the accession talks, Romania was forced to accept the 
introduction of a special postponement clause covering, among others, the 
implementation of judiciary reforms. In particular the Treaty of Accession singled out 
specific commitments with regards to the timetable, financing and human resources to 
implement the reforms as well as the full operability of the random distribution of cases, 
to prevent possible corruption or political interference in the allocation of cases to 
prosecutors and judges (See Box 4.2).  With this clause, the Commission aimed at 
securing the time and instruments to pressure the Romanian government to begin 
implementing the measures foreseen in the government’s reform strategy. 
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BOX 4.2. Specific Commitments undertaken by Romania in the field of Judiciary 
Reforms 
 
….  
(3)“To develop and implement an updated and integrated Action Plan and Strategy for the Reform of the 
Judiciary including the main measures for implementing the Law on the Organisation of the Judiciary, the 
Law on the Status of Magistrates and the Law on the Superior Council of Magistracy which entered into 
force on 30 September 2004. Both updated documents must be submitted to the Union no later than 
March 2005; adequate financial and human resources for the implementation of the Action Plan must be 
ensured and it must be implemented without further delay and according to the time schedule set. Romania 
must also demonstrate by March 2005 the full operationability of the new system for random distribution 
of cases”  
… 
    Source: Annex X, Treaty of Accession (Official Journal, 2005) 
 
 
 
The threat of a potential delay to the country’s accession proved an important external 
in stimulus to accelerating reforms prior to accession.  The first few months of 2005 
saw in fact an impressive flurry of justice reform activities.  In line with the EU’s 
demands, the Tariceǎnu government that came into power after the 2004 elections, 
adopted an ambitious reform strategy tackling some of the key shortcomings identified 
by the Commission in its previous annual reports (Government of Romania, 2005).  The 
2004 three-law package, which came into force under the PSD administration, was also 
amended and a clear distinction was introduced between judges and prosecutors making 
the latter independent in conducting investigations.  Objective criteria were also 
elaborated for the random distribution of cases to prosecutors and new rules were 
introduced to regulate the careers of magistrates.  These included the introduction of 
clear and objective rules for the promotion, transfer and revocation of positions as well 
as the establishment of the principle of open competition for leading positions, 
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including a new appointment and revocation procedure of the General Prosecutor and of 
the General Prosecutor of NAPO - the Romanian Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office 
(see Monitorul Oficial, 2005a).  Additional funds were also allocated for the 
modernisation of courts, for the training of judges and prosecutors on EU laws and for 
purchasing equipment.  A new Criminal Code was adopted (Monitorul Oficial, 2006a), 
and discussions began for the revision of the Criminal Procedural Code, to simplify and 
speed up the lengthy and often complicated judicial process42. A new code of conduct 
for magistrates was also approved, providing for the first time in Romanian law that 
judges and prosecutors must not have collaborated with the former Securitate and must 
not be working for any intelligence services while in office (see Superior Council of 
Magistracy, 2005). 
 
It is important to stress that while a number of these measures had been explicitly 
requested by the EU at the conclusion of the negotiations, such as the random allocation 
of court cases, others resulted primarily from the firm determination of the Minister of 
Justice.  The presence of the postponement clause and the EU’s extensive monitoring 
prior to accession had pushed judiciary reforms high on the domestic political agenda, 
helping the Minister to bypass opposition and present a wider set of measures than those 
foreseen in the Treaty of Accession.  As she openly admitted when interviewed by the 
author, “I would have not been very successful without the support of the European 
Commission and the postponement clause still being an option”43.  
 
                                                
42  Author’s interview with Ionut Codescu, State Secretary in the Ministry of Justice 2004-2007, 
Bucharest, November 2006.   
43 Author’s interview with Monica Macovei, Minister of Justice 2004-2007, Bucharest, November 
2006.  
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Thanks to these efforts, as well as those registered in fighting corruption, the 
government was able to secure accession to the EU in 2007. However, a number of 
issues remained open, especially in relation to accountability mechanisms and the 
potential conflict of interests of some of the appointed members of the SCM.  For these 
reasons the Commission elaborated a post-accession mechanism to maintain pressure on 
the Romanian authorities to continue the reforms, amid the risk of safeguard measures 
being introduced in the field of mutual recognition of criminal and civil law decisions.  
 
4.2.2 EU conditionality and Romania’s implementation record 
 
The Romanian justice system underwent a profound transformation in the past two 
decades.  Yet, the previous section has highlighted how efforts at establishing a modern, 
truly independent and effective justice system have been slow and hesitant and the most 
significant policy and institutional improvements came about primarily in response to 
the external pressure from the EU in the concluding phases of the accession process 
(such as the adoption of the three-law package in mid- 2004).  Have these reforms bore 
fruit? To what extent has the Romanian justice system been transformed into a modern, 
efficient and credible institution?  
 
The reforms initiated in 2004, together with the series of measures introduced by the 
Tariceǎnu government to speed court proceedings and improve the efficiency and 
independence of the judiciary, have brought about considerable improvements both at 
legal and institutional level.  Yet, few months ahead of Romania’s formal accession to 
the EU, the judicial system was still suffering from inefficiency, chronic uneven 
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application of the law, huge case workloads and lack of training.  A report released in 
late 2006 by three Romanian NGOs found that many of the statutes under which the 
Romanian judiciary operated were confusing, and problems have persisted in the 
effective separation of powers and judicial independence, especially concerning the 
appointment and promotion of judges and prosecutors (Open Society Foundation et al., 
2006, pp. 3-5).  Similarly, a 2006 assessment by Sojust  - a Romanian NGO specialised 
in the justice sector reforms – argued that Romanian justice system remained hampered 
by poor legal training and by the failure of successive governments to address 
coherently the reform of all legal professions (SoJust, 2006). 
 
Despite the new legal framework and the increase in budgetary allocation for the 
judiciary, improvements in court performance will take many years to become apparent 
and the judicial institutions empowered by the 2004 three-law package, such as the 
SCM, will need to develop their administrative capacity to use productively their power.  
The new role and status of judges envisaged by the new laws has also to be realised 
through acquiring new judicial skills and the strengthening of accountability 
mechanisms.  According to a 2008 assessment by the European Commission, “the 
performance of the Romanian judicial system is hampered by legal uncertainty due to 
many factors, including an uneven application of the law and the excessive use of 
emergency decrees. It will take some time for the reform to take firm root” (Commission 
of European Communities, 2008, p.2). 
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Several surveys carried out since 2000 showed that successive reforms have registered 
only a minor improvement in citizens’ trust and the judiciary is largely perceived as 
corrupt, inefficient and unaccountable.  A 2001 survey on corruption carried out by the 
World Bank found that the Judiciary was perceived as one of the most corrupt 
institutions in Romania, second only to customs officers (World Bank, 2001b, p. 5).  
Similarly, a 2005 Eurobarometer opinion poll indicated that only one-third of 
Romanians trusted the justice system, twenty percentage points lower than the 
confidence among EU15 citizens (Commission of the European Communities, 2005c, 
p.7).  Corruption and public trust are by nature difficult to measures.  However these 
surveys suggest a lack of confidence of ordinary citizens in the act of justice and they 
mirror the weaknesses of the judicial system.  The persistent and often evident 
inefficiency of most courts has crushed public trust in the rule of law, and although 
recent reforms have contributed much to the modernisation of the justice system, it will 
take many years before results in performance will become visible.  
 
4.3 How Domestic Factors affected compliance 
 
Several domestic factors can help explain why Romania faced considerable difficulties 
in establishing a modern, efficient and accountable judiciary.  An obvious starting point 
is to make references to the legacy of the communist past.  As I mentioned earlier in this 
chapter, Romania entered post-communist transition with a highly dysfunctional and 
discredited justice system, and four decades of communism had undermined the 
institutional independence and accountability of judges and prosecutors.   
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Transforming the justice system from an instrument of socialist power into an 
institution devoted to safeguarding the rule of law entailed profound changes at legal, 
institutional and structural levels.  Yet, if communism had an important bearing on the 
functioning of the judicial system, many of the built-in problems of the Romanian 
justice system have been acerbated by the failure of successive post-communist 
governments to introduce coherent and effective reforms.   
 
The absence of a clear reformist agenda for the judiciary is most evident when looking 
at the question of judiciary independence and the executives’ resistance to relinquish 
control over the justice system.  One significant step would have been to grant more 
powers to the SCM, as repeatedly highlighted by the European Commission and expert 
evaluations.  However, external pressure did not bear fruit until 2004 when, facing a 
credible risk of a delay in concluding the accession negotiations, the Năstase 
government launched a comprehensive reform of the justice sector that reflected the 
recommendations of the World Bank and the accession’s demands set by the EU.  Until 
then the Minister of Justice enjoyed enormous control over the justice system, playing a 
major role in appointing, promoting and removing judges from office.  
 
The resistance of the executive to ease its control over the judiciary was not an issue 
unique to Romania, and was common to many other post-communist countries.  In 
Slovakia, for example, until 2002 the executive retained almost total administrative 
control over the judiciary and only constitutional amendments allowed for the creation 
of a judicial Council with a far-reaching administrative authority that ensured judicial 
independence (Commission of the European Communities, 2002c).  
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Latvia was also criticised by the Commission for the failure to address judiciary 
independence and the efficiency of the justice system, especially with regards to the 
rules governing the career structures and appointment procedures of judges and court 
personnel (Commission of the European Communities, 2002d).   However, in the case 
of Romania, the extensive powers held by the Ministry of Justice were used under the 
Năstase administration in a rather “Machiavellian way” – as one EU official defined it44 
- to ensure full subordination of the judiciary to political power.  Indeed, between 2000 
and 2004, the conservative and highly controversial Justice Minister Stănoiu widely 
resorted to her extensive powers to intimidate judges and prosecutors45.  Many feared 
for their jobs and the practise of sending inspectors to investigate individual cases 
became a common day-to-day affair during her term in office46.  To paraphrase a 
comment made by Adrian Năstase, Rodica Stănoiu was giving “too much of a personal 
touch to the judiciary”47. Political control over courts’ decisions was also secured via 
the appointment of political affiliates in key managerial positions. One of the most 
notorious cases was Iliescu’s appointment of Şerban Stănoiu, husband of the then 
Justice Minister, as a judge to the Constitutional Court48.  
 
                                                
44  Author’s interview with Sabine Zwanepoel, Desk Officer Romania 2000-2007, DG JLS, European 
Commission, Brussels, April 2006. 
45  For media coverage see, for example, ‘Presedintele CSJ denunta presiunile factorului politic asupra 
magistratilor de la Suprema’, Adevarul, 17 June 2002. 
46  Author’s interview with Viorica Costiniu, judge at Bucharest’s Court of Appeal and President of the 
Association of Magistrates, Bucharest, November 2006. 
47  Author’s interview with Adrian Năstase, Prime Minister of Romania 2000- 2004, Bucharest, October 
2006. 
48  See ‘Opoziţia critică numirea lui Şerban Viorel Stănoiu la Curtea Constituţională’,  Ziua, 6 June 
2001. 
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If the political class in Romania has proven to be a successful obstacle to the creation of 
a modern and efficient justice system, other powerful ‘veto players’ have played a 
significant role in slowing down the reform process.  One of the most powerful has been 
the Romanian Constitutional Court whose decisions have significantly slowed down the 
modernisation of the justice system and democratic reforms in the country.   
 
According to the Romanian Constitution, the Constitutional Court is entrusted to ensure 
that legislation, regulations and government ordinances are not in breach of the 
Constitution49.  In this respect the Constitutional Court plays an important role in 
restraining any possible abuse of political power.  Yet, in the past two decades the 
Romanian Constitutional Court has had difficulties in finding its ‘soul’ (Weber, 2002).  
While in many post-communist countries - especially Bulgaria, Slovakia and Hungary - 
the Constitutional Courts have acted as a powerful guardian of judicial independence 
(Boulanger, 2006; Ganev, 2002; Malová, 2002), in Romania it acted more as a tool in 
the hands of political will rather than an institution guaranteeing the respect of 
constitutional rights.  As Schwartz critically noted (1999, p. 210), in the first five years 
of the transition the court essentially “rubber-stamped everything Iliescu has done”. 
 
Indeed, in the past two decades the Constitutional Court has used its powers several 
times to block reforms.  One of the most recent and controversial decisions is the 2005 
ruling that declared unconstitutional several amendments to the three-law package that 
were proposed by the Tăriceanu government in order to fulfil the commitments laid 
down by the EU in the Treaty of Accession.  
                                                
49 See Art. 146, Romanian Constitution, (Monitorul Oficial, 1991). 
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As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the three-law package was originally adopted in 
September 2004, under the PSD-administration, following the EP’s open criticism of 
the rule of law in the country.  However, while at the time the Constitutional Court did 
not raise any concerns on the legality of many of its provisions, in July 2005, it declared 
unconstitutional four major articles of the amended law, including the provision 
lowering the retiring age of magistrates that aimed at opening the system to younger 
magistrates.  The Court also opposed the provisions regulating the appointment of head 
of courts.  According the amendments proposed by the government, the heads of courts, 
most of which had been appointed under the PSD administration, should be dismissed 
and replaced by judges appointed via open competition.  Finally, the Court opposed the 
provision setting the incompatibility of SCM membership (a permanent position) with 
other management positions in the judiciary.  According to the Constitutional Court’s 
ruling, this provision could only apply to the President and Vice President of SCM, but 
not to the other members that were allowed to maintain dual status (see Monitorul 
Oficial, 2005b).  
 
Practitioners and legal experts have been divided on the correctness of the interpretation 
of the constitutional provisions and the reasoning behind the Constitutional Court’s 
decision50. However, there are at least some doubts on the real motivation of the 
constitutional judges, especially because the decision largely reflected the position of 
PSD, the main opposition party51.   
                                                
50  According to information received during interviews, even the members of the SCM who were 
benefiting most from the ruling had different interpretations on the Constitutional Court’s decision, 
finding discrepancies in the line of reasoning adopted by the Constitutional judges.   
51 In May and June 2005 Adrian Năstase – that at the time was serving as President of the Chamber of 
Deputies - sent two letters to the European Commission to complain about the changes proposed by 
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In practical terms this decision maintained the status quo with regards to judicial 
appointments and positions, and for some Brussels officials it aimed at halting the 
reform process initiated by the Minister of Justice.  In the words of a senior EU official 
interviewed by the author, the Constitutional Court’s decision “is a clear sign of 
resistance to any efforts to bring into the system young and reform oriented 
magistrates”52. 
 
The conservative attitude of many judges, prosecutors and those serving in the legal 
profession has also represented a major obstacle for the correct implementation of the 
reforms.  During her term in office, clashes between the SCM and Monica Macovei on 
the direction of the reforms were regular features of the weekly SCM’s plenary 
sessions.  For some senior judges, the new Minister did not respect the prerogatives of 
the SCM and “she had an absurd pretension to change everything”, as a former 
President of SCM told the author when interviewed53.  Indeed, the fundamental problem 
is that despite the efforts to bring young magistrates into the justice system, many 
conservative judges that were trained under communism have remained in the Supreme 
Courts and in the SCM, where they now serve in managerial positions due to the 
seniority requirements.  
 
                                                                                                                                          
the Minister of Justice to the three-law package, especially the provisions modifying the statute of 
magistrates. Attached to the letters there was a detailed list of specific amendments proposed by 
Ministry that, according to Năstase, were in breach of the Constitution. Most of these amendments 
were later judged unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court, and for very similar reasons.  The 
author obtained access to these documents but given their sensitivity the source cannot be attributed.  
52 Private conversation with a senior European Commission’s official that for professional reasons has 
preferred to remain anonymous (Brussels, July 2005). 
53 Author’s interview with Dan Lupascu, President of the Bucharest Court of Appeal and President of 
the SCM between December 2004 and December 2005, Bucharest, November, 2006.  
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The members of the SCM who were nominated in December 2004 were primarily 
Heads of Courts, and some are known to be close to political networks and have a 
history of collaboration with the former Securitate54.   As a result, the newly appointed 
SCM only managed to transform itself from an inactive institution into an effective 
guarantor of the status quo, suffering from huge legitimacy problems, conflicts of 
interest, lack of accountability and a poor public image.  As a 2006 report from 
Freedom House critically noted:  
This SCM did not delay in positioning itself as a defender of corporate 
interests rather than a reformer and controller of the judiciary. Members 
insisted on keeping their double capacity as head of courts and controllers of 
the same courts.  They denied the existence of corruption within the judiciary 
and hired most of their staff from the Ministry of Justice.  Many employees 
of the ministry, precisely those who had been accused for years of delaying 
early reforms, followed the transfer of power from the ministry to the council 
and considerable delays were again incurred on long-discussed reforms, such 
as introducing clear standards for the evaluation and promotion of judges 
Freedom House (2006, pp.13-14).  
 
 
As we shall see in Chapter 5, the conservative attitude of a vast segment of the judiciary 
has also undermined the fight against corruption, especially high-level political 
corruption.  Because of the normalcy of political interference of the executive in judicial 
affairs, there have seldom been cases where a judicial decision was issued against the 
will of the executive.  Indeed, despite hundreds of corruption allegations being exposed 
in the media, hardly any have led to successful convictions, especially when they 
involved well-know political figures. 
                                                
54 The most notorious case is that of Florica Bejinariu, member of the SCM, who admitted being a 
Securitate informer but did not resign from her position.  In 2006 the SCM decided against a request 
from the Ministry of Justice to have her removed. Other 10 members of the SCM have been 
investigated by the National Council for the Study of the Securitate Archives (CNSAS), the authority 
responsible for the administration of the archives of the Securitate.  See ‘‘CSM amână decizia în 
cazul Băjinariu’, Ziua, 6 September 2006; “Zece membri CSM au statut incert de la CNSAS’, 
România Liberă, 17 December 2007.  
 
 113 
Besides the successful political and institutional resistance to the reforms, the overall 
efficiency of the judiciary has also been undermined by a long list of built-in problems 
that slowed down and hindered the correct and uniform implementation of legislative 
provisions.  A major problem has been Romania’s tendency to over-regulation, which 
produced a constantly changing and uncertain legal framework.  Surveys carried out 
within the judiciary found judges, prosecutors and practitioners mostly complaining that 
laws changed too quickly, were often poorly drafted and inconsistent with one another 
(World Bank, 2001a).  A cause of these inconsistencies has been the extensive use of 
governmental decrees, a tendency that has characterised the Romanian legislative 
process for most of its transition period (Stan, 2002).  This affected judiciary efficiency 
because it often led to inconsistent court decisions and increased courts’ workload, 
especially for the high courts that had to reconsider decisions in appeal cases55. The 
efficiency of the Romanian judicial system has also been undermined by case overloads 
and long judgements, a problem that resulted not only from legislative instability but 
also from the chronic shortages of qualified judges and prosecutors, lack of modern 
equipment, inefficient court procedures and poor enforcement of court decisions.  Some 
of these issues were progressively addressed, and the increase in funds for the judiciary 
has reduced staff vacancies and has freed-up time for magistrates’ training.   
 
However, despite the progress being made, major issues related to the inefficient court 
procedures and poor enforcement of court decisions have hardly been addressed in 
successive reforms and, at the time of writing, they remain open questions affecting 
                                                
55  Author’s interview with Viorica Costiniu, judge at the Bucharest Court’s of Appeal and President of 
the Magistrates Association, (Bucharest, November 2006).  
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judicial capacity and the credibility of the Romanian justice system.  All in all, the 
judiciary has suffered from the consequences of half-hearted and largely cosmetic 
reforms that created inefficiencies and structural shortcomings.  The substantial 
reorganisation and rationalisation of the justice system that has taken place since 2004 
has addressed some of the system’s key shortcomings, but the picture remains in flux 
and it will take many years before the impact of most legislative provisions will become 
apparent.  
 
The systemic weaknesses of the Romanian justice system raise questions on the overall 
effect of EU conditionality and the extent to which it provoked long-lasting and 
irreversible changes.  As highlighted in the previous section, in the first decade of 
Romania’s post-communist transition the EU failed to address the specific weaknesses 
of the Romanian justice systems, especially in relation to its dubious independence and 
accountability.  Despite evidence of corruption and effective subordination of a large 
segment of the judiciary to the political power, for most of the pre-accession and 
accession period the EU remained mostly silent and at best superficial in its progressive 
assessment of the rule of law in the country.  Indeed, until 2000 the Commission annual 
assessments focused almost exclusively on problems in court proceedings, case 
backlog, low staffing levels and poor training for judges and prosecutors but were 
surprisingly silent on the evident lack of judicial independence and undue interference 
of the executive in judicial affairs.  When the question of judicial independence was 
finally raised in 2000, the Commission only limited itself to a moderate criticism 
pointing out that “the Minister of Justice continues to have a significant influence over 
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judicial appointments and this is an issue that remains to be addressed” (Commission of 
the European Communities, 2000, p.18).  
 
From 2001 onwards, EU policy-makers and Brussels officials became increasingly 
vocal in demanding reforms tackling the independence of the judiciary, especially in the 
concluding phases of the accession negotiations.  This forced the Romanian political 
class to act with drastic measures to calm the EU’s criticism.  But despite the mounting 
evidence of the effective subordination of the judiciary to the political power, in the last 
decade the European Commission never challenged its assessment of Romania fulfilling 
the Copenhagen political criteria.  In doing so, the Commission failed to appreciate that 
many of the built-in problems affecting the Romanian justice system and its efficiency 
were a direct consequence of the political control and undue interference of the political 
class in judicial affairs.  The lack of accountability and independence led in fact to a 
slow internalisation of the reforms and many of the acute problems still registered today 
in the justice system are the result of a failure to address these issues in the early years 
of transition.  In the concluding phases of Romania’s accession the EU tried to remedy 
to these shortcomings, and between 2004 and 2006 the Commission showed less 
reluctance in using the conditionality stick to put pressure on the Romanian authorities.  
This proved successful in accelerating the reforms, but changes did come about perhaps 
too late to ensure that the Romanian justice system would be ready for EU accession. 
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4. 4. Conclusion 
 
The preceding discussion has examined the scope and limits of EU influence on 
judiciary reforms in Romania, highlighting the impact of EU conditionality on policy 
and institutional developments.   
 
The findings of this case study can be summed up as follows.  With regards to the first 
research question - i.e. the impact of the EU’s accession conditionality on domestic 
policies and institutional choices – the reform trajectory in the field of justice since 
1989 has substantiated the argument about the importance of EU conditionality and its 
impact on policy frameworks and institutional structures.  The review of judiciary 
reforms has illustrated, in particular, that the EU impact varied over time and EU 
conditionality became extremely powerful after the EU's formal commitment to 
enlargement and the opening of the accession negotiations.  As mentioned in the 
previous sections, in the initial transition period the EU did not exert much of a direct 
influence on policy changes, primarily because the conditionality attached to the Europe 
Agreement did not explicitly target judiciary reforms.  It is only from the mid 1990s 
onwards, when the EU began to put forward increasingly specific requests, that most of 
the institutional and policy changes can be registered. 
 
The empirical argument has also demonstrated that the EU's leverage was most 
effective during the decision-making phases.  For instance, the harsh criticism made by 
the EP in early 2004 was the determinant factor in the government’s reshuffle that 
paved the way for the passage and approval of the three-law package.  
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This introduced significant changes to the legal and institutional framework and brought 
it broadly in line with the EU’s accession conditions.  Similarly, it was the threat of 
delaying by one year the date of Romania’s accession that compelled the executive to 
speed up the reform efforts after the closure of the accession negotiations in 2004.  The 
empirical evidence has also shown that the vagueness of the EU’s accession 
conditionality did not prevent Brussels from exercising its leverage, as much of the 
Europeanization literature would predict.  The lack of EU wide-standards on judiciary 
independence, accountability and efficiency did not prevent the European Commission 
from spelling out these as requirements for accession nor did not constrain the ability of 
the EU to exercise its leverage.  Indeed, when Brussels showed willingness to sanction 
Romania for its failure to introduce legal guarantees for the independence and the 
accountability of the judiciary, it succeeded in provoking domestic changes.  
 
In assessing the scope of EU influence the empirical analysis also looked at whether the 
EU’s leverage brought about durable and effective policy changes.  As argued in the 
preceding sections, the empirical evidence is mixed as a number of questions remain 
open on the long-term sustainability of many EU-driven reforms.  At the moment of 
accession the Romanian justice system was still affected by chronic inefficiencies and 
over politicisation.  While the extensive reform process launched from 2004 onwards 
represented an important step forward to improving the functioning of the judicial 
sectors and enhance legal guarantees for its independence and accountability, these 
reforms had a very late start and it will take time before improvements in the overall 
efficiency of the justice system will become visible.  
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The analysis of judiciary reforms in Romania has also corroborated the research 
hypothesis on the crucial role that domestic factors had in mitigating the potentially 
powerful scope of the EU's leverage and in constraining reform potentials.  As I have 
illustrated in section 3, the systemic weaknesses of the Romanian justice system are the 
product of half-hearted and often cosmetic reforms, resulting from the unwillingness (or 
inability) of its successive post-communist governments to tackle judiciary reforms 
coherently.  Indeed, a number of key legislative and institutional measures to ensure the 
full independence, accountability and efficiency of the justice system were long 
delayed, and when legislation was passed, legal compliance was not always matched by 
effective implementation.  As a result, the Romanian justice system has struggled to 
transform itself into a credible, efficient and accountable institution and it remains 
affected by chronic structural deficiencies, many of which will take many years to 
overcome.  
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Chapter 5 
Fighting Corruption 
 
 
This chapter continues the line of argument opened in Chapter 4 while assessing the 
impact of EU conditionality on the framing and implementation of anti-corruption 
policies in Romania in the context of its accession to the EU.  As in the case of judiciary 
reforms, the fight against corruption was high on the EU’s political agenda for its 
enlargement to CEE.  EU policy-makers were especially concerned with the negative 
impact of corruption on economic and democratic development, as well as on the 
implementation of EU policies and the misuse of EU funds to support institutional 
reforms in the candidate states.  The fight against corruption was also a central issue 
during Romania’s negotiations for EU accession especially because, for most of its 
transition, the country ranked as the most corrupt among the CEE candidates and 
limited efforts have been made to tackle this problem effectively.  The main difference 
between the two case studies lays in the fact that the fight against corruption entered the 
EU’s political agenda already in the mid 1990s and the EU has in place some anti-
corruption legislation.  This helped the European Commission put forward a more 
detailed conditionality on the negotiating table.   
 
As in the case of the previous chapter, the empirical analysis looks at the domestic 
impact of EU conditionality, identifying how the EU’s leverage intervened in shaping 
domestic decision-making. 
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In particular the analysis scans the empirical material for evidence in support of the two 
main hypotheses put forward by this study.  To reiterate, this thesis posits that the EU’s 
accession conditionality played an important role in shaping domestic policies and 
institutional structures, including measures targeting the prevention and punishment of 
corruption.  However, this thesis also suggests that EU’s powerful leverage was 
mitigated and constrained by factors emanating by the domestic environment.  The 
empirical analysis will highlight how the lack of political will, powerful vested 
interests, institutional deficiencies and legal inconsistencies have slowed down internal 
reforms and undermined the anti-corruption legal framework, thus effectively 
hampering efforts to eradicate corruption in the country.   
 
To outline my argument this chapter uses the same structure as Chapter 4.  Section 5.1 
outlines the content of the EU’s demands as tabled for the aspiring members of the 5th 
enlargement.  Section 5.2 turns to the analysis of domestic reforms in Romania, tracing 
the impact of the EU’s accession conditionality on policy and institutional changes.  
Section 5.3 explains Romania’s uneven implementation record in fighting corruption, 
and identifies the main domestic factors that slowed down reforms and undermined the 
effectiveness of the legal and institutional measures put in place to fulfil the EU’s entry 
conditions.  
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5.1 Background to the EU’s Approach 
 
Corruption has been a major issue of concern for the EU in its relations with the 
countries of CEE, and curbing corruption one the most urgent requirements for 
accession.  Unlike issues related to judiciary reforms, the question of corruption in the 
candidate states was high on the EU’s agenda already in the mid 1990s, and in its 
annual Reports the European Commission has been critical and stringent in evaluating 
efforts in tackling this problem.  For example, in its 1998 Composite Report the 
European Commission noted:  
The fight against corruption needs to be strengthened further. The efforts 
undertaken by the candidate states are not always commensurate with the 
gravity of the problem. Although a number of countries are putting in place 
new programmes on control and prevention, it is too early to assess the 
effectiveness of such measures. There is a certain lack of determination to 
confront the issue and to root out corruption in most of the candidate 
countries (Commission of the European Communities, 1998b, p.4).  
 
 
In a similar vein, the 2001 assessment pointed out:  
In most countries anti-corruption bodies have been strengthened, and 
progress has been made in legislation, in such areas as public procurement 
and public access to information… Notwithstanding these efforts, 
corruption, fraud and economic crime remain widespread in many candidate 
countries, where they contribute to a lack of confidence by the citizens and 
discredit reforms. Continued, vigorous measures are required to tackle this 
problem(Commission of the European Communities, 2001b, p.10).  
 
 
The attention of EU policy-makers to anti-corruption activities in the candidate 
states is not surprising if one considers the potentially negative impact of 
corruption on democratic reforms and economic development.  It is in fact widely 
recognised that corruption, especially political corruption, is highly detrimental to 
democracy and its consolidation because it undermines the proper functioning of 
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state institutions, affects the efficiency and quality of public services and induces 
public mistrust in institutions and state representatives (Diamond, 1999; Doig and 
Theobald, 2000).  Moreover, corruption undermines economic development and 
negatively affects economic growth. Research has shown how corruption hinders 
investments, distorts the regulatory and legal framework on which businesses rely 
on, weakens the financial system, strengthens the underground economy and can 
distort governments’ spending decisions (see, Campos et al., 1999; Gray and 
Kaufmann, 1998; Mauro 1995, 1998; Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997).  In a 
comprehensive assessment published in 2002 Elliot so described the potentially 
dangerous impact of corruption:  
When it is pervasive and uncontrolled, corruption thwarts economic 
development and undermines political legitimacy. Less pervasive variants 
result in wasted resources, increased inequity in resource distribution, less 
political competition and greater distrust of government. Creating and 
exploiting opportunities for bribery at high levels of government also 
increases the costs of government, distorts the allocation of government 
spending, and may dangerously lower the quality of infrastructure. Even 
relatively petty or routine corruption can rob government of revenues, distort 
economic decision-making, and impose negative externalities on societies, as 
dirtier air and water or unsafe buildings. (Elliot, 2002, p.925) 
 
 
EU policy-makers were also concerned with the potentially negative impact of 
corruption on the correct implementation of the acquis.  The EU legal system rests on 
the assumption that its legislation is implemented, observed and enforced by the courts 
and the public administration of the member states.  Extensive corruption can 
undermine their effective implementation and enforcement, hence jeopardise the 
efficacy of EU policies at national level. 
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Despite corruption affecting to different degrees all modern societies, including the old 
EU member states, this became a particularly pressing issue during the accession 
negotiations with the CEE candidate because of the peculiarity of post-communist 
transition that provided a fertile ground for the proliferation of corruption at the very 
heart of state institutions.  A number of studies have shown how corruption, which was 
a common phenomenon during the communist period, expanded very rapidly during the 
early transition period, owing to the weakness of state rules and institutions and the 
profound economic and political transformation occurring in CEE in the early 1990s 
(see, for example, Andvig, 2002; Rose-Ackerman,1999; Sajó, 2003).   
 
Indeed, the transition from socialism brought about a radical restructuring of basic state 
institutions and market structures, with a massive transfer of wealth from the state to the 
private sector through the privatisation of public entities.  In many countries, corruption 
has had a significant impact on this process, encoding advantages in the new rules and 
institutions for narrow vested interests (Ganev, 2007; World Bank, 2000, pp.25-37). 
Moreover, in post-communist societies the state entered transition as the overwhelming 
dominant actor in all realms of society, becoming in many instances the principal agent 
of corruption behind those networks of power and privileges that formed and shaped 
communist societies. 
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5.1.1 EU accession conditionality in the area of Anti-Corruption 
 
Strictly speaking, the EU’s anti-corruption policy falls under negotiating Chapter 24 on 
JHA, but EU legislation per se is very limited.  The instruments developed at EU level 
have been primarily conceived to protect the EU’s financial interest and focus mostly on 
harmonising bribery legislation, extending the criminalisation of corruption to foreign 
officials and officials of international organisations as well as progressively promoting 
judicial cooperation among the member states56.  
 
Despite the EU’s own limited acquis, the candidate states were presented with a broad 
range of internal and external measures to be introduced as a condition for accession. 
With regards to internal measures, during the negotiations the European Commission 
especially emphasised: 1) The drafting of comprehensive anti-corruption strategies and 
implementing Action Plans; 2) The adoption of specific anticorruption legislation; 3) 
The amendment of the criminal and civil law legislation incorporating definitions and 
sanctioning mechanisms contained in international and EU conventions; 4) The 
establishment of anti-corruption bodies; and 5) The reorganization of power and 
competences of law enforcement agencies responsible for investigating and prosecuting 
corruption cases ( see, Commission of the European Communities, 2003b).   
 
                                                
56  For example, the 1995 Convention on the Protection of the European Communities’ financial 
interests established minimum standards to be incorporated into domestic criminal law dealing with 
fraud against the EU’s budget (Official Journal, 1995a), while the 1997 Convention on the Fight 
against Corruption introduced EU definitions of “active” and “passive corruption” of EU officials, 
imposing on the member states the duty to ensure national legislation covers all aspects of these 
definitions (Official Journal, 1997a).  In an effort at curbing corruption within EU’s institutions, the 
European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) was also established in 1999 with the task of investigating 
fraud, corruption and misconduct (Official Journal, 1999b).  
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As for external actions, the CEE candidates were requested to sign and ratify several 
international anti-corruption instruments such as the Council of Europe’s Criminal and 
Civil Law Conventions on Corruption (Council of Europe 1999a, 1999b), the 
Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from 
Crime (Council of Europe, 1990), the 2003 UN Convention against Corruption (United 
Nations, 2003) and the 1997 OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials (OECD,1997).  
 
The EU has also asked active participation in international anti-corruption mechanisms 
such as GRECO - the Group of States against Corruption set by the Council of Europe 
in 1999.   Through its regular monitoring reports GRECO has provided detailed 
assessments of the compliance efforts of the candidate states, including Romania, and 
these explicitly constituted the benchmarks used by the Commission to assess the 
progress made in fulfilling the accession requirements (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2003b).  
 
As an integral part of the accession process, all candidate states were also requested to 
harmonize their national legislation in areas that are crucial to the fight against 
corruption, despite the fact that they do not fall, strictly speaking, under the anti-
corruption label. These include the harmonization of public procurement rules and 
reforms of the public procurement systems in order to comply with EU directives and 
regulations, as well as the introduction of regulations for financial control and state 
audit for the management of EU funds. 
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BOX 5.1. Ten principles for Improving the Fight against Corruption 
 
1) To ensure credibility, a clear stance against corruption is essential from leaders and decision-makers. 
Bearing in mind that no universally applicable recipes exist, national anti-corruption strategies or 
programmes, covering both preventive and repressive measures, should be drawn up and implemented.  
These strategies should be subject to broad consultation at all levels.  
 
2) Current and future EU Members shall fully align with the EU acquis and ratify and implement all main 
international anti-corruption instruments they are party to (UN, Council of Europe and OECD 
Conventions). Third countries should sign and ratify as well as implement relevant international anti-
corruption instruments.  
 
3) Anti-corruption laws are important, but more important is their implementation by competent and 
visible anti-corruption bodies (i.e. well trained and specialised services such as anti-corruption 
prosecutors). Targeted investigative techniques, statistics and indicators should be developed. The role of 
law enforcement bodies should be strengthened concerning not only corruption but also fraud, tax 
offences and money laundering.  
 
4) Access to public office must be open to every citizen. Recruitment and promotion should be regulated 
by objective and merit-based criteria. Salaries and social rights must be adequate. Civil servants should be 
required to disclose their assets. Sensitive posts should be subject to rotation.  
 
5) Integrity, accountability and transparency in public administration (judiciary, police, customs, tax 
administration, health sector, public procurement) should be raised through employing quality 
management tools and auditing and monitoring standards, such as the Common Assessment Framework 
of EU Heads of Public Administrations and the Strasbourg Resolution. Increased transparency is 
important in view of developing confidence between the citizens and public administration.  
 
6) Codes of conduct in the public sector should be established and monitored.  
 
7) Clear rules should be established in both the public and private sector on whistle blowing (given that 
corruption is an offence without direct victims who could witness and report it) and reporting. 
 
8) Public intolerance of corruption should be increased, through awareness- raising campaigns in the 
media and training. The central message must be that corruption is not a tolerable phenomenon, but a 
criminal offence. Civil society has an important role to play in preventing and fighting the problem.  
 
9) Clear and transparent rules on party financing, and external financial control of political parties, should 
be introduced to avoid covert links between politicians and (illicit) business interests. Political parties 
evidently have strong influence on decision-makers, but are often immune to anti-bribery laws.  
 
10) Incentives should be developed for the private sector to refrain from corrupt practices such as codes 
of conduct or “white lists” for integer companies. 
 
 
Source: Commission of the European Communities (2003b)  
 
The European Commission also actively called for anti-corruption measures targeting 
the judiciary and the public administration, demanding the introduction of transparent 
recruitment rules, high professional standards and increased remuneration levels as 
means to curb corruption within state institutions.  
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The full scope of the EU’s accession demands in the field of anti-corruption was spelled 
out in 2003 when the Commission presented the measures for preventing and combating 
corruption in Europe and proposed ten principles for improving the fight against 
corruption in acceding, candidate and other third countries (See Box 5.1).  Besides legal 
measures, the Commission emphasised the establishment of anti-corruption bodies, the 
training of specialised staff, civil service reforms as well as awareness-raising 
campaigns in the media and party financing regulations. These principles spelled out the 
full the scope of EU conditionality that Romania was requested to comply with. 
 
5.2 The Impact of EU Conditionality on Anti-Corruption policies 
 in Romania 
 
Romania has consistently been ranked as the most corrupt country among the CEE 
candidates and among the states worst affected by corruption in the world. The 2002 
Transparency International Survey of 102 countries ranked Romania 77th, behind 
Uzbekistan, Tanzania, Ethiopia and Zimbabwe (Transparency International, 2002). In 
the following years the country followed an aggravating trend, hitting its worst rank 
(87th) in 2004 when finalising the accession negotiations for EU accession 
(Transparency International, 2004).  
 
Various reasons have been given to explain the scale and the persistence of the 
corruption phenomenon in Romania, from the cultural legacy of its Balkan tradition of 
bribing officials to the legacy of its communist regime, which deeply impoverished the 
country forcing ordinary citizens to try to win the favour of the powerful elites in order 
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to have access to goods and services.  This made corruption and bribery a deep-rooted 
every-day affair affecting all layers of society, from doctors to top party officials (Stan, 
2005).  Other scholars have pointed to the particularistic nature of Romanian society, 
with its marked popular mistrust in public officials, high political migration and a 
protracted control of key positions and resources by a restricted group of powerful 
individuals (Mungiu-Pippidi, 1997).   
 
Independently of its causes, Romania experienced some of the worst effects of 
corruption in the first fifteen years of its transition, with irresponsible privations and 
extensive fraud of public money that enriched a small group of influential individuals 
but left millions of ordinary Romanians without their lifetime savings.  Yet, fighting 
corruption figured high on the political agenda of all the successive post-communist 
governments.  This raises a number of questions on the political will of Romania’s 
political class to embark in effective reforms as well as the limits of EU conditionality 
to promote effective and long-lasting policy changes.  
 
5.2.1 EU conditionality and Anti-Corruption policies after 1989 
 
Romania entered post-communist transition with no pre-existing anti-corruption legal 
framework and the need to satisfy the EU’s entry conditions has been the main driver of 
anti-corruption policies in the country.  The first explicit form of conditionality in the 
field of anti-corruption was put forward by the EU in 1998, when the member states 
called for “further efforts to implement measures to combat corruption” as a short term 
priority of Romania’s Accession Partnership (Official Journal, 1998). 
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This was followed by a more stringent assessment of the country’s progress in 1999, 
when the Regular Report from the European Commission defined corruption as a 
“widespread problem”, noting the lack of determination at domestic level to curb 
corruption (Commission of the European Communities 1999, pp. 13-14).  The European 
Commission’s concerns were then incorporated in the revised 1999 Accession 
Partnership that explicatively called on the Romanian government to “adopt a law on 
prevention of and fight against corruption” and to establish “an independent anti 
corruption department” (Official Journal, 1999a). 
 
At domestic level, the CDR coalition that came into power following the 1996 elections 
showed willingness to introduce the changes demanded by the EU, also because the 
institutional and legislative measures requested by the member states coincided with the 
key priority of the newly appointed Ciorbea government57.  Thus, while before 1996 no 
legal steps were taken to fight corruption, from 1997 onwards EU-oriented legislative 
proposals were elaborated, including a civil service law containing more stringent 
penalties for corruption in the public administration (see Monitorul Oficial, 1999b).  In 
line with the EU’s demands, the executive also proceeded with the creation of anti-
corruption bodies, with the establishment of the Squad for Countering Organized Crime 
and Corruption attached to the General Prosecutors’ Office as well as several 
anticorruption sections inside some key Ministries. 
                                                
57  Authors’ interview with Valeriu Stoica, Minister of Justice, 1996-2000, Bucharest, December 2006.  
On the anti-corruption program of the Ciorbea’s government see Stoica (1997).  
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At legislative level, a framework law on the prevention and punishment of acts of 
corruption was also approved in May 2000 (Monitorul Oficial, 2000), and during the 
CDR mandate Romania signed the Council of Europe Criminal and Civil Law 
Conventions on Corruption as part of the international commitments laid down by the 
EU as a condition for accession.  However, as the then Minister of Justice confirmed 
during the interview with the author58, the executive anti-corruption drive soon stalled 
because of the severe differences between the coalition’s partners on the pace and 
direction of the reforms. This prevented the executive from introducing any further 
extensive anti-corruption legislation.   As a result, by the time Romania formally opened 
the accession negotiations with the EU in early 2000, the anti-corruption framework 
was fragmented and unclear and the anti-corruption institutions that had been created 
were not provided with a sufficiently strong legal basis to begin investigating dubious 
privatisation cases.    
 
The opening of the accession negotiation translated into a progressive toughening of EU 
conditionality, with increasingly more critical assessments of the efforts made by the 
Romanian authorities to curb corruption.  For example, in its 2000 and 2001 Annual 
Report the European Commission warned of the detrimental effect of corruption, calling 
for “substantial actions” to tackle this “widespread and systemic problem” (Commission 
of the European Communities, 2000, p. 18, 2001b, p.20). 
                                                
58  Authors’ interview with Valeriu Stoica, Minister of Justice, 1996-2000, Bucharest, December 2006.   
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On the domestic side, the Nǎstase government did not seem to give priority to the EU’s 
concerns.  Only in October 2001, almost 1 year into office, the Năstase executive finally 
approved a National Plan against Corruption which contained, at least on paper, a 
rather impressive list of legislative and institutional measures the government intended 
to pursue while in office (Government of Romania, 2000).  In January 2002 the 
government also set up an Anti-Corruption Department (NAPO), and promised to 
eradicate corruption from its party ranks.  However, as in the case of judiciary reforms, 
the PSD anti-corruption drive proved short-lived and at best rhetorical.   
 
By mid 2002 some institutional reforms had taken place, especially in the public 
procurement field, and some corruption-linked investigations were also launched (Stan, 
2004).  But these resembled more Potemkin reforms than coherent strategies, aimed at 
reassuring the EU and NATO observers rather than at tackling corruption effectively.  
Indeed, the intensified legislative work did not translate into an improved performance 
of anti-corruption bodies or a lowering in the perception of corruption and, by late 2002, 
there was hardly any evidence of the effectiveness of the government’s anti-corruption 
drive.   At legislative level, a number of measures envisaged in the anti-corruption 
strategy had been delayed including crucial issues such as political parties financing, 
which was originally planned for early 2002 but was not accomplished until late 2003, 
under pressure from the EU.  
 
In 2002, the Open Society Institute found corruption to be “endemic”, highlighting the 
de facto immunity granted to parliamentary deputies and ministers and the massive 
executive discretion over public spending and taxation, which provided a fertile ground 
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for the proliferation of corrupt activities within state institutions (Open Society Institute, 
2002b, pp. 464-69).  The same year the Transparency International Annual Report 
concluded that Romania lost several billion dollars every year to widespread corruption 
(Transparency International, 2002).   
 
The most critical assessment came from the Council of Europe.  The first GRECO 
Report published in 2002 highlighted considerable deficiencies in the legislative 
framework and in the powers of anti-corruption bodies to carry out investigations and 
initiate corruption cases.  The Council of Europe’s experts also portrayed a rather 
gloomy picture of Romania’s anti-corruption efforts in the first decade of transition: 
Corruption affects the activities of almost all public institutions in Romania 
and is a worrying phenomenon.  The most serious acts of corruption are linked 
to organised crime, with the attendant risk that government bodies and the 
judicial system have been infiltrated.  In particular several investigations have 
outlined the existence of corruption within the Romanian courts and police 
system, and all the levels of satisfaction of these services are the lowest for all 
public services assessed (Council of Europe, 2002, p.5).  
   
 
The outspoken criticism of the Council of Europe did not go unnoticed in Bucharest and 
forced the government to take some measures to tackle corruption.  Thus, where before 
2003 very little progress had been made, between 2003 and 2004 the Romanian 
government applied significant changes to the anti-corruption legislation, making the 
2004 Commission’s Report conclude that the “Romanian anti-corruption legislation is 
well developed and is broadly in line with relevant EU acquis” (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2004a, p. 22). 
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One critical moment was the motion presented by the EP in early 2004, which called 
into question Romania’s closing of the negotiations due to its sluggish democratic 
standards.   As in the case of judiciary reforms, fear of a delay in finalising the 
negotiations compelled the PSD administration to revise the anti-corruption framework 
in line with the EU’s demands.  Accordingly, the government approved in March 2004 
a new code of conduct for civil servants, providing some clarification in the conflict of 
interest’s legislation (Monitorul Oficial, 2004d).   Previously, the Romanian Parliament 
also approved a new law on decision-making transparency in the public administration 
(Monitorul Oficial, 2003b).    
 
The so-called “sunshine law” established criteria for citizens’ access to information, 
consultation and participation procedures in the decision making-process both at 
national and local level as well as disciplinary measures for civil servants failing to 
comply with the law.  During this period, Romania also ratified the Council of Europe’s 
Criminal and Civil Law Conventions on Corruption and introduced an Anti Corruption 
Act containing more severe sentences for corruption and bribery (Monitorul Oficial, 
2004f).   
 
However, the reform drive of the Romanian government did not fully convince EU 
officials, and many openly expressed dissatisfaction with the failure of the executive to 
curb corruption”59. 
  
                                                
59  See for example the interviews with Baroness Nicholson, the EP Rapporteur for Romania in 
‘România a fost distrusa din interior de corupţie’, Ziua, 29 March 2004 and the interview with 
Commissioner Verheugen, “Romania rapped over continued corruption”, European Voice, 27 May 
2004. 
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BOX 5.2.  Postponement Clause: Commitments for Romania in the field of Anti-
Corruption  
 
…. 
 
 (4) To considerably step up the fight against corruption and in particular against high-level corruption by 
ensuring a rigorous enforcement of the anti-corruption legislation and the effective independence of the 
National Anti-Corruption Prosecutors' Office (NAPO) and by submitting on a yearly basis as of 
November 2005 a convincing track-record of the activities of NAPO in the fight against high-level 
corruption. NAPO must be given the staff, financial and training resources, as well as equipment 
necessary for it to fulfill its vital function. 
 
(5)To conduct an independent audit of the results and the impact the current National Anti-Corruption 
Strategy has generated; to reflect the conclusions and recommendations of this audit in the new multi-
annual anti-corruption strategy which must be one comprehensive document, in place no later than March 
2005, accompanied by an action plan with clearly defined benchmarks to be reached and results to be 
obtained, as well as adequate budgetary provisions; the implementation of the Strategy and Action Plan 
must be overseen by one existing, clearly defined, independent body; the strategy must include the 
commitment to revise the protracted criminal procedure by the end of 2005 to ensure that corruption cases 
are dealt with in a swift and transparent manner, in order to guarantee adequate sanctions that  have a 
deterrent effect; finally, it must contain steps to considerably reduce the number of bodies which all have 
powers to prevent or investigate corruption by the end of 2005, so that overlapping responsibilities are 
avoided.   
…. 
Source: Annex X, Treaty of Accession of Romania, Official Journal (2005) 
 
 
Romania’s unconvincing drive to fight corruption led the member states to impose 
tough safeguard measures at the moment of the closure of the accession negotiations.  
As a condition for closing the negotiations, the member states laid down very strict 
conditions and benchmarks, demanding increased efforts in fighting high-level 
corruption, effective legal guarantees for the independence of NAPO as well as 
evidence of a convincing track record in curbing high-level corruption (See Box 5.2).  
 
The presence of a tough postponement clause in the Treaty of Accession would prove 
instrumental in stimulating domestic changes in line with the EU’s requirements. 
Indeed, the most significant efforts to rationalise the anti-corruption framework and 
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implement legislation came in early 2005, with the appointment of a centre-right 
government and Monica Macovei as the head of the Ministry of Justice.  As soon as the 
new Minister took office, anti-corruption activities intensified and several legal and 
operational steps were taken to accelerate the fight against high-level corruption.  Focus 
was placed on implementation, and the Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2005-2007 
contained a number of legislative, institutional and implementation measures to prevent, 
combat and sanction corruption (Ministry of Justice, 2005a and 2005b).  
 
One of the most important changes was the appointment of a completely new 
managerial team for the Anti-Corruption Department (DNA) within the General 
Prosecutor’s office to replace NAPO, the main anti-corruption body created by the PSD 
government, long criticised for its inefficiency and inactivity in investigating high-level 
corruption cases (see, for example, Commission of the European Communities, 2003a, 
p.27, 2004a, pp.22-23).  The restructuring of DNA was designed to fulfil the 
requirements set by the EU in the Treaty of Accession.  Under the new law – that was 
originally adopted by Government ordinance in 2005 - DNA became an autonomous 
body vested with the power of investigating high dignitaries including Members of 
Parliament (Monitorul Oficial, 2005c), a provision seen by Brussels as an important 
sign of a newly acquired independence of prosecutors in investigating politicians and of 
the country’s commitment in taking high-level corruption cases seriously.  Further 
legislative and operational measures to curb and prevent corruption included the 
amendments to the law on funding political parties60, control over state subsidies, the 
                                                
60 The new legislation has brought significant legal improvements by establishing, in particular, 
political parties’ obligation to make public, in the Official Journal, their income and expenses. For a 
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criminalisation of tax evasion, the strengthening of transparency in public procurement 
procedures and the introduction in May 2005 of new mechanisms regulating the laws on 
templates for declarations of wealth and interests of high officials, which are reported to 
be the strictest in Europe61.  In April 2005, criminal immunity for public notaries and 
bailiffs was also abolished and more stringent penalties were introduced for money 
laundering offences (Monitorul Oficial, 2005e).  
 
The commitment in fighting corruption was also reflected at implementation level. 
Under the direction of Daniel Morar, a young prosecutor appointed to replace a PSD 
affiliate, DNA managed to charge over 1000 defendants including Members of 
Parliament, Ministers and a deputy Minister, several magistrates and several employees 
of law enforcement agencies. Investigations have also been opened against members of 
the current Parliament and high-level dignitaries, including top officials of the 
President’s own party and members of the ruling coalition62.  After years of inaction, 
DNA also launched investigations into a series of highly dubious privatisation contracts 
signed by the PSD government that proved very disadvantageous to the state, with the 
loss of millions of euros63. 
                                                                                                                                          
complete analysis see, Transparency International (2007, p.27).  For the text of the law see 
Monitorul Oficial (2006c). 
61  Author’s interview with Rupert Vining, Council of Europe’s expert and Presidential Advisor to 
President Băsescu 2004-2007, Bucharest, October 2006. For the text of the law see Monitorul Oficial 
(2005d).  
62 Investigations have been opened against the former deputy Prime Minister and head of the UDMR, 
Marko Bela for an alleged bribe; against George Copos, at the time serving as deputy prime charged 
with tax evasion; Dinu Patriciu, a wealthy PNL member and close friend of Prime Minister 
Tăriceanu who was being investigated by prosecutors for money laundering and other charges 
related to his own company Rompetrol and Dan Ioan Popescu, industry and commerce Minister in 
the Năstase cabinet under prosecution for his failure to explain the origin of assets worth more than 
€1.25 million.  
63 This includes the Energy Case involving Hydroelectrica along with other 11 companies, where 
energy was delivered to certain firms at preferential rates, well below market price, and the so-called 
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The new anti-corruption framework also targeted the judiciary - with a new code of 
conduct and declaration of wealth - as well as the public administration both at central 
and local levels by strengthening the operational capabilities of the Anti-Corruption 
Department of the Ministry of Interior (DGA), and through awareness campaigns 
carried out with the support of local NGOs.  The steps taken by the government showed 
increased political will and commitment in tackling corruption. The opening of high-
profile investigations against well-known politicians, including former Prime Minister 
Năstase, was perceived as a positive sign that the centre-right coalition was serious 
about the reforms64.  
 
The motivations of the newly appointed government for complying with the EU’s tough 
deadlines were largely domestic, reflecting at least initially, the reformist credentials of 
the DA-Alliance.  Curbing high-level corruption and reforming a highly discredited 
justice system were the cornerstones of the Alliance’s electoral promise to set Romania 
on a new course after years of misrule and bad governance, which damaged the 
country’s image in the eyes of foreign observers. Securing Romania’s accession in 
2007, by complying with EU-related commitments, was seen as crucial in this respect.  
However, from 2006 onwards, when it became clear that the Commission would not 
delay Romania’s entry, political consensus began to fade and profound disagreements 
on the direction of the reforms undermined the coalition viability, marking the end of 
the DA-Alliance just two months after accession. 
                                                                                                                                          
Frigates Affairs, related to the acquisition in 2003 of two second-hand frigates from Britain’s BAE 
System. For media coverage see ‘Noi suspiciuni de corupţie legate de BAE Systems’, Hotnews, 13 
November 2006; ‘Turbina de făcut bani a băieţilor deştepţi”, Evenimentul Zilei, 14 April 2007. 
64  ‘Netting the untouchables’, The Economist, 4 February 2006. 
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Conscious of the fragility of the reform momentum, the European Commission put in 
place in December 2006 a post-accession mechanism to monitor progress in fighting 
corruption.  As in the field of judiciary reforms, Romania is required to address a 
number of benchmarks amid the risk of safeguard measures being introduced by the 
Commission in the field of JHA.  These benchmarks are: 
• “Establish, as foreseen, an integrity agency with responsibilities for verifying assets, 
incompatibilities and potential conflicts of interest, and for issuing mandatory 
decisions on the basis of which dissuasive sanctions can be taken (Benchmark 2).  
• Building on progress already made, continue to conduct professional, non-partisan 
investigations into allegations of high-level corruption (Benchmark 3).  
• Take further measures to prevent and fight against corruption, in particular within 
the local government (Benchmark 4) ”.  
                                                  (Commission of the European Communities, 2006a) 
 
The introduction of the post-accession monitoring mechanism effectively extended EU 
conditionality into the post-accession period, allowing the EU to maintain pressure on 
the Romanian authorities to ensure the implementation of the reforms.  Yet, the 
introduction of a post-accession monitoring mechanism in the field of corruption shows 
that many in Brussels were aware that progress was accomplished thanks to the 
determination and commitment of few and largely isolated forces, lacking the necessary 
broad political consensus to ensure that efforts at curbing corruption would not stop at 
the moment of accession. 
 
5.2.2 EU conditionality and Romania’s implementation record 
 
Romania’s track record in curbing corruption leaves much to be desired for. Over the 
past decade, several scandals involving members of Parliament, high-ranking officials 
and wealthy businessmen were exposed by the media, such as the BANCOREX crash – 
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the biggest financial disaster in Romania, and the RAFO affairs that involved PSD 
affiliates and close allies of Iliescu65.  Yet, only a small number of cases were 
investigated and very few have led to successful convictions.  Anti-corruption bodies 
have also proliferated but these proved mostly ineffective in fighting corruption.  For 
example, NAPO - the anticorruption department set up in 2002 by the PSD 
administration as the flag of Romania’s anti-corruption reforms – proved inadequate in 
initiating high-profile prosecutions because it lacks the legal instruments and the human 
resources necessary to launch investigations 66.  
 
Various assessments by the EU and other international organizations repeatedly 
portrayed corruption in the country as endemic and systematic, with no significant 
changes being registered over the years (see, for example, Council of Europe, 2002; 
Freedom House, 2005a; Open Society, 2002b; World Bank, 2001b).  No significant 
change has also been registered in the perceived level of corruption despite the change 
in the political elites following the 1996, 2000 and 2004 elections.  In 2001 a World 
Bank study found that corruption was perceived as a normal and widespread 
phenomenon, with about two-thirds of the Romanian respondents believing that “all” or 
“most” officials were corrupt and firms reporting frequent unofficial payments for a 
variety of state services (World Bank, 2001b).   
                                                
65 The RAFO affairs involved the formerly state-owned oil refinery awarded in 2001 by the then PSD 
Government to Corneliu Iacobov, a close friend of Iliescu, later sold to a British company after it 
accumulated in three years almost 30 billion USD in unpaid taxes. It was later discovered that the 
London based company was owned by an associate of Iacobov and himself close to Iliescu and two 
of his key advisors, a general of the intelligence services and a senator. It later emerged that the same 
people were behind the Bancorex crash, the biggest financial disaster in Romania. The collapse of 
the formally state owned bank has resulted in a loss of over 20 trillion USD, which was passed over 
to taxpayers. The state has yet to recover the debt.  
66  Author’s interview with Marian Săntion, Prosecutor and Director General of DGA, the Anti-
Corruption Department in the Ministry of Interior between 2004 and 2007, Bucharest, 2006.  
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TABLE 5.1.   Transparency International Annual Perception Corruption Index (PCI) 
 
Country 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 
           
Bulgaria 64 57 55 54 54 45 47 52 63 66 
Czech Republic 41 46 47 51 54 52 47 42 39 37 
Estonia 28 24 27 31 33 29 28 27 27 26 
Hungary 39 41 40 42 40 33 31 32 31 33 
Latvia 51 49 51 57 57 52 59 57 58           - 
Lithuania 51 46 44 44 41 36 38 43 50 71 
Poland 61 61 70 67 64 45 44 43 44 39 
Slovakia 49 49 47 57 59 52 51 52 53 47 
Slovenia 27 28 31 31 29 27 34 28 25           -
- 
Romania 69 84 85 87 83 77 69 68 63 61 
 
Source: Transparency International (www.transparency.org) 
 
Transparency International, in its annual comparative study of the perception of 
corruption, constantly ranked Romania as the most corrupt country among the post-
communist states of CEE (Table 5.1).  Given the difficulties in measuring corruption, 
surveys on its perceived level do not necessarily reflect in full the situation on the 
ground.  Yet, Romania showed a limited track record in prosecuting corruption cases 
and many of the high-level corruption scandals reported in the media were never fully 
investigated. 
 
This is even more surprising if one considers that the country has developed one of the 
most complex and comprehensive anti-corruption legal frameworks in Europe and that, 
from 1998 onwards, several anti-corruption campaigns and programmes have been 
financed by the EU and its member states.  According to the independent audit of the 
anti-corruption situation in Romania carried out by Freedom House in early 2005, 
Romania had developed “an impressive arsenal of legal instruments of transparency, 
accountability and anticorruption” (Freedom House, 2005b, p.7). 
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Yet, the audit found that the anti-corruption legislation has effectively not been 
implemented and prosecutors had very limited autonomy and independence in 
conducting investigations (Freedom House, 2005b, p.8). 
 
The legal changes introduced by the Tariceǎnu executive to strengthen the 
independence of prosecutors and the implementation capacity of the anti-corruption 
institutions have brought some improvement.   For instance, some visible results have 
been registered after the appointment of Daniel Morar as the head of DNA, with the 
opening of high profile cases involving well-known politicians, high-ranking officials 
and wealthy businessmen.  The reorganisation of this institution into an autonomous 
department of the General Prosecutor’s Office, and the legal guarantees extending its 
competences and powers to investigate high-level and political corruption cases have 
much contributed to these results.  Similarly, after DGA became operational in 2005, 
over 2000 investigations have been opened against civil servants, police and customs 
officers, and more than 7000 cases of bribery and corruption were reported by the 
general public via Telverde, the free anti-corruption phone line set up in 2006 (see 
Ministry of Interior and Administration, 2007a). However, the implementation of the 
anti-corruption reforms has had a very late start and it will take many years before 
results become visible. 
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5.3 How Domestic Factors affected compliance 
 
Several factors help explain Romania’s poor performance registered in eradicating 
corruption.  From a strictly legal perspective, the effectiveness of the anti-corruption 
framework has been hampered by several legislative inconsistencies and significant 
loopholes in the law that have nullified some legal provisions in place.  For example, 
although Romania ratified the UN Anti-Corruption Convention in 2002, it was unable to 
implement the key requirement to establish “illicit enrichment" as a criminal offence 
because this clashed with the Constitutional provision according to which the 
acquisition of assets is always presumed to be legal.  As a result, several high profile 
investigations could not be initiated because of insufficient evidence of the dubious 
origin of wealth (Open Society et al., 2006, p. 9).    
 
The fight against corruption has also been weakened by inadequate control and 
sanctioning mechanisms, which proved ineffective in deterring and punishing 
corruption. For example, despite Romania introducing one of the most detailed asset 
and interest declarations in Europe, no audit or institution was put into place to monitor 
and verify the declaration of public servants and public officials.  In addition, the failure 
to submit interest declarations attracts virtually no penalty and until 2006, an official 
was only requested to declare his/her own assets, and not those of his or her own family 
members. 
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From an institutional point of view, the fight against corruption has been hampered by 
institutional weaknesses, a low administrative capacity in preventing and fighting 
corruption, a lack of inter-institutional cooperation, inefficient administrative 
jurisdictions and a lack of rationalization of competences and coordination among the 
many bodies involved in the fight against corruption67.  The lack of policy experience in 
devising legal, institutional and operational measures to prevent, fight and sanction 
corruption largely contributed to a number of these institutional and legal weaknesses, 
as senior officials of the Ministry of Justice confirmed during interviews68.  However, 
the reform trajectory shows that the effectiveness of anti-corruption policies has been 
hampered primarily by the failure of the political elite to tackle corruption seriously.    
 
Despite all successive post-communist governments declaring the fight against 
corruption as their outmost priority, most reforms have been half-hearted and generally 
ineffective, and repeated criticism from the EU and other international organizations 
were carefully bypassed by largely cosmetic legal frameworks that fell short of any 
implementation effort.   When EU –compatible rules were introduced, reforms often 
lacked the necessary cross-party political consensus to ensure their long-term 
sustainability.   
 
 
                                                
67 Author’s interview with Rupert Vining, Council of Europe’s expert and Presidential Advisor to 
President Băsescu on anti-corruption issues, Bucharest, November 2006. 
68 Author’s interviews with personnel in the Ministry of Justice and SCM including Simona Teodoroiu, 
State Secretary (2000- 2004), and Ionut Codescu, former Director of the Department of European 
Integration in the Ministry of Justice and Secretary (2004-2007). Bucharest, October- December 
2006.  
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For example, when the National Council of Struggle against Corruption and Organised 
Crime by President Constantinescu, the opposition denounced it as an instrument for 
hunting down political opponents, and deep internal divisions inside the governing 
coalition on the scope of the anti-corruption reforms undermined efforts to establish 
effective legislative and institutional mechanisms to address corruption in the country 
(Shafir, 2001, p.89). 
 
The most blatant evidence of inaction can be found under the PSD administration 
between 2000 and 2004. Despite corruption being at the top of the list of the executive’s 
electoral promises, hardly any effort was made to tackle corruption effectively, and 
most anti-corruption bodies remained inactive and ineffective.   Instead, between 2001 
and 2004, the PSD government intensively and actively pursued a deep politicisation of 
the judiciary, of the public administration and of key executive positions in all state 
sectors, from hospital directors to school principles (Stan, 2005).  In the public 
administration, for instance, a number of EU-funded programmes to bring qualified 
young professionals inside the Ministries and the public administration at national and 
local level were used as instruments for political favours, to locate young party affiliates 
into the Ministries’ streamlined civil services69.  This practice reinforced the network of 
political patronage and control, allowing corrupt politicians to maintain a firm grip on 
all key areas of society.    
 
                                                
69 Author’s interview with a senior EU expert who for professional reasons has asked to remain 
anonymous, Bucharest 2006.  
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The reason why political parties reap private gains for themselves or their allies, and 
seek patronage by engaging in a deep politicization of the public administration and 
other state sectors has recently attracted academic attention (see Ganev, 2007; 
Grzymała-Busse, 2007; O’Dwyer, 2006b; Meyer-Sahling, 2006 and Haughton 2008 for 
a review).  According to Grzymała-Busse (2007, p.3-4), when political competition is 
“robust” - that is when an opposition “is clearly identifiable, plausible as a governing 
alternative, and vociferously critical” – the elite in power is constrained in its ability to 
reap private gains for themselves and their allies.  By contrast, when political 
competition is less robust incumbent politicians “could more freely extract resources 
and create new formal institutions that would allow further exploitation (Grzymała-
Busse, 2007, p.13).   
 
Indeed, in Romania the PSDR/PSD and Ion Iliescu enjoyed a comfortable majority in 
Parliament, while the centre-right parties that emerged from the disastrous electoral 
performance in 2000 did not act as a viable or credible political alternative to the ex-
communist leadership until 2004.  Yet, the commitment of the DA-Alliance to break 
rent-seeking behaviour, corruption and mismanagement of public life is also 
questionable.   The anti-corruption campaign launched after 2004 served as a narrow 
political agenda, merely to ensure EU accession in 2007. As it became evident that 
Justice Minister Macovei was serious about the anti-corruption reforms, and their 
implementation, she grew increasingly isolated and openly opposed to by a large 
segment of the political class, including members of the ruling coalition70. 
                                                
70 See interview with Monica Macovei, “Din martie, am simtit ca governul nu mai e o echipa”, 
Evenimentul Zilei, 8 November 2006; 2006; ‘Cum am ajuns inamicul public’, Revista 22, No. 866, 
10-16 October 2006.  
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Key reforms were slowed down or blocked in many areas by powerful vested interests 
and concrete actions to fight corruption have been the matter of a forceful fight between 
the conservative and reformist wings inside the ruling coalition.  This became even 
more evident after the rather encouraging Commission’s Monitoring Report in October 
2005, that was perceived by some Romanian politicians in the ruling coalition as a 
lessening of the EU’s pressure, and of the Commission’s more positive stance towards 
Romania71.  
 
Major obstacles to anti-corruption reforms have also come from the Romanian 
Parliament.  In the first two years of the DA administration (2005-2007) it repeatedly 
showed a clear inclination to block or slow down the anti-corruption package.  The most 
blatant attempt by Parliament to undermine anti-corruption efforts was the refusal in 
early 2006, to allow a search warrant for the home of former Prime Minister Adrian 
Năstase, who at the time was also Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies.  No effort was 
made to justify this refusal, despite the fact that it concerned one of the most spectacular 
examples of unexplained wealth to be found in Romania, and the indications pointing 
towards corruption would have been regarded as overwhelming in most EU member 
states72.  In early 2006 the Senate also failed to ratify the reform of DNA, putting the 
country on the verge of a political crisis.  Although the ordinance was rejected primarily 
because of the massive absence of senators, coalition members, including some from 
PNL and UDMR, joined forces with the opposition and voted against the ordinance.   
                                                
71  Author’s interview with Monica Macovei, Minister of Justice 2004-2007, Bucharest, December,  
2006.  
72 This was the opinion expressed by a senior expert from one EU member state in the Peer Review 
assessment on anti-corruption and money laundering reforms that took place in Romania in March 
2006. The author was given access to this document but given their confidential nature the source 
cannot be attributed.  
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For the European Commission this represented a clear lack of political consensus in 
fighting corruption. As a senior EU official told the author, the rejection of the 
ordinance by the Senate “shows there is a cross-party interest group of individuals, 
including members of parliament, who feel threatened by the stepping up of the fight 
against corruption, because they have personal reasons”73. 
 
Apart from these major issues, obstruction has also occurred on other important aspects 
of the anti-corruption draft-laws, such as the efforts to amend the law concerning the 
declarations of wealth - basically aiming to render the templates useless and ineffective 
- and the rejection of a Government emergency ordinance on the powers and roles of the 
judiciary police in corruption cases74.  As mentioned previously, political resistance to 
anti-corruption reforms has not been confined to opposition parties but also came from 
within the ruling coalition and some individual Ministers, who openly opposed during 
the executive meetings key anti-corruption measures, such as in the case of the National 
Integrity Agency (ANI)75 - the controversial agency to verify assets and 
incompatibilities of public officials.  Members of the ruling coalition also openly 
criticised the activities of DNA, accusing prosecutors of using corruption investigations 
as political tools against politicians and businessmen.   
 
                                                
73  Author’s interview with a senior EU official that for professional reasons has asked to remain 
anonymous. Brussels, 2006. 
74  Private conversation with a senior EU official who for professional reasons has asked to remain 
anonymous Brussels, 2006. 
75 Author’s interview with Monica Macovei, Bucharest, December 2006. The ANI law, was only 
supported by the Liberals and Democrats but weakened by UDMR, PC who joined forces with the 
opposition to severely limit its actions.  After the draft law was presented by the Minister of Justice, 
there have been numerous attempts by the Parliament to render this institution ineffective causing 
endless postponements of the law. See ‘Democraţii, împotriva Guvernului’, România Liberă, 1 
November 2006; ‘Ipocriziile UDMR”, Evenimentul Zilei, 11 September 2006.  
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The most outspoken critic of DNA and Monica Macovei has been Dan Voiculescu, 
president of PC, who has a long history of collaboration with the Securitate and has 
been under investigation for fraud and corruption76.  Yet, the attempts by the Romanian 
Parliament and members of the ruling coalition to undermine and block further progress 
in the fight against corruption is a clear indication that the fight against corruption had 
little if no support by a significant part of the political majority.  This also highlighted 
how, for a large segment of the Romanian political class, including those belonging to 
the governing coalition, compliance with the EU’s demands was at best rhetorical, 
aiming at securing EU membership in 2007 but with little or no genuine interest in 
continuing the reforms after accession.   
 
On its part, the European Commission did not spare criticism. In its final report 
published in September 2006, the Commission noted how “in the Parliament there has 
been some attempts to substantially reduce the effectiveness of such [anti-corruption] 
efforts” (Commission of the European Communities, 2006c, p. 5).  For the Commission, 
“[t]here needs to be a clear political willingness of all political actors to demonstrate the 
sustainability and irreversibility of the recent positive progress in the fight against 
corruption (Commission of the European Communities, 2006c, p.35).  Moreover, EU 
and other foreign officials openly supported the efforts made by Monica Macovei in 
fighting corruption. 
                                                
76 For example, on 27 September 2006, the day after the Commission gave the green light for 
Romania’s accession in January 2007, Voiculescu went on National television declaring that he had 
evidence that Monica Macovei had collaborated with the Securitate when she was a prosecutor in the 
Bucharest courts during the communist period.  See also ‘Macovei manipulează demnitari europeni’, 
Jurnalul Naţional, 12 September 2006.  
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For example, during his visit in Bucharest in March 2006 European Commissioner 
Franco Frattini declared: “I want to mention the fact that the progress achieved in the 
justice field, in the fight against corruption are due to the efforts which Minister of Justice 
Mrs. Monica Macovei has made and whom I want to particularly thank77” . Nicholas 
Taubman, the US Ambassador to Romania also stated:  “Minister Macovei is a leader in 
operating such reforms. Some foreign observers would see her leaving the Ministry as a 
step backward”78.  However, this support fell on deaf ears and the Minister was sacked 
two months after accession as a result of a bitter in-fight between the President and the 
Prime Minister. 
 
Further serious impediments to the success of the anti-corruption strategy have come 
from other powerful veto players, first and foremost the Constitutional Court.  For 
example, in March 2005, just a few months after the tough closure of the negotiations 
with the EU, the Constitutional Court decided that DNA (then NAPO) could have no 
competence to investigate Members of Parliament, despite the fact it had been created 
for this very same purpose.  The anti-corruption strategy also stalled because of the 
conservative attitude of a vast segment of the judiciary.  Despite several scandals being 
reported in the media, no high-profile investigation case has so far led to a successful 
prosecution and the legislative attempts to increase the integrity of the judiciary and of 
the broader justice system have been met with great resistance.  
 
                                                
77  Joint Press Conference by Prime Minister Tăriceanu and Vice-President of the European 
Commission Franco Frattini, Bucharest 13 March 2006 (Government of Romania - Press office).  
78  Quoted in “US, Europe stand up for Macovei”, Nine O’Clock, 12 February 2007. See interview with 
Herbert Bosch after his visit to Romania ‘Corupţia politicienilor români - o problemă gravă pentru 
UE”, Evenimentul Zilei, 24 September 2006. 
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All in all, the fight against corruption has been undermined by over fifteen years of 
missed and half-hearted reforms.  Reducing corruption would have required challenging 
vested interests that benefited from the status quo and this largely explains why little 
effective progress was made to tackle this problem.  
 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
 
This case-study examined the framing and implementation of anti-corruption policies in 
Romania from the collapse of the communist regime in 1989 to the country's formal 
accession to the EU in January 2007.  As in the case of the previous chapter, the 
empirical analysis traced the impact of the EU’s accession conditionality on policy and 
institutional developments and examined the outcome of this influence. It further 
assessed how domestic factor constrained the reform potentials and hampered efforts to 
eradicate corruption.  
 
With regards to EU influence on domestic policy choices, the analysis presented in this 
chapter has corroborated the hypothesis on the importance of EU conditionality as a 
stimulus to domestic reforms. The empirical analysis of anti-corruption policies has 
revealed a causal link between the EU’s accession requirements and a number of 
domestic institutional and policy changes.  Moreover, the analysis has shown how the 
limited EU anti-corruption legislation did not prevent Brussels from exercising its 
leverage, and the EU ‘carrot and stick’ conditionality approach created considerable 
pressure on the Romanian authorities to introduce EU-compatible rules. 
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As discussed in section 2, the greater changes to the anti-corruption legal framework 
and its institutional structures came in response to EU pressure, especially when the EU 
showed willingness to sanction Romania for its sluggish efforts in putting in place a 
sound anti-corruption legal framework. As argued, from 2001 onwards the 
progressively outspoken criticisms from the EU and other foreign institutions proved 
crucial in stimulating progress in targeting corruption both at legislative and 
institutional level.  One crucial moment was the EU's Copenhagen summit in October 
2002 when Romania, along with Bulgaria, was not included in the list of countries set to 
join the EU in 2004.  The decision gave an unprecedented credibility to the EU’s 
conditionality stick and showed that unless important changes were made, there would 
be no conclusion of the negotiations.  The harsh criticism from the EP in 2004 also 
made the Năstase executive revise the anti-corruption framework in order to avoid a 
delay in finalising the negotiations.  The most significant example of the power of EU’s 
leverage in pushing reforms at domestic level is perhaps the introduction of the 
postponement clause in the Treaty of Accession that allowed the Commission to push 
conditionality to its limits and compel the Romanian government to live up to its 
commitments.   
 
The preceding discussion of the evolution of anti-corruption policies has also provided 
empirical support to the second hypothesis put forward by this research regarding the 
role and impact of domestic factors.  The reform trajectory in the field of anti-corruption 
has highlighted how powerful veto players at governmental level, coupled with a 
number of legal and institutional deficiencies, played a determinant role in slowing 
down the introduction and implementation of EU compatible rules. 
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As specified in section 3, there have been several obstacles to the successful fight 
against corruption.  The most significant has been the lack of political will to introduce 
durable and effective measures.  The fight against corruption has also been hampered by 
pockets of corrupt and politically aligned judges and prosecutors that often prevented 
the successful prosecution of a number of corruption cases.  Although Romania made 
progress in the establishment of a sound anti-corruption legal framework, this was 
primarily conditioned by the EU’s pressure and the EU’s monitoring rather than 
national will, with little political consensus on the scope of anti-corruption reforms.  
Yet, since achievement owes much to the pressure from the EU, questions remain open 
on the long-term sustainability of these reforms efforts.  
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Chapter 6 
Securing the EU’s External Borders 
 
 
This chapter examines the domestic impact of the EU’s accession conditionality in the 
field of external borders control, which comprises the Schengen acquis and the EU’s 
restrictive visa regime within the negotiating Chapter 24 on JHA.  This policy area was 
high on the EU’s political agenda during the accession negotiations with the CEE 
candidates because of the political sensitivity of border issues and the security 
implications arising from the shifting eastward of the EU’s future external borders 
(Grabbe, 2006, p. 150).  Border security was also one of the most important items 
during the accession negotiations with Romania due to the length and location of its 
borders that raised concerns over the country’s ability to implement EU policies 
effectively.  
 
As in the case of the preceding chapters, the empirical analysis looks at the interaction 
between EU conditionality and domestic reforms, tracing the impact of the accession 
requirements on border policies in post-communist Romania.  When compared to the 
other two case studies, this is one policy area where the EU had, from the outset, 
considerable potential leverage to intervene in domestic decision-making.  Unlike issues 
related to judiciary reforms and the fight against corruption where the EU mostly lacked 
legally-binding instruments, the Schengen acquis is detailed and legally complex and 
covers an extensive list of policy measures regulating border management as well as 
visa, asylum and immigration policies. 
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The extensive and detailed acquis meant politicians in Romania had little margin for 
negotiating the terms of accession, especially since full compliance with Schengen was 
set as a pre-condition for membership.  Moreover, Romania entered post-communist 
transition with underdeveloped JHA policies and obsolete border structures and 
equipment. While the process of EU integration offered Romania the opportunity to 
benefit from EU funds and the technical expertise of the member states, it also gave the 
EU ample room for intervening in defining the content of its domestic policies.  Perhaps 
more significantly, unlike the other two policy areas, politicians in Romania had strong 
incentives to introduce EU-compatible rules.  Beside the ‘carrot’ of membership, the 
EU explicitly linked border security to the lifting of visa restrictions for Romanian 
citizens wishing to travel to the Schengen area.  This was an important incentive for 
politicians in Romania because compliance with EU conditionality brought about 
immediate benefits.  
 
If we follow the Europeanization logic outlined in Chapter 2, we should therefore 
expect a relatively high level of compliance in this policy area because the EU put 
forward on the negotiating table a detailed acquis, and domestic actors had sufficiently 
strong incentives to comply with the EU’s requirements (see, for example, Grabbe, 
2006; Schimmelfennig et al., 2003; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004).  The 
evolution of border policies in Romania confirms this expectation, but only in part.  
While the wide scope and precision of the EU’s demands helped achieve policy 
convergence at a legal level, the actual implementation of EU legislation has been 
uneven, flawed by low administrative capacity, lack of expertise and poorly established 
practices and methods.   
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Indeed, unlike judiciary reforms and anti-corruption policies where the implementation 
has been hindered by powerful veto players, the fundamental problem here has been the 
country’s low state capacity – that is the inability of the public administration and law 
enforcement agencies to implement EU policies correctly.   
 
To examine the scope of EU influence on border policies in Romania, this chapter 
proceeds as follows: Section 6.1 outlines the external border conditionality put forward 
by the EU for the candidate states of CEE while section 6.2 looks into detail at the 
impact of the EU's accession demands on the framing of domestic policies in Romania. 
Section 3 examines how domestic factors undermined the correct implementation of EU 
legislation.  
 
6.1 Background to the EU’s policy 
 
External borders control has been one of the most important and politically sensitive 
areas of the EU’s enlargement policy to CEE, and the strict implementation of the 
Schengen acquis was set as a pre-condition for accession for all the candidates, 
including Romania.  The EU’s negotiating position was strongly influenced by security 
concerns over their ability to guard the future external borders, and reflected widespread 
fears among the member states of crime and uncontrolled migration from beyond the 
EU’s territory as well as from the candidate states themselves (Apap et al., 2001). 
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The predominance of the security rationale partly stems from the very same nature of 
the Schengen cooperation (Townsend, 2003).  The Schengen Agreement – originally 
signed by France, Germany and the three Benelux countries in 1985 - created in fact a 
common territory inside the then European Community without the existence of 
traditional national borders, but to compensate for the security deficit resulting from the 
abolition of border checks, a number of common measures were also introduced in the 
fields of asylum, immigration and visa policies79.  Yet, security concerns became 
exceptionally predominant in the context of the EU’s enlargement to CEE due to the 
length and location of the future external borders of the Union. Given their geographical 
location and low economic development, the CEE candidates became to be perceived as 
transit points and a potential source of a whole range of security threats, from 
immigrants and asylum seekers to organized crime, smuggling and trafficking in human 
beings (Mitsilegas, 2002, p. 668).   
 
There is a generalised consensus in the literature that the EU’s negotiating position vis-
à-vis the candidate states reflected an increased ‘securitization’80 of JHA issues, 
whereby problems such as organized crime, illegal immigration and asylum became 
increasingly perceived after the end of the Cold War as security threats in most Western 
countries (Grabbe, 2002; Huysmans, 2000; Mitsilegas et al., 2003). 
 
                                                
79 These include measures  regulating the movement of third-country nationals, the issuing of entry 
visas, a division of responsibilities for processing asylum applications, and the creation of the 
Schengen Information System (SIS) - a computer database containing information about people 
crossing borders, wanted criminals, failed asylum applications, stolen cars and stolen property. The 
list of common measures to implement the Schengen Agreement is outlined in the Schengen 
Implementing Convention that was signed in June 1990 and came into force in March 1995 (see 
Official Journal, 2000b). 
80  On the concept of securitization of JHA issues see Bigo (2000) and Waever (1995).  
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These security concerns had also heavily shaped the framing of common asylum, 
immigration and border policies, and help explain the rapid development of the JHA 
acquis at EU level.  The refugee crisis of the 1990s after the breakdown of the former 
Yugoslavia highlighted the flaws of individual responses to asylum and immigration 
crisis, and brought JHA cooperation onto the EU’s political agenda during the 
negotiations of the Maastricht Treaty (Geddes, 2000; Marshall, 2000).  This led in 1992 
to the creation of a third JHA intergovernmental pillar of the EU in the Maastricht 
Treaty and the gradual institutionalization of migration, asylum and border policies at 
EU level81.  Similarly, the application for membership of several eastern European 
countries in the mid 1990s heavily influenced the decision to bring the Schengen 
intergovernmental cooperation into the EU’s legal framework, with the incorporation of 
the Schengen acquis into the Amsterdam Treaty in 199782.  As Friis and Jarosz (2000, 
p. 50) noted, enlargement to CEE implied in fact a shift eastward of the future external 
borders, hence the need for aspiring members to align their national policies and 
standards to the JHA acquis.  
 
With this background in mind, it comes as no a surprise therefore that JHA took a 
central stage during the accession negotiations with the countries of CEE and full 
compliance with the Schengen acquis became a precondition for membership. 
                                                
81  See Title VI  (articles K to K. 9), Treaty of the European Union (Official Journal, 1992).  
82  With the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999 border and visa policies have become of 
community competence under Title IV of the EC Treaty. Article 62 provides the legal basis for the 
adoption of measures related to the absence of border controls, the crossing of the EU’s external 
borders (such as standards and procedures to carry checks on persons) and the definition of the 
conditions for entry of third-country nationals. In addition, Article 63(3) establishes a community 
competence to act in the area of migration, including the conditions of entry and residence of third-
country nationals, as well as measures to combat illegal immigration, such as repatriation. See 
Official Journal (1997b).  
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Indeed, while flexibility was accorded to some old member states – notably the UK, 
Ireland and Denmark83, the candidate states were presented with a non-negotiable 
acquis, without the option of derogations or opt-outs. According to the terms of 
accession the acquis had to be implemented in full upon accession with the sole 
exception of those measures directly linked to the lifting of border checks at the internal 
border and full accession into Schengen.   This was clearly spelled out in Article 8a of 
the Protocol integrating the Schengen acquis into the EU’s framework attached to the 
Amsterdam Treaty, which stated that “for the purpose of the negotiations for the 
admission of new Member States into the European Union, the Schengen acquis and 
further measures taken by the institutions within its scope shall be regarded as an acquis 
which must be accepted in full by all States candidate for admission” (Official Journal, 
1997b). The Tampere European Council in October 1999 reaffirmed this condition for 
accession, stressing the importance attached by the EU to “the effective control of the 
Union's future external borders” (European Council, 1999b).  
 
6.1.1 EU conditionality in the field of external borders control 
 
The Schengen acquis that the CEE candidates were required to implement as a 
condition for accession is laid down in more than 3,000 pages of legal rules and 
technical implementing measures regulating the crossing of the EU’s internal and 
external borders, entry and movement of third-country nationals into the EU, 
                                                
83  The UK and Ireland have negotiated opt-outs from Schengen but participate in the areas of police 
and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, SIS and the fight against drugs. Denmark is a member 
of Schengen but retains opt-outs with regards to measures taken under Title IV of the EC Treaty, 
with the exception of measures related to common visa policy. On JHA flexibility see Monar (1999) 
and den Boer (2001).  
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information exchange and data protection, responsibilities for processing asylum 
applications as well as measures related to police and judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters (Official Journal, 1999c). 
 
Broadly speaking, the EU's accession conditionality in the field of external border 
controls can be divided into three main areas:  (1) Compliance with the EU's border 
management acquis (i.e. rules and procedures regulating border checks at the internal 
and external border;  (2) Harmonization with the EU’s restrictive visa policy and; (3) 
Introduction of compensatory measures in the field of asylum, immigration, fight 
against cross-border crime and corruption.  
 
With regards to border management, the EU demanded the candidate states to achieve, 
upon accession, a ‘high-level of external border controls’ both at sea and land borders.  
The basic requirements to achieve a high-level of external border controls are outlined 
in the Schengen Implementing Convention84 and the Common Manual on external 
borders, a document that contains a wide range of technical standards and procedures to 
be introduced at the external borders (Official Journal, 2002d).  Another key document 
is the so-called Schengen Catalogue elaborated in February 2002 by the Schengen 
Evaluation Working Party, the Council’s body responsible for evaluating the 
implementation of Schengen rules in member countries and aspiring Schengen members 
(General Secretariat of the Council, 2002).   
                                                
84  Article 6 of the 1990 Schengen Implementing Convention states that border checks must be 
systematic, equal along the entire border and must be carried out in accordance with uniform 
principles.  The Convention further stipulates the formal details for crossing borders and for issuing 
short-term entry visas to third-country nationals. See Chapter 2 of Title II, Schengen Implementing 
Convention, Official Journal (2000b). 
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Despite its non-binding nature, it contains a set of best practices and recommendations 
for the correct application of the Schengen acquis.  According to the Catalogue, to 
achieve a high-level of control at the Union’s external borders, national policies should 
be based on an Integrated Border Security Model “spread over four complementary 
tiers” (General Secretariat of the Council, 2002, pp. 9-15).   
 
The first of these tiers concerns a number of activities to be carried out in third 
countries, such as the inspection of documents related to visa applications by consular 
offices and the detection of forged documents.  The second relates to international 
cross-border cooperation, including bilateral and multilateral agreements with third 
countries, such as readmission agreements.  The third tier refers to measures directly 
linked to external border controls.  For example, the catalogue indicates that all persons 
and vehicles must be checked systematically, and effective border surveillance must be 
ensured between all the authorised border-crossing points.  The final tier relates to 
activities to be carried out inside the Schengen area, such as measures to prevent illegal 
immigration as well as checks, surveillance and expulsion of third-country nationals 
(General Secretariat of the Council, 2002, pp. 9-15).  The Catalogue also requires that, 
upon accession, a sufficiently high-level of control is ensured at the temporary external 
borders, namely the national borders between the new member states and the remaining 
candidate countries, between the candidate countries themselves, and between the new 
member states and the current Schengen members. In the case of Romania the 
temporary external borders refer to those with Bulgaria and Hungary. 
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The second area of formal accession requirements relates to the harmonization with the 
EU’s restrictive visa policy.  During the accession negotiations the applicant states, 
including Romania, were asked to harmonize national rules regulating the entry and stay 
of third-country nationals, and modify pre-existing short-term visa regimes in line with 
the acquis (Official Journal, 2000).  In practical terms this has involved the introduction 
of visa requirements for third-country nationals that require an entry visa into the EU 
(the so-called EU negative list), and the elimination of visa restrictions for those who do 
not (EU positive list).  The candidate states were also required to harmonise their 
national legislation and adapt their institutional and administrative procedures to the 
acquis on visa fees and on the methods for issuing visas to third-country nationals (see, 
Official Journal, 1995a). 
 
Finally, compliance with the EU’s Schengen conditionality has required alignment to a 
whole range of compensatory policy measures in the field of asylum and immigration, 
police, customs and judicial cooperation (to allow cross border activities such as 
pursuing suspects), as well as compliance with SIS, data protection and enhanced 
documents security.  For example, in the field of asylum the candidate countries from 
CEE had to comply with the rules governing the responsibility for the examination of 
application by asylum seekers as laid down in the Dublin Convention (Official Journal, 
1997c).  
 
It is important to recall that despite compliance with the Schengen acquis being a 
precondition for accession, EU membership does not automatically grant full 
participation into Schengen. This is in fact governed by a separate two-stage procedure.  
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The first stage starts when joining the EU and involves a period of close monitoring and 
evaluation, by the Schengen members, of the correct implementation of the external 
border policies (the so-called Schengen evaluation process).  The second stage, which is 
full participation of the new member state into Schengen, occurs some time after 
accession to the EU and is subject to a separate and unanimous decision by the Council 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2002a).  The implementation of the 
Schengen acquis at national level also takes place as a two-stage process.   A substantial 
part of the acquis needs to be in place at the latest by the time of accession (so-called 
Category I measures), whereas other elements only need to be applied after accession 
into Schengen (Category II measures). In 2001 the European Commission published an 
information note, clarifying the distinction between Category I and Category II 
requirements (Commission of the European Communities, 2001b). The latter includes, 
for example, the separation of extra and intra-Schengen passenger flows at international 
ports and airports and measures regulating the lifting of controls at the internal 
borders85.   
 
If the Schengen acquis represented the formal membership requirements, EU 
conditionality for the CEE candidates has been broadly and extensively defined, to 
include all binding and non-binding documents agreed upon by the member states. 
Moreover, the Commission requested during the negotiations a whole range of 
administrative and institutional measures touching directly the formation of state 
                                                
85  See Art. 2 (crossing the internal borders) and Art. 4 (checks at airports), Title II of the Schengen 
Implementing Convention, Official Journal (2000b). 
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policies, the organization and functioning of the institutions in charge of border 
management as well as the working of law enforcement agencies.   
 
Research carried out on the CEE candidates has highlighted how, owing to the limited 
development of JHA policies in many aspiring members, the breadth of the accession 
requirements has allowed the EU to play a major role in shaping their border policies, 
well beyond the scope of its intervention in the domestic policy processes of its existing 
member states (Grabbe, 2006; Henderson, 2005).   At the same time, the volume and the 
legal complexity of the Schengen acquis created considerable political, financial, 
institutional and administrative challenges to most candidates, much greater than those 
experienced by the EU’s old member states (see Duleba, 2005; Henderson, 2005; 
Mitsilegas, 2002; Piorko and Sie Dhian Ho, 2003).   Perhaps the boldest challenge faced 
by the candidate countries has been compliance with the EU’s restrictive visa policy, 
because it involved drastic changes to pre-existing and often favourable visa regimes 
with neighbouring countries (Amato and Batt, 1999; Jileva, 2002; Piorko and Wolczuk, 
2001; Wolczuk, 2002).   Moreover, the candidate states were confronted with a 
particularly “speedy and fuzzy target”, as Grabbe noted (2006, p.151). The significant 
changes brought about by the Amsterdam Treaty did not fully settle the scope of the 
EU’s accession requirements, and much uncertainty remained on the actual content and 
implications of the JHA acquis at domestic level.  Compliance was further complicated 
by the confidential nature of the acquis, and it was not until 2001 that the Commission 
explicitly clarified which part of the acquis had to be implemented upon accession 
(Monar, 2000, pp. 27-30). 
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If the complexity of the Schengen acquis has been a major source of challenge for most 
of the candidate states of CEE, the specificity of their domestic conditions also 
represented a significant stumbling block in achieving speedy compliance with the EU’s 
border conditionality.  As several studies have pointed out, during communism there 
was little or no formal structure to deal with immigrants or asylum seekers, borders and 
immigration policies were under-developed, state institutions were weak and 
infrastructures and technologies were outdated (see, for instance, Grabbe, 2000; 
Lavenex, 1999; Monar, 2000).  Preparing for accession to the AFSJ often translated into 
a massive, and costly, legal and institution-building exercise to introduce the necessary 
legislative and administrative measures to comply with the EU’s entry conditions 
(Grabbe, 2000; Piorko 2005).  As we shall see later in this chapter, Romania 
experienced similar challenges to those faced by many of the other candidates, although 
the length and location of its external borders meant greater financial costs and more 
complex institutional adjustments. 
 
6.2 The Impact of EU conditionality on External Border Policies  
in Romania 
 
The EU’s negotiating position vis-à-vis Romania was not different, in substance, to that 
of the other candidate states. At the opening of the accession talks in 2002, Romania 
was presented with a non-negotiable JHA acquis requiring the full harmonization and 
implementation of the EU’s restrictive border and visa policies.  
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MAP 6.1. Romania’s National Borders  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yet, security concerns played a significant role in shaping the EU’s agenda during the 
negotiations, primarily due to the length and geographical location of the country’s 
national borders.  Indeed, geography mattered profoundly in the case of Romania. The 
country is geographically located between two highly volatile and politically unstable 
regions: the Western Balkans and the Black Sea. Beyond its borders lay several weak 
democracies, some of which have become ‘safe havens’ for organized crime, such as 
the uncontrolled territory of Transnistra in neighbouring Moldova.     
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Romania’s national border is also long and notoriously difficult to patrol - stretching for 
over 3100 km - a third of which is now the EU’s external border, the second largest 
segment under the responsibility of one single member state86.  Moreover, Romania has 
traditionally been a country of origin of migrants (legal and illegal) and asylum seekers, 
as well as a source and transit country of human trafficking from neighbouring countries 
(Lăzăroiu, 2000).  As a result, Romania came to be perceived as a potential trouble spot 
for transnational crime and a source and transit area for illegal immigrants and asylum 
seekers.  These security concerns led to the introduction of severe restrictions on the 
movement of Romanian citizens inside the EU and a stringent monitoring of the 
country’s ability to implement the EU’s external border policies.  
 
6.2.1 EU Conditionality and border policies after 1989 
 
Romania entered post-communist transition with a highly dysfunctional border system.  
The entire national border that stretched with the former Yugoslavia, the former Soviet 
Union and the countries under its influence resembled a heavily militarised no-man’s-
land zone, with watchtowers, barbed wire and electric fences.  As in many other post-
communist states, strict laws regulated cross-border movement and border structures 
and equipment were obsolete, especially when compared to western standards. 
                                                
86  The total external border under the responsibility of Romania amounts to 2070,6 km (681,3 km with 
Moldova, 649,4 km with Ukraine, 546,4 km with Serbia and 193,5 km of sea border on the Black 
Sea). 
 167 
After 1989 some steps were taken to regulate the legal relations with neighboring 
countries, with the conclusion of different bilateral agreements on cross-border 
movement.  But the border regime inherited from the communist period remained 
mostly intact throughout the 1990s, until the prospect of Euro-Atlantic integration 
pushed border security issues on to the domestic political agenda.  This led, from 1999 
onwards, to a profound restructuring of the legal, institutional and administrative 
frameworks regulating the national border regime.  
 
In terms of incentives, the EU had “two important carrots” to offer the Romanian 
authorities in return of increased security at the future EU’s external borders: the 
opening of membership talks and visa-free access for Romanian citizens wishing to 
travel to the Schengen area (Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008, pp. 132-133).  These 
incentives proved an important stimulus for domestic reforms.  To show the executive 
commitment to fulfil the EU’s priorities on border security, in 1999 the Vasile 
government (1998-1999) launched the first restructuring of the legal and institutional 
framework regulating the national border regime, by replacing conscripts with 
professional officers hired under contract and by demilitarizing the Ministry of Interior 
and Administration (MIA). These were two key short-term priorities of the 1998 
Accession Partnership (Official Journal, 1998).  Similarly, to secure visa-free travel for 
Romanian citizens, the administration which came into power after the 2000 elections 
(Iliescu and the PDSR – later renamed PSD) immediately tightened the conditions of 
entry of third-country nationals,  introduced passport requirements for Moldovan 
citizens wishing to enter Romania and promised a speedy adoption of a new Alien Law 
to replace the 1969 communist-era legislation. 
 168 
NATO membership also mattered for the Năstase executive, and this stimulated reforms 
of the military and the security services.  It also kept on the political agenda the fight 
against trafficking in human beings, organized crime and corruption, which emerged 
after the 9/11 terrorist attacks as key issues of concern for NATO’s members.  
However, with regards to external borders policies it was primarily the need to satisfy 
the EU’s entry conditions that spurred domestic reforms, while border security did not 
systematically figure as a condition for NATO membership (see Papadimitriou and 
Phinnemore, 2008, p. 132). 
 
The most profound developments of the national border regime can be traced back to 
the formal opening of the accession negotiations on Chapter 24 in January 2002.  Like 
the other candidate states, Romania was asked to comply in full with the whole JHA 
acquis including the Schengen acquis as incorporated into the EU’s legal framework by 
the Amsterdam Treaty.  At the opening of the negotiations Romania declared it was 
ready to adopt the entire acquis and did not request any transitional periods or 
derogations (Government of Romania, 2001b, p.1).  This implied a commitment to 
implement the entire Schengen rules upon accession with the sole exception of those 
measures directly linked to the abolition of the internal borders.  
 
The opening of the negotiations allowed the European Commission to formulate more 
explicit and detailed demands, hence shape more actively the content and timing of 
domestic reforms. For example, the 2002 Roadmap for Romania laid down rather 
specific benchmarks for assessing the progress made in implementing JHA policies 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2002b, p. 39). 
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TABLE 6.1.  PHARE Funds Allocation for Border Management 1998 - 2006 
 
Year 
 
PHARE Funds – M€ 
1998 0,59 
1999 10,50 
2000 13,49 
2001 3,45 
2002 10,88 
2003 9,90 
2004 36,80 
2005 29,03 
2006 26,39 
TOTAL 143,05 
 
  Source:  Romanian Border Police (www.politiadefrontiera.ro) 
 
 
With regards to the Schengen acquis, the Commission requested the introduction of a 
specific number of measures.  These were:  
• Amendment and regular update of the Schengen Action Plan; 
• Adoption of an integrated border management strategy; 
• Recruitment of additional border police officers; 
• Enhance the administrative capacity of the central authority for issuing visas; 
• Amendment to the Alien Law in line with the Acquis; 
• Adoption and implementation of a national strategy to fight organized crime 
 
With the opening of the accession negotiations, EU financial assistance under the PHARE 
program was also increased (€113million for the period 2002-2006) and this also served 
to finance several twinning projects designed to help the country elaborate legislation 
and develop the necessary institutional capacity to implement the acquis (see Table. 
6.1). 
 
At domestic level, the launch of accession translated into an increase in legislative 
activity to set up the legal and institutional framework for the implementation of JHA 
policies. 
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In April 2002, a new Law on the State Border came into force harmonising the 
provisions regulating the internal border with the Schengen Code (see Monitorul 
Oficial, 2002a).  The law also clarified the concept of internal and external borders and 
established a calendar and procedures for the entry into force of the measures related to 
the lifting of internal border checks at the moment of full accession into Schengen.  
Parallel to the amendments to the legal framework regulating borders, the government 
also committed to increase frontline staffing levels at the external borders to improve 
the effectiveness of border controls. Bilateral negotiations were also initiated for cross-
border cooperation treaties with Ukraine, Hungary and Bulgaria, while international 
police cooperation agreements were concluded with EUROPOL, the EU’s member 
states and several neighbouring countries. 
 
With regards to the harmonization with the EU’s visa policy, in 2002 the PSD 
administration approved a new Alien Law that regulated the conditions of entry and stay 
of third-country nationals and introduced a clear distinction between short and long-
term visas (See Monitorul Oficial, 2002b).  Modelled on the EU acquis, the law 
substantially modified the Romanian visa regime that had been in place since 1969.  In 
order to comply with the EU’s visa policies, from 2002 onwards visa restrictions were 
removed for all the countries on the EU’s positive list and visa requirements were 
introduced for all those on the EU’s negative list.  This process was finally concluded in 
2004, when Romania introduced visa requirements for Russia, Turkey, Ukraine and 
Serbia and Montenegro.  The only exception is Moldova, which enjoyed a visa-free 
regime until 1 January 2007. 
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From 2002 onwards Romania also aligned its legislation to the acquis on issues related 
to visa fees and procedures for issuing visas to third-country nationals, with the setting 
up of an online visa system connecting the National Visa Centre and the Alien 
Authority.  Within the negotiating Chapter 24, measures were also taken to harmonize 
national legislation with the EU’s asylum and immigration policies, judicial cooperation 
in civil and criminal matters, and the fight against organized crime, drug trafficking and 
trafficking in human beings. 
 
A number of scholars have pointed how the extensive and detailed acquis and the 
absence of pre-existing policies in the fields of border and visa policies in most CEE 
gave the EU ample leverage to define extensively its accession conditionality (see, for 
instance, Grabbe, 2006; Henderson; 2005; Monar, 2000).  This included areas 
regulating the organization and functioning of states institutions, the working of law 
enforcement agencies as well as the formulation of security-related state policies.  In the 
case of Romania, one area where the EU intervention is mostly evident is the 
conditionality attached to the re-organization of the border police and of other law-
enforcement agencies.   The Schengen rules foresee that the effective control of the 
EU’s external borders must to be carried out by specialized, properly trained and 
properly equipped officers (Official Journal, 2000b).  Yet, during the negotiations the 
EU went further in its demands, asking for extensive measures to regulate the 
management of careers for border guards and customs officers - such as recruitment, 
promotion and demotion - including the introduction of appointment criteria and the 
revision of salary levels for public officials (see, for example, Commission of the 
European Communities, 2003a, 2004a).   
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Similarly, the EU intervened in directing state policies on a number of security-related 
areas, such as fight organized crime, drug trafficking and fighting corruption among the 
law enforcement agencies.  The latter included demands for specialised institutions 
responsible for investigating and prosecuting corruption at administrative level and 
among border and customs officers (Commission of the European Communities, 
2003a).   This led to the creation of DGA, the institution responsible for investigating 
and prosecuting corruption cases involving MIA’s civil servants and law enforcement 
officers.  This additional conditionality was mostly framed as administrative and 
institutional measures to implement the acquis, but it allowed the Commission to play a 
major role in devising the details of the EU’s border conditionality for Romania.  
 
Another way the European Commission used its leverage to stimulate reforms was the 
threat of introducing sanctioning mechanism, especially from 2002 onwards, when 
Romania began to lag behind in the implementation of the Schengen acquis.  The major 
issues of concern for EU officials were the delays in modernising border infrastructures, 
filling staff shortages, training border guards, implementing measures to fight illegal 
immigration and cross-border crime as well as improving cross-border cooperation with 
neighbouring countries – a key pillar of the Schengen acquis (see, for example, 
Commission of the European Communities, 2001a, 2002a, 2003a and 2004a). Romania 
was also criticised for the inconsistencies in its Schengen Action Plan - a key planning 
document for the implementation of external border policies. 
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According to the 2003 Report from the European Commission, it showed a lack of 
understanding of the content of the accession requirements:  
The updated Schengen Action Plan needs to be modified substantially in order to 
show full awareness of the two-stage process in implementing the Schengen 
acquis. Romania must also continue its efforts to establish an operational national 
information system containing Schengen-compatible data. There are no clear 
linkages between the various strategies that have been elaborated as regards 
external borders (National Border Security Strategy, Integrated State Border 
Management Strategy and Schengen Action Plan). Limited practical co-operation 
casts doubt on the value of the current Integrated State Border Management 
Strategy, which is already rather vague, and lacks timeframes for implementation 
or budgetary allocations (Commission of the European Communities, 2003a, 
p.104).  
 
The Commission’s assessment largely reflected the conclusions of a large-scale 
JHA peer-review mission that found major shortcomings with regards to the 
quality and professionalism of the border police and the implementation of 
procedures and methods for external border security87.  These concerns led to the 
introduction of safeguard measures in the Treaty of Accession, with a detailed list 
of requirements to be fulfilled as a condition for accession in January 2007 (Box 
6.1 below).  As in the case of judiciary reforms and the fight against corruption, 
the postponement clause was a wake up call for the Romanian authorities to step 
up the preparations for accession, and was indeed perceived as a credible threat.  
As a document of the Ministry of Interior pointed out:  
The main objective of the Romanian Government is the accession to the European 
Union on January, the 1st, 2007. There is no plan B. We do not take into 
consideration the option of delaying the accession to the EU. We do not want 
Romania to become the precedent for activating the safeguard clause (Ministry of 
Interior and Administration, 2005).  
 
 
 
                                                
87 Author’s interview with Sabine Zwanepoel, Desk Officer for Romania and Bulgaria, DG JLS, 
Brussels, 2006. 
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BOX 6.1.  Schengen Acquis: Specific commitments undertaken by Romania  
 
…. 
I. In relation to Article 39(2)  
  
(1) To implement without further delay the Schengen Action Plan, as published in M.Of., p. I, nr. 129 
bis/10.II.2005, amended in line with the acquis and in accordance with the deadlines agreed upon.   
  
(2) In order to ensure a high level of control and surveillance at the future external borders of the Union, to 
speed up considerably efforts in terms of modernising equipment and infrastructure at the green border, 
blue border and at border crossing points, and to further enhance the capacity of operational risk analysis. 
This must be reflected in one single multi-annual investment plan to be tabled no later than March 2005, 
which must allow the Union to measure progress on a yearly basis and until the decision referred to in 
Article 4(2) of the Protocol is taken in respect of Romania. In addition, Romania must considerably step 
up its plans to recruit 4 438 border police agents and officers and in particular ensure that a staffing level 
as close as possible to 100% is reached along the borders with Ukraine, Moldova and at the Black Sea 
coast already upon accession. Romania must also implement all necessary measures to effectively combat 
illegal immigration, including strengthening cooperation with third countries.  
 
…. 
 
(6) To ensure by March 2005 a clear legal framework for the respective tasks of, and cooperation between, 
gendarmerie and police including as far as implementing legislation is concerned, and to develop and 
implement a clear recruitment plan by the middle of 2005 for both institutions with the aim of having 
made considerable progress in filling the 7 000 vacancies in the police and the 18 000 vacancies in the 
gendarmerie by the date of accession. 
 
(7) To develop and implement a coherent multi-annual anti-crime strategy including concrete actions to 
curb Romania’s status as a country of origin, transit and destination of victims of trafficking and to 
submit on a yearly basis and as of March 2005 reliable statistics on the way this crime phenomenon is 
being tackled.  
 
    Source: Annex X, Treaty of Accession, Official Journal (2005) 
 
 
 
 
Moreover, the member states were quite precise in their demands, leaving little margin 
for discretion to the Romanian authorities on how to interpret EU conditionality.  The 
Romanian government responded to this assessment by adopting a new Schengen 
Action Plan along with an Integrated Border Management Strategy in line with the EU’s 
specifications.  Staffing levels at the borders were increased, additional surveillance 
instruments were purchased and the authorities stepped up efforts to fight corruption, 
cross-border organized crime and trafficking in human beings, with the creation of the 
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National Agency for Preventing the Trafficking in Human Beings, a specialised 
structure to prevent human trafficking and monitor victims’ support assistance.  Since 
2005 the number of detected illegal crossings and cross-border offences (such as 
smuggling, falsified documents, drug and cigarette trafficking) has also increased, 
showing greater effort to implement the EU’s Schengen requirements88.  Thanks to 
these efforts, as well as those accomplished in reforming the judiciary and fighting 
corruption, Romania was able to secure accession in 2007.  A key priority for the 
government is now to ensure a speedy entry of Romania into the Schengen area. 
Romania has signalled its intention to join Schengen in 201189 and will now be closely 
monitored by the member states to verify that standards and procedures to secure the 
future external borders are fully implemented.Huge progress has been made in the past 
decade to modernize the Romanian borders, but it will take considerable commitment 
and efforts to ensure that EU standards and procedures are maintained across the 
external borders of the EU.  
 
6.2.2 The nature of the Schengen acquis and the challenges of compliance 
 
To comply with the EU’s border and visa policies Romania had to harmonize its 
national laws with EU laws and undertake a whole range of measures to build 
institutions and policies to implement them.  This has entailed elaborating legislation to 
regulate border and visa regimes, creating adequate infrastructures and facilities to deal 
with asylum seekers and illegal immigrants, purchasing costly surveillance equipment, 
                                                
88 These were the main conclusions of a peer-review mission involving membe states’ experts that took 
place in June 2006. The author was given access to these documents but given their confidential 
nature the source cannot be attributed directly.  
89  “Romania and Bulgaria prepare to join Schengen List”, Southeast European Times, 27 January 2008. 
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hiring and training professional border guards as well as conclude several bilateral and 
multilateral visa and readmission agreements with the EU’s member states and 
neighbouring countries.   
 
Compliance with the Schengen conditionality turned out to be a complex task for 
Romania.  Schengen is perhaps the most politically sensitive and financially demanding 
policy area of the whole JHA acquis.  It is broad, voluminous and complex, renowned 
for its obscurity and lack of transparency (Grabbe, 2000, p.503).  Moreover, Schengen 
is not a static compendium of rules but it is in constant evolution and the EU’s 
accession demands have expanded progressively, especially since the Amsterdam 
Treaty provided the legal basis for the development of common visa, asylum and 
immigration policies among the EU’s member states.   
 
As previously pointed out, research carried out on the experience of accession of the 
CEE countries has shown how the transposition and implementation of the Schengen 
acquis posed most candidates significant challenges.  In particular, the analyses on the 
national experience of individual countries have drawn special attention to the 
considerable financial, socio-economic and socio-political costs faced by aspiring 
members in fulfilling EU requirements in this policy field (see, Duleba 2005; Jileva 
2002, Mitsilegas 2002, Piorko and Sie Dhian Ho 2003; Piorko and Wolczuk 2001).  In 
one of the first pioneering works in this field, Jorg Monar (2000) also highlighted how 
the diversity in legislation and policy approaches as well as in organisational structures 
and implementing conditions represented significant stumbling blocks for the correct 
implementation of the acquis. 
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Similar challenges can also be observed in Romania.  The rapidly changing and legally 
complex nature of the Schengen’s legal framework posed significant policy making 
challenges to the Romanian authorities, since it involved the elaboration of complex and 
politically sensitive security-related measures, from the reorganization of law 
enforcement agencies to the framing of EU-compatible asylum, immigration and visa 
policies.  Adapting to the rapidly changing Schengen acquis was not an easy task for 
Romania, mainly because civil servants and law enforcement authorities lacked the 
necessary policy experience to elaborate and implement comprehensive JHA policies.  
The country benefited from the expertise of the EU’s member states and several 
twinning projects focused on drafting legislations and setting up institutions. However, 
according to many civil servants interviewed, the variety of national solutions across the 
member states often made it difficult to identify the best model or practice to follow in 
order to meet the accession demands90.   
 
Meeting Schengen’s requirements has also involved for Romania a large-scale 
institutional and administrative effort.  After 1989, border structures and equipment 
were obsolete and the country lacked the most basic infrastructures to process asylum 
and visa applications.  As a result, a new range of institutions had to be created either 
from scratch (such as the Visa Information Centre, the National Refugee Office and the 
Authority for Aliens) or had to be strengthened (such as consular posts)91. 
                                                
90 Author’s interviews with senior civil servants from the Ministry of Interior and Administration, the 
Ministry of European Integration and the Romania Border Police Directorate. These included 
Claudia Big, JHA negotiating expert in the Ministry of European Integration and Mircea Bacalu, 
Deputy Head of Department for European Integration, Ministry of Interior and Administration, 
Bucharest, November 2006. 
91  Author’s interview with Radu Dobre, JHA Counsellor, Permanent Representation of Romania to the 
European Union, Brussels, April 2006. 
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To meet the negotiating needs, the Ministry of Interior and the Border Police underwent 
a major restructuring both at central and regional level.  This process involved the hiring 
of experts in EU affairs and the creation of specialised units to manage the accession 
process.  In the Border Police alone, six new general directorates were created at 
regional level, along with 22 Police Country Inspectorates, 80 Border Police 
Detachments and 2 Border Naval Groups.  This proved to be a complex exercise both 
financially and in terms of human resources.  For example, the full demilitarisation of 
the border police involved more than 20,000 officers, all of which had to be trained on a 
complex range of issues such as risk analysis, drug trafficking and goods smuggling92.  
The huge implementation costs of the EU’s border policies have also resulted in a major 
financial challenge for Romania.  Bringing border structures up to the EU’s standards 
meant huge investments for hiring and training border guards and for purchasing 
equipment.  
 
According to data provided by the Ministry of Interior, between 1998 and 2004 more 
than €210 million have been allocated to border security alone, and €54 million of this 
came from the state budget.  Additional funds have also been required to process visa 
applications (ex. strengthening consular posts both in terms of logistic and personnel), 
as well as for building reception centers for asylum seekers and for training judges and 
prosecutors in EC law. The financial challenge is likely to continue after accession. 
 
 
                                                
92  Author’s interview with Marin Turica, senior officer in the Border Police Directorate, Bucharest, 
December 2006. 
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TABLE 6.2.   Migration Trend : Long-Term Visa Applications (Q1 2006  - Q1 2007)  
 
 
Country of Origin 
 
 
Q1 2007 
 
Q1 2006 
 
% Difference  
    
Turkey 850 499      70,3   % 
China 461 505 -      9,0   % 
Moldova 408 15   2720,0  % 
Ukraine 212 153       38,5  % 
India 88 37     137,8  % 
Syria 15 26     - 42,3  % 
TOTAL 2049 1235       65,9  % 
Source:  Ministry of Interior and Administration (2007b) 
 
An additional €559 million have been allocated by the EU under the Schengen Facility 
for the first three years after accession93.  However, as the economy develops and the 
standard of living increases as a result of EU accession, Romania is likely to turn from a 
country of origin and transit into a target country for asylum seekers and immigrants, 
both legal and illegal.  Migration pressure has risen since accession, especially from 
Moldova (see Table 6.1), and this is likely to further increase the financial costs for 
integrating migrants and refugees into Romania’s society. 
 
Finally, Romania has faced the political challenge resulting from the obligation to 
accept, without the option of derogations, the EU’s restrictive visa policies. Like most 
of the other candidates, this involved a drastic change to pre-existing and rather 
favourable visa arrangements for neighbouring countries, with significant political 
implications for Romania’s bilateral relations with its neighbours, especially those with 
Moldova (Dura, 2006). 
                                                
93  See Article 32 Treaty of the Accession, Official Journal (2005). 
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Already in 2001, bilateral relations were strained by the decision of the Romanian 
government to introduce mandatory passport requirements for Moldovan citizens.  To 
mitigate the impact of the new provisions on cross-border contacts Romania provided 
Moldova with a 1 million USD non-repayable financial contribution to cover the 
passport costs for certain categories of Moldovan citizens, such as students, tourists and 
inhabitants of border regions.  However, the introduction of these restrictive measures 
led to an unprecedented number of citizenship applications being filed by Moldovan 
citizens.  Further problems have emerged since the introduction of the visa requirements 
for Moldovan citizens on 1 January 2007.  During the accession negotiations Romania 
was successful in postponing visa requirements until the day of accession, but despite 
the fact visas are now issued free of charge for Moldovan citizens94, cross-border 
contacts have been made more difficult, causing tensions at political level95.  
 
Harmonisation with the EU’s visa regime was a condition imposed by the EU not only 
for accession, but also to ensure the removal of Romania from the EU’s negative list.  In 
fact, until January 2002 Romanian citizens had to go through lengthy, expensive and 
complex visa procedures to travel to the EU96.  To reassure some reluctant member 
states who feared uncontrolled migration, the Năstase executive introduced restrictive 
exit policies, whereby Romanian citizens would only be allowed to travel abroad if they 
                                                
94  In early 2007 Romania introduces free of charge visas also for Ukrainian citizens travelling to 
Romania.  
95 In the first 60 days after accession, the Romanian consulate in Chisinau has been overwhelmed with 
visa requests, and online visa applications in the first few days after Romania’s accession have 
paralyses the consulate’s Internet site. See ‘Moldovans rush for Romanian visa’, BBC News, 4 
January 2007.  With regards to citizenship applications, an estimated 700,000 citizenship 
applications have been filed in the months prior to Romania’s accession causing tensions between 
the two countries. See ‘Moldova Protests Romanian Citizenship Program’, RFERL, 7 March 2007.  
96  Mandatory visa requirements for Romanian citizens have remained in place for travelling into the 
UK and Ireland until 1 January 2007. 
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fulfilled exit requirements towards the EU – that is sufficient funds, medical insurance 
and a valid return ticket (Monitorul Oficial, 2002b).  In addition, the government 
modified the passport regime for Romanian citizens, introducing the possibility to retain 
passports and to suspend the right to use the passport for up to five years for those who 
committed criminal offences abroad.  Following the introduction of the new conditions 
for exit, the Romanian authorities were confronted with the largely unexpected 
challenge of ‘keeping its own nationals in’.  In 2002, when the provisions entered into 
force, almost half a million citizens were refused exit97.  At the same time, a drastic 
increase in the number of returns of Romanian citizens from the EU’s member states 
was registered, making the European Commission conclude that the elimination of visa 
restrictions had produced “mixed results”  (Commission of the European Communities, 
2003a, p. 104).  
 
Large-scale emigration of Romanian workers into the EU has been, and continues to be, 
an issue of concern for some member states.  Tough restrictions have already been put 
in place on labour migration for Romanian (and Bulgarian) citizens, most notably to the 
UK and Ireland, which maintained their labour market open for the 2004 new-comers 
but restricted access for Romanian and Bulgarian workers98 Although this decision 
caused outcry in both countries, with Romania openly accusing the British authorities of 
discrimination99, it reflects a negative perception of both countries as source and transit 
                                                
97 According to unofficial data of the Border Police, a substantial number of these people were 
attempting to emigrate in the EU. Interview with a senior official of the Ministry of Justice who for 
professional reasons has asked to remain anonymous, Bucharest, December 2006.  
98  Most of the other member states have introduced similar restrictions for Romanian and Bulgarian 
workers as the one already in place for the new countries that joined in 2004.   
99 See ‘Suntem europeni de categoria a doua’, România Liberă, 25 October 2006; ‘Tăriceanu: Este o 
decizie nefericită pentru Marea Britanie’, România Liberă, 25 October 2006.  
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areas of illegal immigrants and asylum seekers, and highlights a limited trust that some 
member states have in Romania’s ability to act as effective guardians of the EU’s 
borders. 
 
6.3 How Domestic Factors affected compliance 
 
In the previous section I have highlighted some of the key challenges faced by Romania 
in transposing and implementing the EU's external border conditionality.   Yet, when we 
look at Romania’s experience in a comparative perspective, the problems faced by the 
country in meeting the EU’s border conditionality were not different, in substance, to 
those most of the other countries of CEE had to confront.  As I have outlined in section 
1., most candidates started from scratch in setting up EU-compatible border policies and 
administrative structures, as the communist regime left behind mostly underdeveloped 
border policies and obsolete structures and equipment.  As it was the case for most of 
the other CEE candidates, Romania was presented with a complex and fast evolving 
acquis that posed similar institutional, policy, administrative and political challenges. 
 
The obvious additional complication for Romania has been the length of its national 
borders that makes its experience only comparable to that of Poland, which is now 
responsible for over 1600 kilometres of the EU’s external border.  Iwona Piorko’s 
analysis of the challenges of accession in the Polish context has shown how the size of 
the country and the length of its state border translated into higher financial costs to set 
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up and modernize infrastructure and greater institutional and administrative adjustments 
(Piorko, 2005).  As previously noted, the size of the country and the length of the 
Romanian border had a huge impact on the country’s capacity to implement the acquis 
as it created additional financial costs and greater institutional and administrative 
challenges.  Moreover, Romania’s geographical location meant extra monitoring on the 
part of EU officials, because it exposed the country to greater risks of cross-border 
criminal activities – such as trafficking in human beings, forged travel documents, drug 
trafficking and trafficking in stolen cars.  But if the problems of compliance observed in 
Romania were not exceptional, the accession negotiations have been far more 
problematic than with any other CEE applicant, and the EU had to resort to introducing 
a special postponement clause to compel the Romanian political class to address serious 
shortcomings in implementing the JHA acquis.  How can Romania’s compliance 
problems be accounted for?  
 
One observation stands out when we look at Romania’s record of compliance and 
domestic reforms: the major delays in putting into place an adequate legal and 
implementation framework regulating an EU-compatible border regime.  Although 
some reforms were launched in 2000 and 2001 to secure visa-free travel for Romanian 
citizens, internal preparations did not actually begin until late 2001, just a few months 
ahead of the scheduled opening of the accession negotiations for Chapter 24.  In 2001 
the entry and movement of third-country nationals was still regulated by the 
communist-era 1969 Alien Law and the overall legislative framework underpinning the 
regime of the state border and the status, organization and function of the Romanian 
border police was so fragmented that the Năstase executive (2000-2004) had to resort to 
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a flurry of emergency ordinances to settle the legal foundations of JHA policies.  This 
included key pieces of legislation such as the Law on the State Border, which was 
approved via emergency ordinance only in June 2001, and this did not become state law 
until mid 2002 (see Monitorul Oficial, 2001).    
 
Similar delays were also registered at administrative and operational level.  It is only in 
late 2001 that specialised units in charge of the EU’s integration process were created 
inside the MIA100. At operational level, the demilitarisation of the border police that was 
launched in 1999 proceeded slowly, and at the end of 2001 only 1,326 conscripts (of the 
3,314 envisaged) were actually replaced with staff hired under contract101.  Lacking 
sufficient preparations, it is perhaps unsurprising that Romania remained trapped in a 
persistent catching up effort with significant delays being registered by the European 
Commission in its annual reports.  
 
What is even more striking is the fact that, being part of the second wave of the EU’s 
eastward enlargement, Romania was potentially in a far better position to mitigate some 
of the challenges stemming from the nature and volume of the Schengen acquis.  A 
considerable part of the accession acquis was clarified by the time Romania opened the 
accession negotiations in early 2000, and the Romanian authorities could also draw on 
the experience of other CEE candidates, both in terms of what the EU’s requirements 
actually were and the domestic challenges involved.  JHA was a ‘moving target’ also 
for Romania. 
                                                
100 Author’s interview with Mircea Bacalu, Deputy Directory of the Department of European 
Integration, Ministry of Interior and Administration, Bucharest, November 2006. 
101  These data were provided to the EU by the Romanian Government in the Accession Conference’s 
Position Paper for Chapter 24 negotiations. See Government of Romania (2001b, p. 6).  
 185 
However, with the incorporation of the Schengen acquis in the EU’s legal framework it 
was clear that JHA was emerging as an area of concern for the member states.  EU 
conditionality might have been vague in some of its parts but the European Commission 
was clear in its criticism when assessing the delays in jumpstarting internal 
preparations.  For example, in its 1999 Regular Report, the Commission noted:  
Romania must now urgently implement the important measures announced by its 
authorities. Some important pieces of legislation have to be adopted or amended 
and the restructuring and modernisation of the relevant administrations, especially 
those depending from the Ministry of Interior, have to be completed so as to ensure 
the effective implementation of the legislation. In particular, the demilitarisation of 
the Ministry of Interior and its subordinated institutions, primarily the Police and 
the Border Police General Inspectorate is a priority which must be implemented 
without delay (Commission of the European Communities 1999, p. 56).  
 
 
Yet, the domestic political elite seemed to have underestimated the importance attached 
by the EU to external border policies and the scale of the challenges the country would 
face in fulfilling the EU’s demands. Contacts were established with the other CEE 
candidates but there is little indication that the Romanian authorities benefited from this 
relative advantage. 
 
Besides starting late, the preparations for accession have been complicated by a number 
of structural and built-in problems, which affected the speed and quality of the legal 
approximation and implementation of the Schengen acquis.  The most significant of 
these structural problems is the weakness of Romania’s administrative capacity, 
reflected by the country’s low policy-making capacity, lack of strategic vision in policy 
elaboration, uneven internal consultation and coordination across ministries and state 
agencies, and limited evaluation of the financial impact of executive and parliamentary 
decisions. 
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While low state capacity was a common issue to many CEE candidates, several EU 
officials interviewed argued that this was a particularly acute problem in Romania102.  
The quality of the public administration improved over time, but it was generally 
perceived as over-politicised and unprofessional, a factor that contributed much to 
develop a negative perception of the country in many EU quarters.  
 
The weaknesses of the administrative capacity in Romania has affected the preparations 
for accession across a whole range of policy areas, but its impact is particularly evident 
when looking at complex policy areas such as the JHA acquis, where implementation 
requires considerable internal institutional coordination and highly qualified civil 
servants. Romania “failed on both fronts”, as a senior EU official told the author103. 
Other officials have pointed out during interviews how strategic documents and draft 
legislation often lacked long-term vision and showed poor policy understanding, with a 
clear tendency to ‘cut and paste’ policy models rather than developing policies 
reflecting domestic needs104.  These shortcomings were also reflected in the 
Commission’s annual Reports.  In the 2003, the Commission’s Regular Report noted: 
There are no clear linkages between the various strategies that have been 
elaborated as regards external borders (National Border Security Strategy, 
Integrated State Border Management Strategy and Schengen Action Plan). Limited 
practical co-operation casts doubt on the value of the current Integrated State 
Border Management Strategy, which is already rather vague, and lacks timeframes 
for implementation or budgetary allocations. Co-operation between all the agencies 
involved in border management remains largely ineffective and unfocused 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2003a, p.104).  
 
                                                
102  Author’s interviews with EU officials and member states’ experts including Enrico Grillo 
Pasquarelli, Director, DG Enlargement, European Commission, Brussels, April, 2006, and Richard 
Lucking, pre-accession advisor, Bucharest, November, 2006. 
103  Author’s interview with a senior EU official who for professional reasons has asked to remain 
anonymous, Brussels, 2006. 
104  Author’s interviews with three EU officials who worked closely with the Romanian authorities 
during the negotiations.  For professional reasons they have asked to remain anonymous.  
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Implicit in the Commission assessment was a more generalised criticism made to the 
Romanian authorities for their failure to reform the Romanian public administration into 
a modern, efficient, accountable and professional institution.  Already in 1997, the 
Commission pointed out how the low efficiency of the public administration and the 
lack of qualified civil servants in Romania represented “a major problem compromising 
both the pace and the quality of legislative approximation” (Commission of the 
European Communities, 1997a, p. 49).  However, as in the case of anti-corruption and 
justice reforms, successive post-communist governments managed to bypass EU’s 
criticism with half-hearted and superficial measures, which failed to address many of 
the public services’ structural deficiencies (Hinţea, et al, 2004).  
 
Finally, another major stumbling block to the effective implementation of the EU’s 
border policies has been, and continues to be, the widespread corruption among border 
guards and customs officers.  In 2001, a World Bank report commissioned by the 
Romanian government found that customs and border officials were perceived as the 
most corrupt among state institutions (World Bank, 2001b, p.5) and several high profile 
cases uncovered in recent years have reinforced this perception.  Since DGA - the Anti-
Corruption Department of the MIA -became operational, efforts have been made to 
fight corruption among border officers.  The number of investigations and prosecutions 
for corruption cases has risen but the increased effort to prevent and eradicate 
corruption has also highlighted the real scale of the corruption phenomenon among law 
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enforcement officers, many of which were discovered to be on the payrolls of organized 
criminal groups105.   
 
Arguably, some of the problems observed in Romania in the field of external border 
controls mirror a more generalised failure of the political class to understand the 
complexity of the accession process and the pre-requisites for EU integration.  When 
the Romanian political class finally recognised that preparing for EU accession had 
more to do with managing deep internal reforms than conducting a sophisticated 
diplomatic exercise with Brussels, most of the country’s deficiencies had emerged, and 
politicians found themselves struggling to repair the negative image the country 
acquired in many EU quarters. 
 
6.4 Conclusion 
 
This case study examined the development of external border and visa policies in the 
context of Romania's preparations for EU accession.  As in the case of the previous 
chapters, the objective of the empirical analysis was to trace the impact of the EU's 
accession conditionality on policy and institutional developments.  It further identified 
and explained how factors emanating from the domestic environment slowed down 
internal reforms and mitigated the scope of EU influence.  
 
 
                                                
105 Off-the-record information obtained by the author during an interview with a senior official of one of 
the main anti-corruption institutions in Romania, Bucharest, 2006. 
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As regards to the first research question - i.e. the impact of the EU’s accession 
conditionality on policy and institutional developments – the empirical analysis 
presented in this chapter has demonstrated the importance of EU conditionality as a 
stimulus to institutional and policy reforms.   
 
The evolution of external border policies has in fact shown how the profound 
transformation and modernization of the Romanian border regime can be mostly 
explained by the strong and persistent pressure by the EU.  This was linked to the rather 
explicit accession conditionality and worked with a mix of ‘carrots and sticks’.  In 
particular, the empirical analysis has demonstrated how the EU’s accession 
conditionality heavily influenced the pace and content of domestic reforms.  The most 
significant policy and institutional developments coincided with critical moments in 
EU-Romania relations, highlighting that EU leverage was most effective during the 
decision-making phases.  For instance, it was the prospect of opening the accession 
talks in 2000 that jump-started domestic preparations both at legislative and institutional 
level.  Similarly, the decision to maintain restrictive visa policies on Romanian citizens 
compelled the political class to step up the process of the modernisation of the border 
regime.  Moreover, the EU’s tough stance toward Romania at the closure of the 
accession talks in 2004 also forced the government to address several shortcomings in 
implementing JHA policies. 
 
The empirical discussion has also shown that extensive and detailed acquis and the 
absence of any policy legacy in the fields of border and visa policies gave the EU both 
leverage to define the accession conditionality and the space to suggest specific 
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institutional and policy changes.  It also limited the negotiating power of politicians in 
Romania because full compliance with the Schengen rules was, from the outset, a clear 
condition for membership.  Moreover, this was one policy where domestic politicians 
had sufficiently strong incentives to fulfill the EU’s entry conditions equally before and 
after accession - such as the lifting of visa restrictions and, in the post accession period 
the full participation into the Schengen area. This helped overcome the considerable 
adaptation costs and the political, institutional, financial and administrative challenges 
linked to the transposition and implementation of EU rules in this field.  
 
With regards to the second research question, the analysis of border policies in Romania 
has also corroborated the research hypothesis on the crucial role that domestic factors 
can have in mitigating the scope of the EU’s leverage.  As mentioned in section 2, some 
of the difficulties observed in the implementation of EU rules can be attributed to the 
size of the country and the length of its national borders.  These have caused greater 
administrative and institutional adjustments and increased financial costs.  However, the 
empirical discussion has also highlighted how internal preparations to comply with the 
EU’s external borders acquis started late, and these have been further complicated by 
the weaknesses of the country’s administrative capacity that has affected the 
implementation of the acquis.  This suggests that the specific implementing conditions 
have played a significant role in undermining the correct implementation of EU rules at 
national level.  
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
 
 
This thesis has examined EU influence on JHA policies in Romania up to the moment 
of its accession on 1 January 2007.  Its objective was to provide a detailed and 
empirically rooted assessment of the impact of the EU’s membership conditionality on 
policy and institutional changes, thus adding to existing research on EU influence in 
post-communist countries, especially studies on EU conditionality and Europeanization.   
 
This thesis has addressed two sets of research questions.  First, it asked whether the 
EU’s accession conditionality shaped JHA policies in Romania and if this was 
conducive to effective and long-lasting changes. Secondly, this thesis investigated how 
factors emanating from the domestic environment affected compliance.  To answer 
these research questions and unpack the nature and scope of the EU's leverage, this 
thesis has analysed policy and institutional developments in three areas under the JHA 
umbrella: judiciary reforms, anti-corruption and external border policies.  These case-
studies were selected because of their political relevance during the negotiations for 
accession of Romania to the EU.  As specified in Chapter 1, all three policy areas were 
high on the EU's political agenda in the framework of its enlargement to CEE. At the 
same time, these were areas of the EU acquis where significant delays were registered 
by Romania in the transposition and implementation of EU rules.  Therefore, they have 
provided a good test case to evaluate the potential, as well as the limits, of the EU's 
leverage. 
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This concluding chapter draws together the key arguments and findings of the 
individual empirical chapters, summarising the domestic impact of EU conditionality as 
well as the role that domestic factors had in mitigating EU influence.  At the light of 
these findings, I then evaluate how this thesis contributes to academic knowledge and 
identifies avenues for possible future research.  This chapter also looks at the most 
recent developments in EU-Romania relations, raising questions on the scope of the 
EU’s leverage in the post-accession period. This thesis concludes by examining 
Romania’s experience of integration through the lens of the EU’s enlargement policy, 
identifying some of the key lessons the EU learned from its enlargement to Romania 
along with the likely implications for the current and future candidates.  
 
7.1 The findings of the case studies 
 
The first question of this research asked whether the EU’s accession conditionality 
influenced domestic policies and institutional choices in the three cases under 
consideration.  The literature on Europeanization and EU conditionality reviewed in 
Chapter 2 posits conditionality and the process of EU integration as explanatory factors 
for domestic change in the post-communist states of CEE.  Since Romania was part of 
the EU's enlargement process to the region, it was reasonable to assume that the need to 
fulfill the EU's demanding entry conditions was an important lever in domestic policy-
making.  
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When looking at the reform trajectory throughout the pre-accession and accession 
period, the case studies have provided ample evidence of the impact of the EU's 
accession conditionality on policy and institutional developments.   A detailed analysis 
of the evolution of domestic policies in the field of justice, anti-corruption and external 
borders control has, on a number of occasions, revealed a causal link between the EU’s 
demands and domestic reforms.  In particular, as much of the Europeanization and EU 
conditionality literature would predict, the impact of the EU varied over time and it was 
mostly effective during the decision-making phases, especially when the EU signalled 
its intention to resort to sanctioning mechanisms because of the limited compliance 
achieved by Romania in implementing EU rules.  For instance, both in the fields of 
justice and anti-corruption, some of the most significant reforms were launched few 
months ahead of the closure of the accession negotiations in response to a highly critical 
motion by the EP that threatened to call for a freeze in the accession negotiations.  As 
noted in chapters 4 and 5, the fear of a delay in finalising the negotiations led to the 
adoption of the three-law package in the field of justice and a substantial revision of the 
legal framework regulating the power and competences of anti-corruption institutions.  
Equally important to spur reforms was the presence of the postponement clause in the 
Treaty of Accession.  In the field of justice and anti-corruption, the credible threat of a 
delay in Romania’s accession led to intensified legislative activities to meet the 
benchmarks set by the EU.  Similarly, the EU’s tough stance towards Romania at the 
closure of the accession talks in 2004 forced the government to address the several 
shortcomings in implementing external border policies. 
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The interaction between EU conditionality and domestic politics has revealed that EU 
influence worked primarily because the costs of non-compliance with the EU’s 
conditions were perceived to be too high for the Romanian political class to ignore. In 
all three cases, the credible prospect of membership, coupled with the credible risk of a 
delay in the accession process, emerged as powerful incentives for reforming state 
structures, policies and institutions. 
 
In evaluating both the scope and limits of EU influence, this research also looked for 
indications of the sustainability of the reforms introduced under the impulse of EU 
integration.  Here the empirical evidence is mixed.  Significant steps have been taken by 
Romania to bring its policies and institutional structures in line with the EU's entry 
conditions. Yet, judging by the compliance record at the moment of Romania’s formal 
accession to the EU on 1 January 2007, a number of questions remain open as to 
whether many of the reforms introduced have actually taken root at political and 
institutional level.  As I have pointed out in Chapter 4, the legal framework to ensure 
the independence and accountability of the judiciary was progressively put in place. But 
the Romanian justice system continues to be affected by chronic built-in problems and 
weaknesses and is yet to transform itself into a credible and efficient institution 
guaranteeing the rule of law.  Corruption, especially political corruption, is still 
regarded as a widespread and endemic phenomenon despite Romania now possessing 
one of the most comprehensive anti-corruption legal frameworks in Europe.  In the field 
of external border controls the EU’s accession tools have had a visible impact in 
bringing policies and institutional structures in line with western standards. 
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However, the actual implementation of EU policies remains uneven and it will take 
some time before Romania will be able to act as an effective guardian of the EU’s 
external borders.  The introduction of a post-accession mechanism to monitor the 
implementation of JHA policies after accession is in itself evidence of the fact that the 
EU failed to entice full compliance with its conditionality demands prior to Romania's 
formal accession in January 2007.   
 
The case-studies also offered the opportunity to examine whether the clarity of the EU's 
accession demands enhances compliance.  As specified in Chapter 2, the 
Europeanization and EU conditionality literature predict greater policy and institutional 
convergence when the EU's entry requirements are clear and unambiguous, especially 
when the EU provides institutional and policy models to follow or emulate at national 
level  (Grabbe, 2006; Hughes et al., 2004; Jacoby, 2004; Schimmelfennig et al.,2003).  
By contrast, when the EU’s demands are vague and open to interpretation, such as in the 
case of democratic conditionality, the literature predicts limited compliance because 
domestic political elites have more discretion in accepting or bypassing the EU's entry 
conditions (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005).  
 
When applied to the case-studies, the empirical record did not fully reveal a direct 
correlation between the clarity of the EU's demands and the level of compliance one 
might expect at domestic level, suggesting that this relation may not be as ‘causal’ as 
the literature seems to suggest.  Firstly, the case studies have highlighted that clear 
accession requirements and the presence of policy and institutional models do not 
necessarily lead to successful compliance. 
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As noted in Chapter 6, while the precision of the EU’s demands in the field of external 
border controls helped achieve policy convergence at a legal level, the weaknesses of 
the country’s administrative capacity, poor internal coordination and the lack of 
sufficient financial resources slowed down internal preparations and affected the pace 
and quality of the implementation, thus undermining the overall efficacy of EU rules.  
 
Secondly, the case studies have highlighted that vague membership criteria and the 
absence of pre-defined policy and institutional templates do not necessarily limit the 
potential influence of the EU.  As Noutcheva (2006a) argued, vague membership 
conditions can actually strengthen the EU’s position, because they give the Commission 
and the member states greater discretion and flexibility in certifying compliance and 
demand more reforms.  Indeed, as highlighted in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 (which dealt 
respectively with the reform of the justice system and anti-corruption policies) the 
vagueness of the EU’s accession conditions gave the Commission ample room for 
setting higher thresholds for accession, and demanding greater institutional and policy 
changes than Romania had originally subscribed to at the closure of the accession 
negotiations.    Here, the factors which have emerged as critical for the success of EU 
influence were (1) the importance attached by the EU to compliance, and (2) the extent 
to which the EU was prepared to use strategically its leverage mechanisms to push for 
domestic changes.   In the cases of judiciary reforms and anti-corruption  (two critical 
issues on the EU’s agenda), when Brussels showed willingness to sanction Romania for 
its failure to introduce EU-compatible rules and implement reforms, it succeeded in 
provoking domestic changes in spite of the fact it lacked substantial legally binding 
acquis. 
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As I have argued, in both instances the EU’s leverage worked primarily because the 
costs of a delay in the accession were perceived as too high for incumbent politicians to 
ignore or bypass, and this shifted political consensus at domestic level in favour of state 
reforms in line with the EU’s accession demands.   In this respect, the reform trajectory 
in the field of justice and anti-corruption policies has revealed the variety of 
mechanisms through which the EU can influence domestic decision-making.  By raising 
the costs of non-compliance EU policy-makers can prevent veto players from 
obstructing reforms.  Yet, the EU’s leverage is most effective when the EU succeeds in 
building “informal coalitions” with domestic actors, by empowering and strengthening 
domestic reformers (Jacoby, 2006).  In both instances the EU was able to accelerate 
reforms prior to Romania’s formal accession also thanks to the presence of reformist 
sources inside the governing coalition, that used conditionality and the threat of 
postponement as a leverage in domestic politics, to push to the top of the domestic 
political agenda extensive policy and institutional changes. 
 
The second research question put forward by this research asked how domestic factors 
affected compliance and constrained the EU's potentially powerful leverage.  Romania’s 
laggard status in the process of EU integration had made it possible to hypothesise that, 
albeit powerful, the influence of the EU was mitigated by factors emanating from the 
domestic environment.  The findings of the empirical analyses largely corroborated this 
hypothesis, showing how domestic factors played an important if not significant role in 
slowing down internal reforms and in constraining the potentially powerful influence of 
the EU. 
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In particular, it has emerged that insufficient political will, half-hearted commitments, 
the desire to protect vested interests by powerful veto players and the weakness of the 
country’s administrative and judicial capacity have affected the pace and quality of 
domestic reforms, leaving Romania struggling to bring its policies, institutions and 
practices in line with the EU’s accession demands.   
 
As I have pointed out in Chapter 4, the systemic weaknesses of the Romanian justice 
system are the product of half-hearted and often cosmetic reforms, resulting from the 
unwillingness (or inability) of its post-communist elites to tackle judiciary reforms 
seriously.  With regards to the fight against corruption, the legal framework was 
progressively put in place but this largely remained an empty shell, often designed more 
to ‘please’ foreign officials rather than to tackle corruption effectively.  Despite all 
successive post-communist governments claiming that the fight against corruption was 
their top priority, reforms did not lead to an improved performance of anti-corruption 
institutions or a reduction in the perceived levels of corruption.  With regards to external 
border policies, the domestic implementing conditions specific to Romania have 
emerged as a considerable stumbling bloc for the correct implementation of EU rules. 
Implementation was further undermined by structurally built-in problems such as the 
weakness of the country’s administrative capacity, the lack of sufficient financial 
resources and poorly established practices and methods. 
 
One of the key conclusions that can be drawn from these findings is that the policy 
priorities of domestic actors matter for compliance.  In the field of external border 
policies, the Romanian authorities had sufficiently strong incentives to fulfil the EU’s 
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conditions as this was explicitly linked to the opening of the accession talks and the 
lifting of visa requirements for citizens wishing to travel in Europe.  In the other two 
cases however, compliance with the conditionality involved considerable political costs, 
and politicians in Romania were not always prepared to pay the price of initiating 
reforms that would challenge their power base.  When external pressure from the EU 
forced politicians to commit to extensive state reforms, they did so but mostly ‘on 
paper’, and defected from their promises in the process of implementation.  This was 
especially the case for those reforms that should have enhanced the independence of the 
justice system, empower institutions with the legal tools to fight corruption as well as 
improve the efficiency and independence of the public administration.   
 
In these areas, simulating change was less costly than introducing sound state reforms 
because it still allowed corrupt politicians to maintain control over political institutions 
and guarantee impunity for themselves and their close allies from corruption charges.  
Simulating reforms was also politically ‘wiser’ than just ignoring the EU’s demands, 
because of the risk of being excluded from the EU’s enlargement process.  Yet, bad 
reforms and cosmetic commitments have created obstacles at implementation level and 
have made it difficult to move forward with the correct implementation of EU policies.  
More significantly, doubtful democratic and economic commitments and the persistent 
delays in fulfilling the EU’s requirements ultimately complicated the process of 
accession because they negatively affected Romania’s image in EU quarters and 
influenced the way EU institutions intended, and framed, the accession conditions for 
Romania (Pridham, 2007, p. 527).  
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By exploring the process of accession of Romania in the field of JHA this thesis aimed 
at making a contribution to the academic literature on Europeanization and EU 
conditionality as well as to enrich the understanding of the reform process in post-
communist Romania in the context of its accession to the EU.   
 
Academic research on external influence in post-communist countries has flourished in 
recent years and the study of Europeanization has emerged as one of the most vibrant 
research agendas in IR and comparative politics. Yet, studies exploring the impact of 
the EU's accession conditionality on policy and institutional development are still scarce 
and most of them have been carried out at a comparative level.  The originality of this 
thesis is that it traced the link between EU conditionality and domestic reforms in three 
policy areas and in one single case study thus providing detailed and extensive 
empirical evidence of EU influence.  
 
This research has also contributed to the literature on EU conditionality by highlighting 
the different mechanism through which EU influence interacts with domestic politics.  
One of the findings of particular significance is the ability of the EU to devise new 
leverage mechanisms and re-invent its conditionality strategy to accelerate reforms and 
intervene more deeply in domestic decision-making.  The empirical analysis has also 
confirmed that the credibility of conditionality - both in terms of incentives for 
compliance and disincentives for non compliance - is of crucial importance for the 
success of the EU's leverage especially in the case of contested reforms.  This thesis 
also demonstrated how domestic factors matter for compliance, showing that the 
outcome of EU influence is contingent upon the existence of facilitating actors at 
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domestic level. By studying how the domestic environment affects compliance this 
research has thus enhances academic knowledge on the domestic conditions under 
which conditionality is likely to be more or less effective. 
 
This research has also made a contribution to the academic literature on Romanian 
politics.  When compared to some of the other countries of CEE, research on Romania 
is relatively abundant.  Yet scholarly attention has generally focused on the country’s 
communist experience and post-communist transition with only few references to its 
preparations for EU integration.  In this respect this thesis fills a lacuna in the literature. 
Moreover, this research has provided a comprehensive overview of the framing of three 
important policy areas since the collapse of the communist regime, highlighting the 
development of key political and institutional structures in the country.  The findings of 
this study could thus be used as background for further research.   
 
Finally this thesis has addressed a gap in the existing JHA literature. Although the 
academic interest towards the JHA field has been growing rapidly in recent years, this 
remains one of the newest domains of EU cooperation and the expertise in this field is 
still developing, especially with regards to the area of justice and anti-corruption.  By 
exploring these policy areas this thesis thus adds to the current knowledge on the JHA 
acquis.  Moreover, this thesis contributes to the JHA literature in the context of the 
EU’s enlargement by studying an important yet largely unexplored case-study. 
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The results of this thesis could be usefully applied across policy contexts and within a 
broader comparative perspective.  For example, it would be instructive to examine the 
EU influence in other areas of the acquis as the process of Europeanization in less 
politically sensitive areas might reveal different dynamics both at EU and domestic 
level.  Further research could also be directed towards a comparison of the Romanian 
case with new and future candidate states.  A second line of possible research 
development is the question of interaction between EU conditionality and the leverage 
of other international organizations whose role has generally received little attention in 
the literature.  Some few tentative connections were made by this thesis but extensive 
research would much advance knowledge in this field.  
 
Beyond its contribution to academic knowledge, the detailed assessment of the framing 
of EU conditionality in the field of JHA offered in this thesis, and awareness of the 
challenges experienced by Romania in fulfilling the EU’s entry conditions, have also a 
policy value.    As a difficult case much can be learned from its experience, with regards 
to the challenges of fulfilling the EU’s entry conditions, the nature and scope of EU 
conditionality, and the way in which the EU conducted, and is likely to conduct, the 
negotiations vis-à-vis other aspiring members.  This is especially important for JHA 
policies, which have already emerged as a key priority area in the accession talks with 
Turkey and the countries of the Western Balkans. Section 3 reflects upon these issues, 
highlighting some of the lessons learned by the EU from its enlargement to Romania 
and the likely implications for the current and future aspiring and would-be members.  
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7.2  EU leverage after accession 
 
In December 2004 Romania closed the accession negotiations despite serious 
shortcomings in guaranteeing the rule of law, fighting corruption and securing the EU’s 
future external borders, as well as in implementing the EU’s competition policy - one of 
the key pillars of the Single Market acquis.  The member states tried to remedy these 
shortcomings by threatening a one-year delay in Romania’s date of accession.  I have 
pointed out throughout this thesis how the presence of the postponement clause gave the 
EU an unprecedented opportunity to speed up domestic reforms and ensure Romania 
would be ready for accession.  I have also shown how the European Commission 
skillfully used the threat of postponement to maximise its leverage, by stretching 
conditionality to its limits and demanding more reforms than the country had originally 
subscribed to.  Did the EU’s leverage work? Are there any sufficiently convincing signs 
that the reforms initiated under the impulse of the EU’s pressure have taken root? As 
argued in the previous section, when looking at the reform trajectory after 2004 there is 
ample evidence to suggest that on several occasions the EU’s conditionality strategy 
was instrumental, and indeed successful, in accelerating policy changes in lines with the 
accession requirements.  However, two years after Romania’s formal accession to the 
EU there are some doubts as to whether many of the reforms introduced under the 
impulse of European integration have taken root.  
 
Romania is now required to report every year on a set of benchmarks devised by the 
European Commission in the fields of justice and the fight against corruption, amid the 
risk of safeguard measures being introduced.  
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The most controversial and politically sensitive of these benchmarks has been the 
establishment of the National Integrity Agency (ANI) to verify assets, incompatibilities 
and potential conflicts of interest of public officials.  The Commission has also 
demanded evidence of continuous effort in conducting investigations on high-level 
corruption cases, the introduction of measures to curb corruption at local level as well as 
measures to enhance the efficiency of the judicial process and the accountability of the 
SCM (Commission of the European Communities, 2006a).  As I mentioned in Chapter 
3, with the introduction of a post-accession monitoring mechanism the Commission had 
two objectives in mind: to maintain pressure on reforms after accession and to reassure 
some reluctant member states that EU institutions would keep a vigilant eye on 
Romania’s democratic credentials.   
 
Stretching conditionality into the post-accession period has set an important precedent 
for the EU’s conditionality strategy, but at the time of writing there is little indication 
that the EU’s leverage has achieved the desired results.  The much-debated ANI was 
established but thanks to the copious amendments introduced by Parliament to the 
original draft law, this institution is yet to be equipped with the necessary legal and 
operational means to fight corruption106.  Investigations into alleged cases of high-level 
political corruption have continued, but in the last two years key prosecutors have been 
under increased political pressure to abandon high-level corruption cases involving 
well-known politicians as well as high-ranking officers inside the Interior Ministry107. 
                                                
106 ‘Agenţia Naţională de Integritate a fost castrată încă o dată în Senat’, Hotnews, 31 January 2007 
107 ‘DNA Chief denounces political pressures on prosecutors’, Nine O’Clock, 16 July 2007. 
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The most notorious case refers to the decision taken by Tudor Chiuariu, the successor of 
Monica Macovei at the head of the Ministry of Justice, to dismiss Florin Tulus, Deputy 
Head of DNA - the Romanian Anti-Corruption Department - who was in charge of 
corruption and tax evasion investigations against the media magnate and president of 
PC Dan Voiculescu, and Marko Bela, leader of the UDMR108.  
 
Perhaps more significantly, since Romania secured membership, politicians have shown 
a defiant attitude towards EU compliance, and struggles over power and personalities - 
rather than reforms - have taken the scene of Romanian political life.  One hundred days 
after joining the EU, the already fragile DA-coalition broke down and key pro-EU 
ministers were sacked - including Justice Minister Macovei - in a bitter political 
struggle between the Prime Minister and the President.  With overwhelming support 
from the opposition parties, Parliament also suspended President Băsescu in April 2007 
for alleged abuse of power, only to see him back one month later after a popular 
referendum decided he had been unlawfully dismissed.   
 
The political crisis in the country just a few months after accession worried EU 
officials, because it called into question the credibility of the EU’s enlargement policy 
as a tool for preparing aspiring members for accession.  The Commission was quick to 
summon the Romanian authorities to continue with justice and anti-corruption 
reforms109, although many in Brussels knew too well that with membership secured and 
                                                
108  ‘Ministrul Justiţiei a cerut revocarea adjunctului lui Daniel Morar’, Hotnews, 8 May 2007. 
109 See, for example, ‘EC President hopes Romania crisis ends as soon as possible’, Euractiv, 23 April 
2007; ‘Commissioner Frattini shows concern on Romania Justice Reform’, Euractiv, 23 April 2007. 
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without reformers in key positions the reform momentum was unlikely to continue110. 
Arguably, since the closure of the accession talks, the country has witnessed a 
regression in its reforms especially with regards to the fight against corruption.   
 
In early 2007 the Romanian Parliament amended the draft law of the Criminal 
Procedural Code, making it difficult, if not impossible, for prosecutors to conduct 
investigations against politicians and find evidence to launch corruption cases.  In June 
2008 the Constitutional Court also decided that all investigations involving politicians 
had to be sanctioned by Parliament.  Although Parliamentary oversight of investigations 
against members of Parliament is not uncommon, and similar provisions are in place in 
some EU member states, this decision was widely perceived as an attempt to safeguard 
impunity for former Prime Minister Adrian Năstase and former Transport Minister 
Miron Mitrea, who were both being prosecuted for corruption 111.  The legal committee 
of the Romanian Senate also approved an amendment modifying the appointment 
procedures for the heads of the three main institutions involved in the fight against 
corruption and organized crime – DNA, DIICOT112 and the General Prosecutor - despite 
the fact this is in breach of the commitments signed up by Romania under the terms of 
the Verification and Cooperation Agreement introduced in December 2006.   This has 
led to the replacement of Daniel Morar – the head of DNA  – in spite of the fact that 
both the Commission and the Council of Europe made it clear that reconfirming his 
                                                
110 Private conversations with senior EU officials who for professional reasons asked to remain 
anonymous, (Brussels, April– June 2007).  
111 See ‘Lawmakers Derail Romania's Corruption Fight’, RFERL, 27 June 2008.  
112 DIICOT (Romanian acronym for Direcţia de Investigare a Infracţiunilor de Criminalitate 
Organizată şi Terorism) is the institution in charge of investigations regarding organized crime and 
terrorist activities. For media coverage see ‘General Prosecutor’s Office, DNA and DIICOT heads 
might be named by CSM’, Nine O’Clock, 5 September 2008. 
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mandate would have been a sign of Romania’s commitment to fighting corruption113.  
According to Willen de Pauw, a EU expert who has been closely involved in assessing 
Romania’s anti-corruption efforts, “instead of progress in the fight against high-level 
corruption, Romania is regressing on all fronts […] if the Romanian anti-corruption 
effort keeps evaporating at the present pace, in an estimated six months time Romania 
will be back where it was in 2003”114.  
 
What can the EU do to compel the Romanian political class to tackle corruption and 
improve the functioning of the justice system?  At this point there is not much room for 
the EU to push for more reforms.   The Commission has repeatedly threatened 
sanctions, and in its latest assessment asked the Romanian political class to show 
responsibility in fighting high-level corruption. For the Commission, “Romanian 
citizens deserve access to the full benefits of EU membership” and “dispelling doubts 
about Romania's ability to deal with corruption will enable Romanian citizens to reap 
these benefits and enhance their confidence in the rule of law” (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2008, p. 7).  Yet, in practical terms the Verification and 
Cooperation mechanism is a very blunt instrument at the EU’s disposal, and with 
membership secured there is little the EU can do to compel the Romanian political class 
to live up to its commitments. 
                                                
113 Mark Gray, the European Commission spokesperson was quoted as having said: “We expect the 
reform process to go forwards, not backwards… Reconfirming the chief prosecutor will be a test for 
the renewed commitments of Romanian authorities”. See ‘European Commission: Reconfirming 
Anti-Graft head is a test for Romanian authorities’, Hotnews, 31 July 2008. See also interview with 
Drago Kos, the head of GRECO (the Council of Europe Group of States against Corruption) in. 
‘Seful GRECO: schimbarea lui Morar ar fi o decizie politică foarte proastă pentru România’, 
România Liberă, 30 July 2008. 
114  Quoted in ‘In denial - The European Union conceals Romania’s backsliding on corruption”, The 
Economist, 3 June 2008. 
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Activating the safeguard clause in the field of JHA would essentially mean that the 
judicial decisions of the Romanian courts would not be recognised by judges in other 
EU member states.  This hardly looks a dissuasive instrument for the Romanian 
political class, since those worst affected will be the Romanian citizens that will be 
forced to go through lengthier and costly procedures to have their court decisions 
recognised outside the country.  The EU might well withdraw EU funds but with a 
booming economy at home, this does not appear to be an issue of concern for Romanian 
politicians.   The EU has more leverage when it comes to external border policies, 
because it can withdraw the significant benefit of membership to the Schengen area.  
Romania has signaled its intention to join Schengen in 2011 and the process of 
monitoring the implementation of the acquis has recently been launched.  What perhaps 
the EU should do is expressively link anti-corruption results with Schengen accession.  
This might well turn out to be a sufficiently strong incentive for the Romanian political 
class to stop paying lip service to the demands of EU institutions and live up to its 
commitments.  
 
7.3 The EU and future enlargements: Lessons from the experience of 
Romania 
 
When the EU opened its doors to Romania and Bulgaria on 1 January 2007, it brought 
to completion the largest, most ambitious and challenging expansion in its fifty-year 
history. Eastward enlargement has shaped profoundly the EU and its new members.  
Not only with the accession of twelve new countries the Union almost doubled in size 
and population – from 15 to 27 members with a total population close to 500 million 
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people.   But since the end of the Cold War the EU has also emerged as a powerful 
democratizing force, capable of spreading prosperity and stability outside its borders.  
Indeed, the pace at which transition took place in CEE has been remarkable, and 
enlargement turned out to be the most powerful and successful foreign policy tool at the 
EU’s disposal (Vachudova 2005, p. 259).  
 
Whilst the general view is that enlargement has been a success story, enthusiasm over 
further expansions has long been fading. There are some obvious obstacles for future 
enlargements, as the EU has currently exhausted the legal basis for further expansions 
and institutional reforms are needed before taking on new members.  But after the 
accession of ten new countries in 2004, the ‘absorption capacity’ of the EU has 
repeatedly been called into question by policy-makers across Europe.  For some, the 
Union would be wise not to commit to further enlargements because incorporating 
poorer and politically unstable countries will end up paralysing EU institutions, 
undermine the labour market and welfare systems in the member states and further 
expose the EU to organized crime and illegal immigration115.  On its part, the European 
Commission has continued to defend its enlargement policy. Olli Rehn made it clear to 
the member states that enlargement should not be made “the scapegoat for our domestic 
policy failures”, because this policy “has been a success story” and “the EU should have 
all the reasons to be proud of it”116. 
 
                                                
115  See ‘The shock of the new: will eastward enlargement invigorate the European Union – or leave it 
paralysed’, Financial Times, 24 April 2005; ‘Unpromising east: why EU expansion could have 
reached its high-water mark’, Financial Time, 16 May 2006.  
116  Quoted in ‘Fighting EU’s enlargement fatigue’,  International Herald Tribune, 20 June 2006. 
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The EU might well be suffering from an ‘enlargement fatigue’117- perhaps 
unsurprisingly given the scale of its last enlargement.  But as Emerson et al. (2006, p.1) 
argued, “It might be a passing mood.  Given some period of rest, and with experience of 
the recent enlargements and some institutional changes, the European body politic might 
be refreshed and no longer fatigued”.  In the meantime, preparing new countries for 
membership is still very much ‘business as usual’ in Brussels.   
 
There are currently eight countries queuing for EU membership, albeit in an unspecified 
timeframe.  Negotiations are underway with Turkey and Croatia while the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) was granted candidate status in 2005.  The 
rest of the Western Balkans - Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia 
and the newly independent Kosovo - are all ‘potential candidates’ according to the EU’s 
jargon, because the Union has made a promise to all of them that one day it will enlarge 
to the region118.  In the meantime, Brussels has been engaged in helping these countries 
in their transition, by channeling financial aid and expertise to support democratic and 
economic reforms within the framework of the Stabilization and Association 
Agreements (SAA).Beyond the EU’s eastern borders, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia 
are also lobbying for some form of official EU status, although EU leaders have so far 
been careful not to encourage their membership aspirations.   
 
                                                
117 See, ‘A case of enlargement fatigue’, The Economist, 13 May 2006; ‘EU suffers enlargement fatigue 
after rapid spurt of growth’, Financial Times, 4 October 2004.  
118 Although they did not specify a timeframe, at the Feira European Council in 2000 EU leaders stated 
that the EU’s policy objective for the Western Balkans was full EU membership (European Council, 
2000). This commitment was further reiterated by the Thessaloniki European Council in October 
2003(See European Council, 2003). 
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At the time of writing the EU’s success record in these regions is mixed. The EU has 
offered some significant carrots to spur reforms, making it easier for the citizens in the 
Western Balkans to travel to Europe119.  It has also increased financial and political 
resources to help these countries bring discipline to their economies and political 
systems120.  However, so far the Western Balkans and Turkey have proven to be a much 
less favourable environment for democratic and economic transition, with the EU often 
struggling to convince domestic politicians that the benefits of EU membership are 
greater than the immediate costs they face in satisfying its burdensome entry conditions. 
Anchoring fragile neighbours via the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) has yet to 
produce the desired results, while political developments in some of these countries 
continue to show how fragile democratic transition is in states confined to the EU’s 
backyard.   
 
It is beyond the scope of this study to assess whether the EU will be able to fully 
replicate its powerful influence in these regions, or whether chronic economic 
backwardness, fragile state institutions, statehood issues, ethnic acrimonies and feeble 
civil societies will constrain the EU’s reform agenda in these regions.  As regards the 
Western Balkans in particular several studies have already pointed out how integrating 
these conflict-prone countries will pose additional challenges for EU policy-makers, 
both in managing the multi-speed transition of the region and in addressing regional 
                                                
119  Visa facilitation and readmission agreements have been concluded in 2007 with all the Western 
Balkan countries, reducing the costs of short-term entry visa (from €60 to €35) and introducing 
simplified procedures for certain categories of citizens (ex. Businessmen, students and journalists).  
For an analysis of the content of these agreements see Trauner and Kruse (2008).   
120 A total of €7.58 billion have been allocated by the EU to support economic and political reforms in 
Turkey and the countries of Western Balkans for the period 2007-2011. See Commission of the 
European Communities (2007). 
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insecurity (see Anastasakis, 2005; Kostovicova, 2008; Kostovicova and Bojicic-
Dzelilovic, 2006; Lehne, 2004; Wittkowski, 2000).  There are however some important 
lessons for policy-makers and academic alike that can be drawn from the 2004/2007 
enlargement in general and from the experience of the accession of Romania in 
particular.  
 
Perhaps the most important lesson is that the credibility of the EU membership offer is 
crucial for the success of the EU's leverage.  The remarkable changes that took place in 
Romania in the last two decades provide ample evidence of how powerful the EU can 
be in provoking state reforms if a credible offer of membership is at stake, even when 
subscribing to the EU’s conditions bears huge costs for the incumbent politicians and 
undermines their power basis.  Close observers of the country's post-communist politics 
have long claimed that Romania was never a case for rapid economic and democratic 
transition.  For most of the 1990s it struggled to overcome the legacy of 
underdevelopment inherited from Ceauşescu’s tyranny, and its post-communist political 
elite showed aversion to democracy and sound economic governance.   Yet, most would 
readily agree that the benefits of EU membership, and the costs of exclusion from 
mainstream western institutions, were just too big for politicians to ignore.  As the 
empirical analysis presented in this thesis has also highlighted, the benefits of 
integration coupled with the severity of the accession process, does set the parameters 
of domestic politics, compelling domestic political elites to introduce EU-compatible 
reforms. 
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This should be a sobering lesson for EU decision-makers as they engage with the 
countries in South East Europe, because when the commitment to enlarge weakens, so 
also does the opportunity of the EU to exercise its transformative power.  As Tim 
Haughton (2007, p. 244) pointed out: “Officials from the EU and the member states 
should be well advised to bear in mind the importance of the credibility of the Union’s 
willingness to absorb new members, as pessimism about prospects for admission 
decreases the power of incentives”.   By the same token, the EU’s attempts to export its 
policies through the ENP might not be sufficiently strong enough in its incentives to 
promote reforms and spread prosperity in the EU’s southern and eastern neighbours.  
Without a credible prospect of membership, the offer of ‘everything except institutions’ 
might not turn out to be the trump card that the EU has been looking for (Scarpitta, 
2006).  
 
Another important lesson to be drawn from the enlargement to CEE, and especially 
from the experience of accession of Romania and Bulgaria, regards the dynamic nature 
of EU conditionality (Phinnemore, 2006b, pp. 10-11). The conditions for accession laid 
down by the EU for the 5th enlargement were already stricter than the requirements put 
before the applicant states from previous enlargements, with the explicit introduction of 
the democratic and economic criteria for accession (Grabbe, 2006).  As I have pointed 
out in this thesis, the vagueness of the accession criteria as originally outlined by the 
Copenhagen European Council, together with the specificity of the accession acquis, 
has given the EU ample room for certifying compliance and demanding more reforms. 
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This allowed to differentiate between the candidates and flexibility in evaluating 
progress (or lack of it), and substantially increased the power of EU institutions to shape 
policy and institutional outcomes in aspiring members (Maniokas, 2005, pp. 34-39). 
Moreover, the EU has also seen its leverage growing from its experience in CEE, and 
with Romania and Bulgaria it adopted a tougher and much more interventionist 
approach to push reforms. With both countries the EU also proved highly imaginative in 
devising new leverage mechanisms and in reinventing membership conditionality to 
accelerate compliance (Phinnemore, 2007).  
 
These considerations carry significant implications for current and future aspiring 
members.  The first implication is that enlargement has become a much less predictable 
and more complicated business. Not only has the EU increased differentiation between 
aspiring members, but the conditions for accession have been tightened, with Brussels 
far more willing to address lack of progress with the threat of significant sanctions.  This 
was the case with Croatia in 2005, when the Commission made the opening of the 
accession negotiations conditional to the full cooperation with the International War 
Crimes Tribunal in The Hague. With Serbia, the EU went as far as suspending talks on 
the SAA because of the country’s failure to hand over war criminals. 
 
The second implication is that the EU has made it harder for candidates to proceed 
upwards on the negotiating ladder.  It will no longer be sufficient for a candidate state to 
declare its commitment to reforms – as was common practice during the negotiation 
process of the CEE candidates - but ‘benchmarks’ will have to be met before opening, 
and closing, new negotiating chapters.  
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As David Phinnemore (2006b, p. 17) pointed out, “whereas with the 2004 enlargement 
the emphasis was on the adoption of the acquis, albeit with evidence of implementation, 
there has since been greater concentration on the need to prove actual implementation 
and compliance”.  
 
The enlargement to Romania and Bulgaria has also set an important precedent with 
regards to safeguarding measures. The member states have already signaled that the 
accession negotiations are “an open-ended process” and its outcome “cannot be 
guaranteed beforehand” (European Council, 2004, p.7).  Turkey’s accession is the 
biggest concern in some EU capitals, for its size, geographical location, slow economic 
development and cultural differences.  But this might well apply to all the candidates as 
they embark on their road to membership.   
 
Finally, the experience of Romania bears important lessons for the current candidates 
and aspiring EU members with regards to the challenges in preparing for membership 
and the conditions for successful integration.  The most important of these lessons is 
that joining the EU involves more than just a large-scale transposition of EU laws into 
national law, but it entails a profound transformation of the state, and its policies.  Key 
to this is the presence of an independent and accountable justice system and an efficient 
public administration.  A well-functioning and independent judicial system is an 
indispensable pillar in any democratic society and an essential condition for helping to 
fight corruption and organised crime.  The judiciary also plays a crucial role regarding 
the implementation and enforcement of EU rules, hence the efficacy of EU legislation at 
national level.   
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A modern, efficient, accountable and professional administration is also indispensable 
for the management of the accession process, since civil servants are called upon to 
devise national policies, implement EU regulations and manage EU funds.  As 
mentioned in chapter 6, a weak administrative capacity can affect the preparations for 
accession in significant ways, especially when the transposition of EU rules involves 
legally complex areas such as the JHA acquis.  Moreover, an efficient legal system and 
public administration foster confidence in foreign investors, and are crucial for the 
modernisation and sound economic development of a candidate state.   
 
The reform of the justice system has now predominately entered the EU’s political 
agenda in the context of future enlargement.  A new negotiating chapter – Chapter 23 – 
has been created, also covering anti-corruption policies and the protection of 
fundamental rights. Thus, political conditionality has been ‘institutionalised’ in the 
process of EU accession.  In the light of Romania’s experience, this is a positive 
development, as it will give the EU much more room for intervening in and directing 
reforms, and promoting the introduction of sound institutional and policy changes. The 
EU has also introduced a tougher monitoring of the administrative capacity to 
implement the acquis, and the new candidates will have to prove they have in place the 
adequate resources (such as qualified personnel, administrative procedures and 
institutional arrangements) before they can open or close a negotiating chapter.   
 
For some aspiring members the toughening of EU conditionality might raise questions 
of double standards since it will pose additional burdens that may delay the accession 
process. 
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But as the experience of Romania has shown, the absence of state structures in place to 
manage EU integration is ultimately counterproductive.  As I have argued throughout 
this thesis, Romania struggled to bring its policies in line with the EU’s entry 
requirements in the field of JHA primarily because much needed reforms were delayed, 
and did not come into being until very late in the accession process.  Yet Romania paid 
a hefty price for paying lip service to the EU’s demands.  Simulating reforms might 
have been less costly than sound democratic and economic governance, but over the 
long term it frustrated relations with EU officials and relegated Romania to a laggard 
status in the process of EU integration. 
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Appendix  
 
List of Interviews 
Unless otherwise stated, the title or affiliation listed was accurate at the time of the 
interview.   
 
 
Joanna APAP, Administrator, European Parliament “Internal Policies of the Union”, 
Brussels, 24 April 2006. 
 
Mircea-Ion BACALU, Deputy Director-General, General Directorate on European 
Integration and International Relations, Ministry of Interior and Administration, 
Bucharest, 11 November 2006.  
 
Claudia BIG, JHA Negotiating Expert, Ministry of European Integration, Bucharest, 26 
October 2006.  
 
Marius BIZĂU, PHARE Implementation Officer, Directorate for European Integration, 
International Cooperation and Programs, Border Police General Inspectorate, Bucharest, 
15 December 2006. 
 
Mihaela BLAJAN, Director EU Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bucharest, 4 
December 2006. 
 
Valericâ BOJIAN, First Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bucharest, 4 December 
2006. 
 
Barbara BRANDTNER, Member of Cabinet of Commissioner Neelie Kroes, European 
Commission, Brussels, 5 May 2006.  
 
Bogdan BUDEANU, Head of Unit - Fight Against Trafficking in Human Beings, 
Border Police General Inspectorate, Bucharest, 11 December 2006. 
 
Roxana BURNEU, Counsellor on EU Affairs, General Directorate on European 
Integration and International Relations, Ministry of Interior and Administration, 
Bucharest, 1 November 2006.  
 
Ionut CODESCU, Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice, Bucharest, 10 November 
2006.  
 
Nusa COMAN, Head of the Schengen Unit, General Directorate on European 
Integration and International Relations, Ministry of Interior and Administration, 
Bucharest, 1 November 2006.  
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Titus CORLĂŢEAN, Vice President of PSD and personal advisor to former Prime 
Minister Adrian Năstase (2001-2003), Bucharest, 21 November 2006.  
 
Viorica COSTINIU, Judge at Bucharest’s Court of Appeal and President of the 
Association of Magistrates, Bucharest, 27 November 2006. 
 
Madeleine CROHN, Country Director ABA/CEELI, Bucharest, 28 November 2006. 
 
Sarah CULLUM, First Secretary, British Embassy, Bucharest, 17 October 2006. 
  
Alexandru CUMPĂNAŞU, Executive Director, AID-Romania, 22 November 2006. 
 
Aurel CIOBANU-DOROEA, former Chief Negotiator to the EU (1999-2000), Brussels, 
20 June 2006. 
‡ 
Christopher DASHWOOD, Desk-Officer for Romania on JHA issues, DG Enlargement, 
European Commission, Brussels, 17 May 2006. 
 
Cristian DAVID, Minister Delegate in charge of the control of the implementation of 
international financed programs and enforcement of the acquis communautaire (2004-
2007), Bucharest, 21 November 2006.  
 
Cristian DIACONESCU, Vice President of PSD and former Minister of Justice (March-
December 2004), Bucharest, 13 October 2006.  
 
Radu DOBRE, Counsellor, Mission of Romania to the European Union, Brussels, 19 
April 2006.  
 
Jean-Charles ELLERMANN-KINGOMBE, Member of Cabinet of Commissioner 
Fischer Boel, Brussels, 27 April 2006. 
 
Lorenzo FANARA, Enlargement Counsellor, Permanent Representation of Italy to the 
European Union, Brussels, 21 April 2006. 
 
Steve FOSTER, Pre-accession Advisor, Bucharest, 9 November 2006. 
 
Anabela GAGO-FILORI, Member of Cabinet of Commissioner László Kovács and 
former Member of Cabinet of Commissioner Antonio Vitorino (1999-2004), European 
Commission, Brussels, 3 May 2006.  
  
Iulian GÎLCĂ, Judge and President of the Superior Council of Magistracy, Bucharest, 1 
November 2006.  
 
Heather GRABBE, Member of Cabinet of Commissioner Olli Rehn, European 
Commission, Brussels, 3 March 2006.  
 
Enrico GRILLO-PASQUARELLI, former Head of Unit - Romania Section, DG 
Enlargement, European Commission, Brussels,  3 May 2006.  
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Mircea GROSARU, Member of Parliament and Member of the Judicial Committee, 
Chamber of Deputies, Bucharest, 28 November 2006. 
 
Cozmin GUŞA, President of Party of National Initiative (PIN) and former Secretary 
General of PSD (2000-2003), Bucharest, 9 October 2006.  
 
Kristian HEDBERG, Member of Cabinet of Commissioner Olli Rehn, European 
Commission, Brussels, 19 April 2006.  
 
Marius HIRŢE, Deputy Head of Mission, Mission of Romania to the European Union, 
Brussels, 5 April 2006. 
 
Nicolae IDU, Director of the European Institute of Romania, Bucharest,  11 October 
2006.  
 
Dalila IONESCU, Coordinator for Youth Projects, Romanian Forum for Refugees and 
Migrants (ARCA), Bucharest, 6 December 2006. 
 
Karolina KOTTOVA, Member of Cabinet of Commissioner Franco Frattini, European 
Commission, Brussels, 10 April 2006.  
 
Julia LEFERMAN, Advisor to the President of the Chamber of Deputies, Parliament of 
Romania, Bucharest, 6 December 2006. 
 
Richard LUCKING, Pre-Accession Advisor, Bucharest, 27 November 2006. 
 
Dan LUPASCU, President of the Court of Appeal of Bucharest and former President of 
the Superior Council of Magistracy (2004-2005),  Bucharest, 10 November 2006. 
 
Monica MACOVEI, Minister of Justice (2004-2007), Bucharest, 25 November 2006.  
 
Radu MAGDIN, former Desk Officer for the Western Balkans (2004-2006), Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Bucharest, 1 December 2006. 
Raduta MATACHE, Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of Romania in the UK, 
London, 13 April 2006. 
 
Gautier MIGNOT, Enlargement Counsellor, Permanent Representation of the Republic 
of France to the European Union, Brussels, 21 April 2006. 
 
Antonio MISSIROLI, Senior Research Fellow, European Policy Centre, Brussels, 2 
March 2006. 
 
Adrian NĂSTASE, Member of Parliament and former Prime Minister of Romania 
(2000-2004), Bucharest, 18 October 2006.  
 
Emma NICHOLSON DE WINTERBOURNE, MEP and Rapporteaur for Romania to 
the European Parliament Committee of Foreign Affairs (1999-2004), Brussels, 21 June 
2006. 
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Dan NICHITA, Human Resources Expert, Directorate for Europe Integration, Border 
Police General Inspectorate, Bucharest, 15 December 2006. 
 
Gergana NOUTCHEVA, Research Fellow, Centre for European Policy Studies, 
Brussels, 6 April 2006. 
 
Leonard ORBAN, Chief Negotiation with the EU, Bucharest, 11 October 2006.  
 
Ioan Mircea PAŞCU, Vice-President of PSD and former Minister of National Defence 
(2000-2004), Brussels, 19 April 2006. 
 
Iwona PIORKO, Desk Officer “Asylum and Immigration”, DG JLS, European 
Commission, Brussels, 21 April 2006. 
 
Vasile PUŞCAŞ, former Chief Negotiation with the EU (2000-2004), Bucharest, 17 
October 2006. 
  
Hildegard PUWAK, former Minister of European Integration (2000-2003), Bucharest, 
27 October 2006.  
 
Martijn QUINN, former Desk-Officer Romania, DG Enlargement, European 
Commission, Brussels, 20 April 2006.  
 
Petre ROMAN, former Prime Minister (1989-1991) and Foreign Affairs Minister 
(1999-2000), Bucharest, 27 November 2006. 
 
Ioan RUS, former Minister of Interior and Administration (2000-2004), Cluj-Napoca, 
31 October 2006.  
 
Marian SÂNTION, Director General of the General Anti-Corruption Directorate 
(DGA), Ministry of Interior and Administration, Bucharest, 22 November 2006.  
 
Adrian SEVERIN, former Minister of Foreign Affairs (1996-1997), Brussels, 11 May 
2006. 
 
Onno SIMMONS, Deputy Head of the European Commission Delegation in Romania, 
European Commission, Bucharest,  29 September 2006. 
 
Natalia SOLTAN, Counsellor, Mission of Moldova to the European Union, Brussels, 21 
April 2006. 
 
Valerian STAN, Political Analyst and Advisor of the Institute of Public Policy, 
Bucharest,  18 October 2006. 
  
Arin Octav STANESCU, Lawyer and President of the National Association of 
Insolvency Practitioners, Bucharest, 22 November 2006. 
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Mihaela Rodica STĂNOIU, former Minister of Justice 2000-2004, Bucharest, 24 
October 2006.  
 
Sorin STERIE, JHA Counsellor, Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, Brussels, 20 
April 2006. 
 
Christof STOCK, Desk-Officer - Bulgaria on JHA issues, DG Enlargement, European 
Commission, Brussels, 8 May 2006. 
 
Valeriu STOICA, Former Minister of Justice (1996-2000), Bucharest, 7 December 
2006. 
 
Simona Maya TEODOROIU, former Secretary of State (2000-2004), Ministry of 
Justice, Bucharest, 26 October 2006.  
 
Alin TEODORESCU, Minister Chancellor (2003-2004), Bucharest, 26 October 2006.  
 
Gelu TRANDAFIR, Journalist, Bucharest, 16 October 2006.  
 
Ioan-Dragos TUDORACHE, Justice and Anti-Corruption Team Officer, European 
Commission Delegation in Romania, Bucharest,  8 December 2006. 
 
Marin TURICĂ, Head of Unit - Fight against Cross-Border Organized Crime, Border 
Police General Inspectorate, Bucharest, 11 December 2006.  
 
Carmen TURTUREA, Counsellor, Embassy of Romania in the UK, London, 13 April 
2006. 
 
Iulia VAIDA, Journalist, Bucharest, 28 November 2006.   
 
Koen VAN DE CASTEELE, Desk Officer - Romania, DG Competition, European 
Commission, Brussels, 3 May 2006.  
 
Geoffrey VAN OLDEN, MEP and Rapporteaur for Bulgaria to the European 
Parliament, Brussels, 9 May 2006.  
 
Rupert VINING, Council of Europe’s expert and Presidential Advisor to Traian 
Băsescu, Bucharest, 29 October 2006.  
 
Renate WEBER, former Presidential Advisor to Traian Băsescu (2004-2005) and 
President of the Open Society Foundation, Bucharest,  16 October 2006.  
 
Jan Marinus WIERSMA, MEP and Member of the Foreign Affairs Committee and the 
Delegation to the EU-Romania Joint Parliamentary Committee, European Parliament, 
Brussels,  4 May 2006.  
 
Sabine ZWAENEPOEL, Desk-Officer Romania and Bulgaria, DG JLS, European 
Commission, Brussels, 6 April 2006.  
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